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Due to the advent of globalisation in the past two decades, foreign direct investment 
became an essential activity around the world. The motivation for FDI activities could 
be identified as the following: resource seeking, market seeking, knowledge seeking, 
and efficiency seeking. FDI undertaken for these different motivations could influence 
trade, technology, economy, labour division, and natural resources in both the home 
and the host country. This thesis is a macroeconomic study investigating the causality 
of foreign direct investment, international trade, local R&D activities, and economic 
growth. The research is based on 30 OECD countries from 1981 to 2015, which uses 
data collected from official annual time series data. It includes OECD Statistics, 
UNCTAD Statistics and the Global Innovation Index. This thesis makes use of a 
variety of econometric methods to analyse empirical study, comprising of the VAR 
model and pooling data analysis methods. To interpreting the causality in each 
country, six country profile factors added to the analysis of whether different country 
profile factors would alter the causality. The country profile factors include FDI 
regulatory restriction, institutions, market sophistication, product market regulation, 
knowledge input, and knowledge and technology output. 
 
The major findings were the patterns in each relationship based on the ranking level 
of the country profile factors of each country. According to the regression result, a 
bi-direction continually exists if the country either has a pure high-ranking level of all 
the country profile factors or if they have a pure low ranking level thereof. Otherwise, 
in the case of a country with a mixed level of country profile factors, a single 
direction flows to other variables from FDI (such as economic growth, R&D, and 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivations 
Since the inception of the liberalisation of foreign investment regulation, the 
relationship between international equity markets and intermedia goods between 
countries improved, which reflected globalisation. Upon the conclusion of World War 
II in 1945, a significant change prompted improved relations between trade and 
investment. Countries began to use their abundant resources, such as natural resources, 
human resources, transport resources, and market resources to attract investment (or 
conduct investment) from (or into) other countries. Developing countries, in particular, 
have a more positive attitude towards welcoming inward investment from developed 
countries, thereby introducing potential beneficial impacts on their domestic economy. 
In the 1980s, another outcome of globalisation was the international labour division, 
which was carried out in different countries and promoted tertiary production. 
Therefore globalisation was associated with growth in trade and foreign investment. 
Subsequently, it stimulates the movement of labour in both short-term (such as 
managers’ movement) and long-term (such as economic migration). 
 
The motivation of globalisation in foreign direct investment is classified into three 
categories: resource seeking, market seeking, and efficiency seeking. More recently, 
resource-seeking was divided into seeking natural resources such as agriculture 
product, mineral, crude and seeking of knowledge, for example, the latest technology 
and scientists of R&D. (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). Market-seeking refers to 
established subsidiary plants in foreign countries to serve the local overseas market. 
Thus, in early stages, the market seeking resource of a firm employs their essential 
skills with lower versions into the host country, and the market seeking subsidiary 
carries out R&D of their own, which could potentially improve the home country 
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product’s competition in the foreign country. Resource-seeking FDI based on natural 
resources associated with MNEs in foods, mineral, human capital, and the 
resource-based industries. In the 1980s, it was increasingly recognise that foreign 
direct investment could also be a part of knowledge generated in the foreign market. 
Therefore, knowledge seeking has been separated from resource seeking. 
 
Knowledge seeking FDI entails that the company may separate their headquarters and 
R&D activities. For example, the headquarters may be in one market, but they serve 
knowledge generated from another market. Moreover, efficiency-seeking FDI was 
associated with the production of multiple component goods. For instance, in the 
automobile industry, the elements may be present from different countries, since the 
firm would prefer to maximise efficiency in different stages and the production of 
these stages could be located in different countries. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: 
 Section 1.2 will fill the gap of the current research  
 Section 1.3 will present research questions of the thesis  
 Section 1.4 will discuss the value added in this thesis 
 Section 1.5 will indicate the structure of the remaining chapters of the 
thesis 
1.2 Gap of Recent Research 
The trend of international trade and foreign direct investment increased during 
globalisation, about the official statistics on national economies. In particular, a rising 
number of countries created time series data for both flow and stock of FDI, which 
could compared to a cross-country dataset. Since the 1980s, a large number of 




For example, (See Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2), the total FDI inward flow was 1.7 
trillion US dollars by the end of 2016; especially with regards to the OECD, the total 
inward FDI flows arrived at 1.1 trillion US dollars, occupying 64% of the world. 
Furthermore, the outward FDI flows, in total OECD, received over $1 million and 
occupied 73% of the total world FDI outward flows. The inward and outward position 
of FDI occupied 73% and 77% of the total world FDI position respectively. According 
to the Figures, a narrow gap exists between total world FDI flows and total OECD 
FDI flows. Notably, the amount of FDI flows in the world, and the OECD overlapped 
from 1981 to 1991. All of these phenomena display that the OECD countries have 
made a significant contribution to the total volume of FDI flows in the world. 
 
Figure 1. 1 FDI Inward Flows in the World and OECD, 1981-2015 
 
 






Figure 1. 2 FDI Outward Flows in the World and OECD, 1981-2015 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD, Statistics, 2016 
 
However, the FDI has increasingly been used in the case study, for instance, 
individual companies, individual industries or individual country. Therefore, the 
aggregate statistics of FDI would not examine enough, based on the expectations of 
international business scholars. Most of the recent empirical studies use panel data 
and grouping of the countries for a general result of the relationship between FDI and 
international trade, which may omit the characteristics of different countries. The FDI 
flow data is a time series data implying that its modifications rely on the changes in 
time. Thus, the bias in time series data should be considered. Some scholars argue that 
using panel data could potentially omit the time trend bias in the econometric test. 
 
However, it also depends on the purpose of the research. This means that if the 
researchers generally wanted to know about the inter-relations between FDI and trade, 
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they could use panel data. On the contrary, the time series data is a better choice for 
understanding the changing impact of FDI flows on trade and economic growth. 
Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to investigate some essential hypotheses driven 
from international business literature and to examine several causalities from 
aggregate statistic data. In particular, the thesis investigates the behaviour of 
international trade and foreign direct investment, alongside examining whether the 
country characteristics can attract resource seeking, market seeking, knowledge 
seeking, and efficiency seeking FDI in separate proportions. 
1.3 Statement of Research Questions 
Three research questions are addressig in this thesis. Figure 1.3 displays four 
relationships: foreign direct investment, trade, economic growth and R&D. Dash lines 
indicate the causalities that will measured in the thesis. The statements of three 
research questions are displayed below with the explanation: 
 







1) What is the relationship between foreign direct investment and 
economic growth? 
Regarding international business, the causality of foreign direct investment and 
economic growth is a standing issue. Since market seeking is one of the primary 
motivations for MNEs to conduct investment in foreign countries, it could promote 
significant growth in the host economy. At the same time, several new jobs exist 
between the host and home countries, which could transfer a good amount of skilled 
foreign investors into the labour force. Moreover, when foreign products introduced 
into the host country market, they will compete with the local products. As a result, it 
recommended that the local producers update their technology of goods to keep their 
ownership advantages. If not, the local consumers could benefit from cheap or higher 
quality goods through a subsidiary. 
 
Another reason behind observing the relationship between FDI and economic growth 
is that no direct way could identify this causality even in the GDP equation. Although 
both the investment and the net export influence economic growth of a country, the 
investment factor in the GDP equation does not solely include FDI, but also additional 
portfolio investment into the investment factors. Therefore, the direct relationship 
between FDI and economic growth was not fully observed. This research question 
looks at how FDI flows out of this equation and merges with the international trade, 
along with finding out how they work together to impact economic growth in one 








2) What is the relationship between foreign direct investment and local 
R&D activity? 
The main focus of this research question measures whether R&D is a crucial aspect of 
the influence on FDI flows in a country. Hymer (1976) was one of the first scholars to 
identify an active link between foreign direct investment and R&D intensity. He 
argues that the knowledge in a firm could be a source of monopolistic advantages, 
which could generate huge profits through foreign direct investment overseas. This 
suggestion gives a clear hypothesis: that of a country having developed technology or 
a powerful R&D department, which would mean that they could attract more foreign 
investment into their country. This is because they have advantages compared to other 
countries. On the contrary, a country with developed technology, like the United 
States, could also invest in other countries. Such countries generally have a minor 
advantage in innovation, but they may have abundant natural resources or human 
capital resources. As a result, a mutual partner relationship exists between the United 
States and other countries. Consequently, one direction of outward flow can 
potentially develop into bi-directional FDI flows between countries. This empirical 
study can find in Chapter 7 of this thesis, in addition to country profile analysis and 
regression result. 
 
3) What is the relationship between foreign direct investment and 
international trade? 
This research question observes whether this relationship is either displayed in 
‘complements’ or ‘substitute’ in the OECD country. This research question is a 
famous and unsolved issue in the international business sector. Scholars performed 
much pioneering work on this causality and used different quality and quantity 
methods to explain this relationship in either a micro or a macro manner. Nonetheless, 
this issue continued to have a hazy outcome in the previous studies. According to the 
early theories of international business, scholars persist in the substitutability in 
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international trade. Subsequently, the firms could export high technology either from 
the home country or by producing abroad to serve the market, which means they 
ignore the locations of third world countries. Thus, investment in the foreign market is 
an expensive investment to the home country. 
 
From a resource seeking view, some firms in rich countries might focus on seeking 
resources like raw materials, oil, and food, overseas. The purpose of this is to secure 
having enough resources to create products in future, which is known as a strategic 
reserve. Therefore, for instance, the foreign investor would transfer their facilities to 
the resource-rich country, depending on securing the future supply of strategies input 
on their domestic business. In this situation, international trade and foreign investment 
complemented each other because investment undertook the future trade. With the 
progress of globalisation, the distinguishing between pure substitution and pure 
complementarity has become more prominent. Therefore, the third question will focus 
on the pattern of FDI flows and trade, to identify whether complementarity and 
substitutability could co-exist in the relationship between two countries. This 
empirical study can find in Chapter 8 with the regression result and country profile 
analysis. 
1.4 Value Added in the Thesis 
This thesis has five main aspects of contribution with regards to recent empirical 
studies. Firstly, the thesis focuses on 30 (out of 35) OECD countries, in which 
previous studies only considered 11 countries. This provides a country by country 
with in-depth analysis. Therefore, different patterns of FDI could be identified in each 
country to get a more explicit investment pattern for other countries in further 
research. Secondly, an extended panel of 35 years (from 1981 to 2015) for each 
country (previous studies only cover 23 years or 30 years) used. Thus, in the thesis, 
we also measure whether the FDI flows of previous years influence the current FDI 
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flows. Compared to previous empirical studies, such as Turkcan, Duman, and Yetkiner 
(2008), Pain and Wakelin (1998), Barrell and Pain (1997), Luiz and De Mello (1999), 
and Pradhan, Arvin, Bahmani, and Bennett (2017), the thesis uses more recent data 
along with the analysis of the interplay between FDI (inward and outward flow), trade, 
economic growth, and technology for every single country. 
 
The thesis also makes use of more recent data, which analyses the pattern of FDI. 
This could treat as a guideline for future research. For instance, latest data of three 
decades could perform similar research compared with the recent result, thereby being 
able to discover the changes in FDI patterns in 30 years. 
 
This thesis points out that country profile is one of the significant factors to determine 
the pattern of FDI flows. Therefore, the third contribution of the thesis is the creation 
of country profiles. Six factors considered in the thesis to help interpret the regression 
result of each country, including institution, market sophistication, product market 
regulation, knowledge input, and knowledge and technology output. Based on these 
factors, the 30 OECD countries could classified into four categories: high, upper 
average, lower average, and low. This classification could help policymakers or 
investors understand the investment environment of these countries. 
 
At the same time, investors could also understand the status of FDI patterns in these 
countries. For example, the relationship between FDI and economic growth and the 
regression result suggests that the country with a low profile (like Mexico), tends to 
attract more FDI inward flows to encourage economic growth. In this case, foreign 
investors may prefer to engage in FDI because of the potential market in such 
countries. However, countries with a low country profile lack a significant 
relationship between FDI inward flows and economic growth, like Greece and Poland. 
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Another example is with regards to a country with a high-profile , where most may 
not attract more inbound foreign direct investment when their economy develops. 
 
The forth contribution is at the macro-level approach adopted in the thesis. According 
to Dunning’s (2008) view, three groups of scholars put forward FDI theories from 
different perspectives. The first group of scholars, Kojima (1978), and Markusen 
(1985), analyse the macro-level of FDI patterns and focused on location variables. 
The second group of scholars were more focused at the industry or the sector level, 
with more interest in the behaviour of individual business. For example, Buckley and 
Casson (1976) put forward the internalisation theory. The third group of scholars 
focus further on the monopolistic advantage. For example, Hymer (1960) was one of 
the first scholars to argue that the knowledge of a firm could be treated as a 
monopolistic advantage towards other firms. The thesis adapts a micro-level theory to 
explain differences at the country level. For instance, when a country has the latest 
technology, it attracts more foreign investment into their country. Therefore, this 
thesis considers the characteristic of an individual country and tries to explain why 
country engages in FDI. 
 
The final contribution of the thesis is that the results may help develop the pattern of 
FDI and international trade. Dunning (2002) revisited the investment development 
path (IDP), and discussed it to analyse the relationship between FDI. He stressed that 
economic growth should be compared between two aspects: microeconomic (firms- 
and sector-level) and macroeconomic (country-level). The empirical studies in this 
thesis are on the macro–level, with country profile having proved a J-curve of 
investment development in a country at a certain level. 
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1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
The structure of the whole thesis sets up with this chapter being a part of the 
introduction section. This is followed by chapter 2 and chapter 3 discussing the 
theoretical and empirical background of the thesis. Data description and analysis are 
discussed in chapter 4. The methodology and econometric analysis are a part of 
chapter 5. Chapter 6, 7 and 8 include three empirical studies and the discussion of the 
























Chapter 2 Theoretical Background 
2.1 Introduction 
In the 1960s, a watershed was present in the foreign direct investment (FDI) theory 
when Hymer put forward a new micro-level theory of the multinational enterprise 
(MNE). This watershed makes a distinction between the macro-level theory of FDI 
(pre-1960) and micro-level theory of FDI (Hymer’s theory). Prior to 1960, the 
macro-level theory of foreign direct investment suggested that the industries in 
capital-intensive countries will invest in capital-poor countries, which means 
multinational enterprise constantly make capital transactions from the abundant 
capital country (such as developed countries) to the low capital country (such as 
developing countries). Hymer (1960) criticised macro-level theory for being too 
general not considering the details of when multinational enterprises carry on the 
foreign direct investment. Thus, Hymer pays more attention to the firm-specific rather 
than country-specific. Furthermore, in 1958, Dunning analysed Anglo-American 
investment partnership and found that the macro-level investment theory cannot 
explain the motivation of investment at firm level. 
 
Therefore, this chapter will discuss the details of FDI theory from pre-1960s until the 
late 20
th
 century in the following sections:  
 Section 2.2 focuses on Dunning’ work about the Anglo-American 
investment partnership  
 Section 2.3 discusses Hymer’s theory   
 Section 2.4 consists of the Eclectic Paradigm   
 Section 2.5 includes the Investment Development Path  
 Section 2.6 briefly introduces Vernon’s Life-cycle Model  
 Section 2.7 comprises of the conclusion  
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2.2 Anglo-American Investment Development 
In terms of the foreign direct investment theory, appreciation is due for the first 
fundamental study to Dunning’s work in 1958. In this work, Dunning visited 245 
U.S.-affiliated companies and got responses from 205 firms, including 306 
manufacturing units. The purpose of his study was to evaluate the contribution of 
American-controlled firms of the British economy in industrial development and 
economic welfare. 
 
In this study, Dunning mentioned that Anglo-American investment partnership had 
experienced four stages, including the formative years (from 1870 to 1914), 
consolidation and stead expansion (from 1919 to 1929), the U.S. firms’ influx into 
British market (since 1930), and the growth of American investment in 1940. The 
reason behind a strong link of partnership between Britain and America was due to 
having more ownership advantages compared to other countries in the same period.  
 
For example, Britain’s industrial manufacturing is part of the external trade and the 
BoP area. Figure 2.1 gives information about the foreign trade between the United 
States and the United Kingdom from 1950 to 1960. At the beginning of 1950s, the 
exports of the United States were $524.1 million, which almost tripled to $1,412.6 
million in 1960. Similarly, the imports from United Kingdom also tripled increasing 
by the end of 1960. These figures also proved that the United Kingdom had the 
closest economic ties with the United States. 
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Figure 2. 1 Foreign Trades between the United States and the United Kingdom, 
from 1950 to 1960 (USD, Millions) 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 
 
Therefore, the investment of the United States in Britain included the profitability of 
investment, maintenance export, comparative costs, and new knowledge passed back. 
For example, the FDI outflow of the United States in 1950 is $14,415 million and 
reached the peak in 1956, at around $26,038 million (See Figure 2.2). At the same 
time, the inward FDI in the United States also had a stable increase from $12,196 
million in 1950 to $23,303 million in 1960. These Figures indicate that the United 
States not only expanded the foreign market, but also attracted investment to develop 
its own economy. Dunning, in his research, also mentioned that some new knowledge 
was passed back to the United States. Especially in terms of a smaller manufacturing 
plant in the UK, the new processes and products could be tested with less capital 
expenditure than the requirement of their American subsidiaries. Therefore, the new 




Figure 2. 2 Outwards and Inwards FDI in the United States, 1950-1960 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 
 
Thus, in this empirical study, the importance of the ownership advantage is expressed, 
which could attract investment and acquire knowledge abroad to improve economic 
growth. For instance, the United Kingdom has good industrial locations and skilled 
workers that could attract inward investment flow from the United States. Since close 
economic ties exist around the world, the competition becomes more serious in 
comparison to previous decades. Therefore, the ownership advantage became more 
and more significant not only at the industry level, but also at the production, firm and 
country level. 
2.3 Hymer’s Theory 
According to the inadequacies of the macro-level theory of FDI, Hymer (1960), put 
forward a theory of MNEs, called the monopolistic advantage theory. Moreover, his 
supervisor, Kindleberger (1969), supplemented and developed this theory, which is 
also known as H-K Tradition theory. 
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Hymer believes that the reason behind multinational enterprises conducting foreign 
direct investment in the host country is due to incomplete markets. Hymer points out 
four factors that lead the market to possess dearth, including product market 
imperfection, production factor market imperfection, economies of scale, and 
government policies. Firstly, some facts may lead to the imperfections of the product 
market, such as: trademarks, commodity-specific, and the price-fixing cartel. 
Secondly, the difference in particular management skills of firms and technology 
being protected by the patent system may cause imperfection in the production factor 
market. Thirdly, it is hard to make economies of scale in imperfectly competitive 
markets. Therefore, economies of scale may easily lead to market imperfection. 
Finally, the government of one country constantly formulates some policies to protect 
domestic markets, such as tariffs, interest rates, and exchange rates. These four factors 
result in market imperfection. Thus, Hymer supports that monopolistic advantage can 
help multinational enterprises deal with market imperfect in the foreign countries. 
 
Hymer puts forth two major ideas in his monopolistic advantage theory. First, the 
firms seeking fora massive amount of sources to get a competitive advantage in the 
global market is the primary motivation that turns firms into MNEs. For example, 
different firms will continue operating in the same industry. Thus, when a firm 
possess competitive advantages of the product, it will naturally find the means to 
maximise this benefit. Therefore, international expansion is the best way for firms to 
keep their competitive benefits and obtain some returns. Secondly, the competitive 
structure may lead some industries to become more international. Therefore, the 
companies could get economies of scale advantage. Moreover, the multinational 
enterprise has a compensatory effect to offset the advantage of local enterprises and 




Hymer analysed the monopolistic benefit of the United States multinational enterprise 
in the 1960s, and summarised several points to prove that the United States has more 
competitive advantages to invest in foreign countries than others. Firstly, MNEs of the 
United States have horizontal and vertical integration advantages. The former 
advantage gives multinational enterprises the ability to control prices, and the 
following advantage helps MNEs externally obtain economies of scale. Secondly, 
multinational enterprises possess a market advantage in the United States, and they 
can obtain certain advantages, such as: patents, trademarks, and the skills of 
marketing. Thirdly, multinational enterprises of the United States have sufficient 
capital, advanced technology and global business strategy. Thus, this gives MNEs a 
competitive advantage in production and management skills.  
 
Fourthly, foreign direct investment in the United States focuses on developing 
investment in countries, which, because of these countries, has several cheap labours, 
abundant resources, and a broad market. Thus, MNEs in the developing countries can 
get labour, material resources and market advantages to reduce the marginal costs of 
investment. Finally, the government of the United States always formulates some 
restrictions (like a tariff, interest rate and exchange rate) to protect multinational 
enterprises from bringing profits of foreign countries. 
 
One of the pros of Hymer’s monopolistic advantage theory is to break international 
capital flows of the FDI theory (the macro-level theory). It also highlights intellectual 
property, and technological advantages indicate the essential role of multinational 
enterprises. Additionally, monopolistic advantage pioneered a new area of foreign 
direct investment research, making FDI an independent discipline. This theory 
explains that MNEs create horizontal integration advantage to maintain a monopoly 
advantage in the competitive market. Moreover, this theory also discusses that MNEs 
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make vertical integration advantage and transfer labour-intensive industries to the 
developing countries, thereby allowing the MNEs to maintain a monopoly status. 
 
On the contrary, Hymer’s monopolistic advantage theory also has some disadvantages. 
For example, this theory cannot explain the industries and geographic distribution of 
foreign direct investment flows. Consequently, this theory lacks the guidance for FDI 
in developing countries, because it focuses on FDI in the United States. Lastly, this 
theory cannot explain the increasing number of multinational enterprises in 
developing countries. Therefore, foreign direct investment also gained significance in 
these countries during the late 1960s. Moreover, this theory ignores the dynamic 
function in foreign direct investment (like time series and location factors). As a result, 
some scholars have explored pioneering theories of foreign direct investment after 
Hymer’s monopolistic advantage theory. 
 
It is clear that Hymer’s monopolistic advantage theory makes foreign direct 
investment a research objective in a new research field. This theory uses multinational 
enterprises in the United States as a case study to find four facts for demonstrating 
inadequacies at the macro-level theory. Moreover, Hymer supports two suggestions to 
complete the FDI theory including the fact that the firms will become MNEs due to 
the possession of competitive advantage sources. Therefore, the competitive structure 
may lead some industries to become more international for firms to get economies of 
scale advantage. Furthermore, Hymer’s theory has a disadvantage, which, due to his 
theory, focuses on the United States in the 1960s along with lack of guidance for the 
developing countries. Therefore, some scholars began to research FDI theories after 
Hymer’s theory most of whom put forward several useful theories and completed the 




In his dissertation, Hymer discussed the theory of direct investment and explained two 
types of imperfection: structural market failure and interest rate, which may lead the 
MNEs to conduct direct investment outside its national boundaries. In terms of the 
structural market imperfection, Hymer mentioned barriers, like asymmetric 
information, unstable exchange rate, and costs, between countries. (Hymer, 1960). 
These barriers could encourage firms to move their capital from a high cost country to 
a lower cost country. Hymer introduced the transaction costs to analyse the further 
mobility of barriers, the differential between borrower’s interest rate and lender’s 
interest rates. He believed that the size of transaction costs depends on the degree of 
development in a country. The high-developed capital market, and the transaction 
costs will generally be low, while being higher on the poorly developed markets. 
(Hymer, 1960). Subsequently, Buckley and Casson developed the internalisation 
theory based on structural market failure in 1976 (See Section 2.4.3). 
 
The second imperfection is the interest rate, which exists because often no transaction 
costs take place between two firms if the direct day-to-day finance is undertaken. 
However, according to direct investment as an international operation, the transaction 
costs will spread between borrowing and lending rates, which the entrepreneurs 
should consider. One of the most important missions for entrepreneurs is balancing 
the control and financing for international operation. If a country has low-interest 
rates, it may attract more foreign investors to enter the market for extra profits. 
 
The aforementioned two imperfections of the market explained capital movement and 
its influence on the decisions made by investors. Owning and controlling of 
subsidiaries is vital for entrepreneurs rather than resorting to licensing. Therefore, 
internalisation is one of the methods to reduce transaction costs and decrease the 
effect of market failure, and to maximise profit in the multinational enterprises. 
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2.4 Eclectic Paradigm Theory 
The Eclectic Paradigm Theory, based on the comprehensive theory, was 
developed by Dunning in 1977. This theory is a mix of three different theories: (O-L-I) 
of foreign direct investment and to explain how multinational enterprises make a 
business decision. 
2.4.1 Ownership Advantage 
‘O’ stands for ownership advantage, which addresses the question, ‘why do firms 
invest overseas?’ (Dunning, 1973). Dunning (1988) has identified three types of 
ownership-specific advantages: 
 
‘(i) Those that stem from the exclusively privileged possession of or access 
to particular income-generating assets; (ii) Those that are generally enjoyed 
by a branch plant compared with a de novo firm; (iii) Those that are a 
consequence of geographical diversification or multi-nationality per se.’ 
 
Dunning believes that if a multinational enterprise conducts FDI into other countries, 
they should have these ownership-specific advantages. However, it does not mean that 
the MNEs will undertake FDI with ownership advantages. It means that ownership 
advantage is a necessity, but not a sufficient condition. For example, if a multinational 
enterprise only has ownership advantage (without location and internalisation 
advantage), the best way for this MNE is the export of domestic production. There are 
two factors to help understand the ownership advantages in multinational enterprises: 
1) MNEs cannot exist in the perfect competition market. 
Firstly, assuming a perfect competition market, there are two countries (Country A 
and Country B). They use the same technology to produce the same product. Thus, 
they spend the same materials, set the same price to sell products, and gain the same 
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profit. Therefore, the supply equals demand in the industry equilibrium at point O1 in 
both Country A and Country B (See Figure 2.4). Then, we could say the firms in 
Country A are identical to those in Country B, and none of these firms has an 
ownership advantage at this stage. 
 
Now, assume there is something happened and make demand curve has an increase 
(shift to the right) in Country B. The demand curve will start progress 1, and the 
following result is the price has increased from P1 to P2. At this stage, because there is 
a supernormal profit in short-run, which will attract new firms to enter the market. 
Therefore, supply curve will also shift to the right and until making a new balance 
between supply and demand. (See progress 2). The point O2 is the new equilibrium in 
Country B at the original price. In long-run, the firms in Country A usually may not 
like to become new entrants and move into Country B. Because there is no 
supernormal profit and the subsidiaries in Country B cannot get profits. Moreover, if 
the firms in Country A want to enter into Country B, then they will face losses in the 
foreign market as they will incur costs of doing business abroad putting them at a 
disadvantage relative to domestic firms. Thus, we say that MNEs cannot exist in the 
perfect competition market. 
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Figure 2. 3 Movement Supply and Demand Curve in the Perfect Market 
 
 
2) MNEs would like to exist in the concentrated market. 
Assuming a specific country has a monopolistic market, a few but large companies 
with high profit will exist. This market has a high barrier to entry, according to 
less-friendly competition environment, which means it could essentially be immune to 
the newest firms entering the market. This is based on these monopolistic companies 
having ownership advantages compared to other weak or local companies. For 
example, some companies have unique technology, which could be copied and used 
during production.  Consequently, they have spent a lot of money on technology 
research or R&D research, but can freely use these technologies for a new product. 
 
Moreover, the company could even attract more investment or conduct investment 
into other companies abroad. If a company has high technology, it will help explore 
the new market in the foreign country. Therefore, the company has substantial 
competitive factors in crashing the local companies, which could also promote the 
company as a multinational enterprise. Following are more details of how R&D 
works in the product life-cycle, discussed in section 2.5 (Vernon’s Theory in 1966). 
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2.4.2 Location Advantage 
‘L’ in this theory indicates location advantage, which explains the question, ‘where do 
firms locate their foreign operation?’ (Dunning, 1973). Dunning points out that the 
reason for the location choice may be promoted by market failure, similar to 
government intervention of the imposition of trade barriers and the transaction of 
particular goods or services. Therefore, if the host country has several advantages in 
the level of economic development, market scale, labour force, infrastructure and 
resource endowment than the countries of origin, then the host country has great 
possibility of receiving much more FDI. In 1978, Kojima put forward the theory of 
comparative advantage to explain behaviours and rules of foreign direct investment 
and the effect on international trade. Kojima used two cases (Japanese trade pattern 
and the United States trade pattern) to explain this relationship. 
 
In the first instance, Kojima (1978) argues that when the home country wishes to 
conduct FDI in the host country, they should start from comparatively disadvantaged 
industries in the countries of origin, but with potential that can be comparatively 
advantaged in the host country. Figure 2.5 shows the pattern of trade in Japan (before 
and after FDI). C1 has a comparative ownership advantage (like technology, 
marketing expertise, management skill), but has a low location advantage (high cost 
of labour) than C2. In this case, Kojima assumed that C1 indicates the home country 
(Japan); C2 indicates the host countries (Hong Kong or least developed countries); C5 
indicates other countries. For example, if the same industry exists in both Japan and 
Hong Kong, but Hong Kong has a lack of high technology after Japan conducts the 
FDI into Hong Kong, the Hong Kong industry considers missing complementary 
factors and becomes a more efficient emergency industry. Therefore, when Japan 
brings FDI into Hong Kong, Japan will import the same product, which may have a 
high cost if they were to produce it. 
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In the second case, Kojima uses trade pattern of the United States to explain a 
contradictory situation. Figure 2.6 gives information about trade in the United States 
without FDI and commerce with FDI. C3 indicates the home country (the United 
States); C4 indicates the host countries (European, which has a less competitive 
advantage than the United States); C5 indicates other countries. In this case, the 
United States (C3) has a monopoly advantage, and they export a lot of comparative 
advantage products into the European countries. When the United States builds some 
subsidiaries in the European countries and made a monopoly of industry, it may 
reduce the export to European countries. Therefore, there is no trade between the 
United States and European countries anymore. 
Figure 2. 4 Trade Creating FDI 
Before FDI                                 After FDI 
            










Figure 2. 5 Trade Destroying FDI 
 
Without FDI                                 With FDI 
            
 
Source: PEARCE.R, 2013 
 
Summarising Kojima’s theory, the first case of FDI in Japan is also called ‘trade 
creating FDI’. This multinational enterprise in Japan focuses on the traditional local 
industries, which could almost lose their comparative advantages. These industries 
can easily find a suitable investment location overseas and highly benefit from the 
returns as compared to domestic investment. At the same time, the host countries not 
only experience an increase in their revenue income but also promote host countries 
to buy products from home countries, that is, creating a new trade. On the contrary, 
the second case is also familiar with ‘trade destroying FDI’. Multinational enterprises 
of the United States have a monopolistic advantage, thereby shifting their production 
base into host countries by setting up subsidiaries. Therefore, it may reduce the 
exports from home country, adversely affecting their economic growth, and violate 
the comparative advantage. 
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2.4.3 Internalisation Advantage 
‘I’ indicates the internalisation advantage, which stands for the question, ‘what 
determines the amount and composition of international production?’ (Dunning, 1973). 
In 1976, Buckley and Casson put forward the hypothesis that if the benefits of an 
intermediate good outweigh its cost, then this good will be internalised in a market. 
They pointed out five types of market imperfection and discussed that market failure 
gives significant benefits to internalisation
1
. (Buckley and Casson, 1976). In their 
theory, the internalisation could generate two types of integration: (i) the vertically 
integrated producer; and (ii) integration of production, marketing and R and D
2
. 
(Buckley and Casson, 1976). 
 
They believe that R&D is an essential factor to influence the decision of 
internalisation. This is due to the fact that knowledge is a public good within the firm 
and market with low transmission costs, which means that it could be easier for the 
firms to acquire and sort out knowledge through their intelligence system abroad. 
Therefore, if a country or a firm has a weak intellectual property rights, like patent, 
copyright, and trademarks, they may lead to the free-rider problem. The fact is that 
firms prefer to internalise the market in knowledge within the firm rather than 
licensing their knowledge to a third party or an independent producer. Therefore, 
Buckley and Casson mentioned that internalisation exists only when firms perceive 
that the benefits will exceed the costs. (Buckley and Casson, 1976). 
 
Notes:  
1. Five types of imperfection and benefits of market failure explained by Buckley, P. and Casson, M. ‘The Future of the 
Multinational Enterprise’, Palgrave, (1976), 37-40. 
2. A combination of these two types of integration explained by Buckley, P. and Casson, M. ‘The Future of the Multinational 




In the thesis, one of our empirical studies is based on this theory to measure the 
causality of foreign direct investment and R&D at the country level (See Chapter 7). 
The reason behind focusing at the country level is that Buckley and Casson, in their 
theory, also mentioned that the pattern of FDI flows between developed countries 
after the World War, could be explained via the internalisation of knowledge. 
 
2.5 Investment Development Path 
Dunning’s OLI Eclectic Paradigm in the last section explained that there are three 
factors that could influence the MNEs’ investment decision. In 2001, Dunning further 
explained his opinion at the country level, and showed how these three factors 
changed during the process of a country development (See Table 2.2). 
Table 2. 1 Process of IDP in a Country 
 Process of IDP The balance of Inward and Outward 
Investment 
Stage 1 Natural Resource-Based Litter inward investment; 
Negligible outward investment 
Stage 2 Investment Driven Increasing inward investment; 
Limited outward investment 





Increasing Knowledge and 
Service Intensity; Knowledge 
Economy 
Substantial inward and outward investment in 
the country 
Source: Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, 2002 
 
Table 2.1 shows the pattern of country development and the situation of inward and 
outward investment in different stages. In the first stage, countries may attract some 
inward investment based on natural resources, like agricultural, forest, and fishing, 
with insignificant outward investment, as well  low intra-industry in both trade and 
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investment. When the country moved to the second, investment driven stage, it began 
looking forward to resource seeking and market seeking in other developing 
countries. 
 
In the third stage, countries move to the innovation-driven, meaning that new ideas, 
goods, and services appeared. In this period, both inward and outward investment 
increased in a country, and all kind of investment focused on efficiency seeking. In 
the last two stages, more knowledge and skilled labour in a country are discussed, 
which could potentially attract more inward investment. At the same time, an 
increased efficiency and knowledge seeking investment will become the primary 
motivations for countries to conduct investment abroad. 
 
In addition, Dunning mentioned that the structure of a country could also have some 
influence on investment patterns, like formal institutions, informal institutions, 
corruption, and market size. Therefore, the thesis will use these characteristics of a 
country to identify each relationship in different groups. 
2.6 Vernon’s Life-Cycle Model 
In 1966, Vernon put forward a product life-cycle model, explaining the progress of a 
product from create to decline. Vernon observed the firms’ behaviour in the United 
States from 1945 to 1965 and found that the products usually need to process three 
stages in a life-cycle (See Figure 2.6). These three stages are: a new product, mature 
product, and standardised product. In modern international trade research, another 
stage is added: product decline in Vernon’s Model. 
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Figure 2. 6 International Product Life-Cycle Model 
 
Vernon mentions in his research that the United States had the advantage of new 
technology over other countries. Therefore, firms in the United States will produce 
new products at stage I. This is also known as the innovation stage as discussed in the 
OLI theory in section 2.4. Innovation or R&D is an essential factor for MNEs, which 
means that multinational enterprises have their ownership advantage and along with 
high competitive strength in the international market. However, Vernon’s research 
also discussed that the new product always takes precedence in the home country 
instead of seeking a lower-cost in the foreign country. The main reason is that 
innovation needs close communication between a research institution and product 
industry, which could minimise the transaction cost as well. When the new product is 
stabilised and has developed its characteristics, the firm will consider pushing it into 





During stage II, the motivation of the firms seeks a foreign market. The firms have a 
mature product with fixed cost, and the purpose of the firms is to find a suitable 
market to cover the transport cost, tariff, and the produce expenditure. Additionally, 
the firms could produce mature products in the foreign countries, that have a good 
number of cheap labours in the foreign market. At the end of this stage, the firms will 
develop multinational enterprises, since they have ownership advantages and have 
established (or control), at least one subsidiary company in the foreign country. 
Standardised product in Vernon’s Model is the last stage, in which, Vernon believes 
that the technology for this product has been widely used around the world. 
Subsequently, a similar massive product in the market will be close to saturation at 
some point. Moreover, at this stage, the motivation of MNEs has changed to 
efficiency-seeking, with the purpose to find a less developed country for reducing 
expenditure of the product and improving their competitiveness in the global market. 
 
According to Vernon’s Life-cycle Model, only three stages of product life exist. 
Nevertheless, people add the fourth stage: decline of product in the modern 
international trade research to complete the entire product life-cycle. Stage IV 
indicates that when the global market tended to saturation, the standardised product 
moved to the decline stage. It means that the technology of this product gained 
momentum, posing no challenge for most of the industry for production. Even the 
developing countries could import or ‘copy’ to produce a similar product. Therefore, 
this product will replace the new one with the latest technology, which will be 
eliminated by the market eventually. By this time, the product reaches the end of its 
life-cycle following four stages. Therefore, the new product will start a new life-cycle 





Currently, people use the product life-cycle model to explain the international trade 
pattern in developed as well as developing countries. Figure 2.7 indicates the 
changing of net export in four stages in the inventor’s country, developed countries, 
and developing countries. Vernon draws three figures in his research to display the 
relationship between production and consumption of the product in the different 
stages. For instance, the United States had a new product, with the production being 
higher than consumption until the early parts of the third (standardised) stage. Hence, 
the net export will be positive, until the product is moved into the final stage (see 
Figure 2.7 black line). 
Figure 2. 7 Patterns of International Product Life-cycle 
Source: Vernon, 1966; Designed by Prabhakar, 2012 
 
Furthermore, other advanced or developed countries need to import from the 
inventor’s country until the product is as practical as standard goods, and the 
technology becomes more familiar around the world. Thus, with regards to other 
developed countries, the net export will be negative in the beginning, with significant 
32 
 
growth in the second and third stage (net export transfer to positive), and will decline 
again during the final stage. 
 
On the contrary, the net export is zero in developing countries at the first stage, since 
the developing countries are not the inventor country’s first preference to be 
considered as export target. Net export exists in the mature product stage with a 
negative sign, implying that the developing countries indulge in more import than 
export. Net export is then regarded as the positive in the third stage, the reason behind 
which is that developing countries have a cheap labour advantage when compared to 
other developed countries. In addition to that, since the product eventually reached the 
standard, some developing countries could use the technology and ‘copy’ it to develop 
similar products. These similar products have several characteristics, such as: low cost, 
low quality, short production cycle, and a vast number of productions. They could 
export these kinds of products to other countries to get profits in the final stage. 
2.7 Conclusions 
This chapter reviewed the theoretical background of foreign direct investment at the 
macro-level (the early FDI research before the 1960s) to micro-level (Hymer’s theory, 
Dunning’s OLI theory, Kojima’s Location theory, and Vernon’s Life-cycle Product 
theory). These theories give us necessary information about the trend of FDI research 
in the last six decades. Similarly, they also support the guidance of empirical study 
analysis. Thus, the following chapter will discuss the previous empirical studies of 
FDI relative causality. The limitations of the previous studies will also be mentioned 





Chapter 3 Empirical Background 
3.1 Introduction 
With the development of economic globalisation, more and more enterprises are 
interested in the international market. These enterprises have committed to develop 
opportunities and establish their subsidiaries overseas. Therefore, people began to 
focus on the development of foreign direct investment (FDI). In recent times, the 
causality between foreign direct investment and economic growth, as well as the 
relationship between foreign direct investment and international trade has a modern 
research topic. This chapter will review the empirical background of FDI and a series 
of relationships among FDI, international trade, and economic growth. The empirical 
studies in this thesis are present in chapters 6, 7, and 8. 
 
The structure of this Chapter will be as follows: 
 Section 3.2 will review the previous empirical study of the relationship 
between foreign direct investment and economic growth  
 Section 3.3 will discuss how research and development (or innovation) 
influences FDI in the empirical studies  
 Section 3.4 will focus on the relationship between FDI and international 
trade in the previous research 
 Section 3.5 will reflect over some previous empirical studies relating to 
the FDI research 
 Section 3.6 will display the details of each empirical study through tables 
of six categories (Author’s name, year to published, sample size, 
econometric methods, data source, and variables) and indicated in the 
Appendices for Chapter 3 (from Table 3.1 to Table 3.4) 
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3.2 Previous Empirical Study 1: The Relationship between FDI and 
Economic Growth 
The first research question in this thesis is: has the foreign direct investment 
influenced the economy of a country? Some previous studies have proved that foreign 
direct investment could independently affect economic growth. For example, in 2001, 
Carr, Markusen, and Maskus found that an interplay between outward FDI flows and 
economic growth in the host country, by using the knowledge-capital Model, 
measuring 36 countries from 1986 to 1994. 
 
Moreover, Pegkas (2015) measured Eurozone countries from 2002 to 2012 and found 
that stock of FDI had a significant and positive effect on the economic growth. 
Furthermore, by using the generalised method of moments in 13 MENA countries 
from 1980 to 2012, Omri (2014) examined the effect of FDI and economic growth. 
He found a positively bi-directional causal relationship between them. Turkcan, 
Duman, and Yetkiner (2008) used the simultaneous equation to examine 23 OECD 
countries from 1975 to 2004. They also indicated that FDI and economic growth had 
a bi-directional relationship. Choong (2011), Adeniyi, Omisakin, and Edwaikhide 
(2012) added the financial sector to measure the causality between FDI and economic 
growth to find that a well-developed domestic financial sector has a significant FDI 
effect on economic growth. 
 
On the other hand, some studies indicate that FDI does not have direct influence on 
economic growth. For instance, Carkovic and Levine (2002) measured 72 countries 
from1965-1995 and found that foreign direct investment inflows cannot exert an 
independent effect on economic growth. Moreover, Temiz and Gomen (2014) 
examined the case of Turkey, and found that no significant relations determined the 




The initial limitation of the recent causality studies between FDI and economic is 
sample size with the period being narrow. For example, Pegkas (2015), Temiz and 
Gokmen (2014) measured this causality in 11 and 16 years, separately. Hence, their 
result can prove the relationship in the short-run, without explaining how the 
relationship changed in long-run. The second limitation is of data bias. For instance, 
Carkovic and Levine (2002) used the average of over seven -5 year periods. It may 
become a data bias in case of missing data in the research. 
 
Furthermore, some other scholars have examined the impact of FDI and economic 
growth on the international trade. For example, Cieslik and Tarsalewska (2011) 
reviewed 97 developing countries using the static and dynamic panel data, and found 
that both trade and FDI positively related to economic growth. Additionally, they 
discussed that openness to FDI has a significant growth than international trade does. 
Tekin (2012) examined 18 least developed countries from1979 to 2009 and found that 
FDI might enhance the export performance, while economic growth does not 
accompany the increase in export. Akoto (2016) tested South Africa between 2008 
and 2009, and found that FDI has a significant impact on promoting exports in the 
long run, but in the short term, exports were not responsive to changes in FDI inflow. 
 
Consequently, certain notable cases exist in specific countries. For instance, Belloumi 
(2014) focused on Tunisia and examined the period between 1970 and 2008 to find 
that trade liberalisation has a significant positive impact on attracting foreign direct 
investment. Tahir, Khan, and Shah (2015) used time series data in Pakistan from 1977 
to 2013 and found that FDI plays a significant and decisive role in the economic 
growth of Pakistan. Additionally, they found that the imports have adversely impacted 
the growth process of Pakistan. 
 
The recent researches are more focused on only one or few countries. For example, 
Akoto (2016), Belloumi (2014), Tahir, Khan and Shah (2015), Tekin (2012) 
researched in South Africa, Tunisia, Pakistan and 18 least developed countries. These 
studies may not indicate the impact of FDI and economic growth of international 
trade in a general. 
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3.3 Previous Empirical Study 2: The Relationship between FDI and 
R&D 
The previous chapter reviewed that the R&D intensity is a crucial factor in a company, 
which could help the company have an ownership advantage compared to others. The 
R&D (or innovation) department in a company could update the new technology and 
start the first stage of product life-cycle. With the latest production by the firms 
indicate increased competition strength in the local and global market. The second 
research question in this thesis is, ‘what is the role of research and development 
played in the foreign direct investment flow?’ More specific, if a country has a high 
technology production, will this situation attract other countries to invest in that 
country? Or will this country ‘sell’ new technology and conduct investment into other 
countries? 
 
With regards to empirical study, Barrell and Pain, in 1997 observed the United 
Kingdom and Germany from 1980 to 1995, and found an interrelationship between 
international trade, FDI, and economic growth in European countries. They also 
argued that foreign direct investment could likely be an essential platform for the 
diffusion of ideas and technology. In addition, Walz (1997) used steady-state 
equilibrium and proved that companies conduct foreign direct investment in 
developed countries, the latest knowledge of which, could be acquired to establish 
subsidiaries in low-cost countries. His research indicated a factor in the late 20
th
 
century that the knowledge-seeking FDI became the most noteworthy motivation for 
firms around the world, especially within high-technology countries. 
 
According to recent empirical studies, Annan-Diab and Filippaios, in 2017, measured 
98 multinational enterprises in Ireland between 2003 and 2009, followed by a 
discussion that high-technology related FDI (such as software sector and IT sector) 
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prefer seeking a country with a comparative advantage in the labour force. On the 
contrary, in the financial sector, they also found that the investor would seek efficient 
FDI in Ireland. This gave a general idea of the motivation varying when MNEs 
conduct FDI in different industry sectors. Therefore, the investor should rely on the 
characteristics of the industry sector to set up their strategies. 
 
Another empirical study came into play, written by Pradhan, Arvin, Bahmani, and 
Bennett in 2017, who measured 36 OECD countries between1970 and 2016 using 
panel integration techniques. They found a bi-direction link between innovation and 
economic growth in the long run and a diverse pattern of this relationship in the 
short-run. Thus, it is implying that the information and communication technology 
(ICT) infrastructure could improve the increasing trend of government consumption 
expenditure. 
 
In the previous studies, few researchers focused on the causality between FDI flows 
and local activities. Most of them used R&D as an extra variable to measure the 
relationship between trade, FDI, and economic growth. Therefore, in this thesis, we 
will investigate the direct link between the R&D and FDI inward, and FDI outward 
flows (See Chapter 7 empirical study for this causality). 
3.4 Previous Empirical Study 3: The Relationship between FDI and 
International Trade 
The final research question is, ‘what is the relationship between FDI and international 
trade?’ In the empirical study, the causality of FDI and international trade is divided 
into two categories, ‘complementary’ or ‘substitute’. Hence, the following question 
will focus on: if we use OECD countries to measure this causality, does the 
relationship between FDI and international trade still indicate ‘complementary’, 
‘substitute’ or none? Moreover, a new issue might occur, that of: if we prove that  a 
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relationship between FDI and trade exists, regardless of it being ‘complementary’ or 
‘substitute’, what is the pattern of FDI and trade? Based on an in-depth analysis, the 
focus is on what situation or under what conditions, will the causality of FDI and 
trade most likely become ‘complementary’ or ‘substitute’. 
 
The previous empirical studies in this causality had a breakthrough in the 1980s. The 
theory of the relationship between foreign direct investment and international trade is 
presenting multinational enterprises as the carrier. As a result, some scholars found 
that the causality of foreign direct investment and international trade existed in both 
the substitute and complementary effect. 
 
For example, Markuson and Svensson (1985) raised a series of non-factors 
endowment model. After combining with the factors endowment model, they argue 
that five factors (technical differences, production tax, monopoly, external economies 
of scale, and market distortions) may lead to foreign direct investment, and 
international trade becoming complementary. According to this model, Markuson and 
Svensson believe that if trade product and non-trade product (like services, buildings, 
education, and housing) were to match, the relationship between foreign direct 
investment and international trade will be substitute. In contrast, if the trade product 
and the non-trade products do not match, the causality of FDI and trade will be 
complementary. 
 
Wacker (2015) examined 50 developing countries from 1980 to 2008 and found that 
foreign direct investment had a significant positive impact on the net barter terms of 
trade. Furthermore, using OLS method and testing 105 countries between 1984 and 
2000, Harding and Javorcik (2012), also discovered a positive effect of FDI on the 
unit values of exports in developing countries. Rana and Kebewar (2014) examined 
122 developing countries in 36 years and found that the more the FTA-CU 
(full-fledged trade agreement) concludes, the greater the amounts of FDI inflows are 
attracted in the developing countries. Therefore, the PSA (partial scope agreement) 
are insignificant in determining the FDI inflows. Pain and Wakelin (1998), using OLS 
method, examined 11 OECD countries from1970 to 1992 and found that FDI outward 
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had an adverse effect on trade shares, but FDI inward had a significantly positive 
impact on trade shares. 
 
The limitation of the causality of FDI and international trade is unable to clearly 
identify the relationship between them. Most of the researchers focus on how the trade 
policy affects FDI or trade itself, like Harding and Javorcik (2012) and Rana and 
Kebewar (2014). Another other limitation is the duration. The previous research 
period does not include the recent years, like from 2000 to 2014; even their research 
has been public in the past two years. 
3.5 Conclusions 
This chapter focused on three research questions, which formed the base of this thesis. 
Each question was followed by answers obtained from several previous studies. 
Subsequently, it was observed that five main reasons may vary the research results. 
The first being sample size selection, for example, some people would like to research 
in developing countries, others may prefer less developed countries. The second is the 
estimation technique selection. For example, in the recent studies, most  people 
would like OLS, GMM, Simultaneous Equation, Co-integration, and Vector Error 
Correlation. The former two techniques have frequently been used, which may be 
because they are fundamental and easy techniques to grasp. The third is the period 
selection, with the average range of a time limit in the recent research being between 
10 to 30 years. 
 
However, some research may focus on 40 years, and some others may focus on fewer 
than five years. The fourth is the estimation methodology selection, such as time 
series, cross-section, and panel data (fixed effects or random effects). The choice of 
methodology might be different because the researchers have a different aim. For 
example, if they choose the time series methodology, they would find out how the 
term trend affects their research. The final question, is on data selection. In the 
causality between FDI and economic growth research, most people have used data 
from World Bank, UNCTAD, and OECD statistics. Therefore, based on the differing 
data, the results will also be altered, although they often use the same database, the 
category data is different. 
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According to the experience of previous studies, we will use 30 OECD countries as a 
sample and the measure these countries one by one to find out if a standard pattern 
flow of FDI and international trade in some countries exists. The period in question is 
between 1981 to 2015. The variables in this thesis involve FDI inward flows, FDI 
outward flows, export, import, GDP, and government expenditure on research and 
development. Therefore, the following chapter is about the description and 




Chapter 4 Data Description 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters reviewed the theory of foreign direct investment in the 
international business sector, and the empirical studies of the relationship among of 
foreign direct investment, international trade, and economic growth. According to the 
three research questions that were addressed in chapter 1, this thesis will use 30 
OECD countries as observation, and investigate the causality between FDI, trade, and 
economic growth. The examined period is 35 years between 1981 to 2015. 
 
Firstly, the reason to analyse the OECD membership country is that OECD is an 
intergovernmental organisation with the mission ‘to promote policies that will 
improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world.’ (OECD, 
2017). Secondly, since most countries are developed in OECD, it could provide 
guidance in the future studies of developing countries. The dataset to be used in this 
thesis is collected from the UNCTAD and the OECD statistics. Since the R&D 
variable in the UNCTAD statistic dataset is not available in the whole period, OECD 
statistic database is being used to fill the gap in missing years. 
The structure of this chapter is organised as follows:  
 Section 4.2 focuses on database description, which briefly introduces the 
UNCTAD and OECD database  
 Section 4.3 discusses data description of the main variables in the thesis  
 Section 4.4 talks about the country profile factors in each country 
 Section 4.5 reflects on the reliability and validity of data  
 Section 4.6 and section 4.7 include the conclusion of the chapter 
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4.2 Database Description 
In this thesis, two different databases will estimate the variables. Foreign direct 
investment, trade, and gross domestic product were collected from the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) database, while the research and 
development was collected from OECD statistic database. This section will briefly 
introduce these two datasets. Table 4.1 gives information about the details of the 
database selected for each variable, data usage in this thesis, and the updated time of 
each database. 
4.2.1 UNCTAD Database 
UNCTAD stands for the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. The 
aim of UNCTAD statistic is to help the ‘treatment of trade and development and the 
interrelated issues in the areas of finance, technology, investment and sustainable 
development.’ (UNCTAD, 2017). UNCTAD database contains a broad range of data 
collected from national and international sources over long durations. It allows for the 
analysis of some emerging and urgent issues within a framework of longtime 
tendencies with a broad geographical scope. 
 
In case of missing data or a break in the data series, the UNCTAD statistics use their 
methodology to make estimates or to be complemented by other international 
organisations, such as: The World Bank, the Organisation of Economic Co-operation 
Development, and the International Monetary Fund. UNCTAD Statistics confirm that 
their work comes under the Principles of Governing International Statistic Activities. 
The details of categories of UNCTAD database can be found in the Notes. 
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4.2.2 OECD Database 
The OECD collected data from its member countries and some non-member countries 
each year. The data providers come from national statistical offices, departments of 
national governments, such as agriculture, education, finance, health, and science and 
technology. Additionally, international organisations support OECD to supplement 
their dataset. The characteristic of OECD database is to avoid duplication when they 
collect the data from different resources. The purpose of this database is to provide 
direct and indirect data information on OECD’s statistic practices for data users. 
(OECD, 2017). The OECD database lists that their statistical categories rely on 






Table 4. 1 Main Variables Data Collection Source 
Variables Databases Categories Data Usage in Thesis Updated 
Time 
Foreign Direct Investment The UNCTAD Database a) Foreign Direct Investment 
Flows and Stock 
a) Foreign Direct Investment: 
Inward and Outward Flows and 
Stock, Annual, 1970-2015 
24/10/2016 
International Trade The UNCTAD Database a) Trade Trends 
b) Trade Structure by Partner, 
Product or Service category 
c) Trade Indicators 
d) Market Access 
a) BPM6: Exports and Import of 
Goods and Services, Annual, 
1980-2013 
19/08/2014 
b) BPM6: Exports and Import of 
Goods and Services, Annual, 
2005-2015 
20/07/2016 
Economic Growth The UNCTAD Database a) National Accounts 
b) Balance of Payments 
c) Exchange Rates 
d) Inflation Rates 
a) Gross Domestic Product: Total 
and per capita, Current and 
Constant (2005) Prices, Annual, 
1970-2015 
25/04/2017 
Research and Development The OECD Database a) OECD Science Technology 
and Industry Outlook 
b) Patents Statistics 
c) Research and Development 
Statistics 
d) Science and Technology 
Indicators 
a) Gross Domestic Expenditure on 
R-D by sector of Performance and 
Type of Cost, Annual, 1981-2015 
18/05/2017 
Source: UNCTAD Statistics; OECD Statistics
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4.3 Data Sources and Description 
This section will discuss four variables including FDI variable (inward flows and 
outward flows), international trade variable (export and import), economic growth 
variable, and R&D variable. Each variable is divided in six categories: mean, median, 
maximum, minimum, standard deviation, and observations. 
4.3.1 Foreign Direct Investment 
According to BPM 5 (1993) Benchmark recommend that the foreign direct 
investment statistics consist of transactions data (known as FDI flow data) and 
position data (known as FDI stock data) and both consist of standard components (See 
Table 4.1.1 in Appendix 4.1). This thesis will use transaction data to measure the time 
trend effect on FDI. The data sources of foreign direct investment are collected from 
four parts: enterprise survey, international transactions reporting system, exchange 
control or investment approval authorities, and others (like published sources, press 
reports or bilateral sources). The tables below indicate the changes of data sources 
collected for OECD countries in 1997 and 2001, divided into ‘most timely’ and ‘most 
comprehensive’ data. To simplify, the ‘most timely’ data stands for the data displayed 
initially after collection. The definition of ‘most timely’ data and ‘most 
comprehensive’ data can be found in Notes at the end of this chapter. The details of 









Table 4. 2 Primary Data Sources for the Most Timely FDI Flow 








Sources, Press Reports, 
Bilateral Sources) 
 Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward 
OECD 1997 
(29) 
12 11 18 18 2 0 0 0 
OECD 2001 
(30) 
16 16 16 16 3 2 4 4 
Changes +4 +5 -2 -2 +1 +2 +4 +4 
Source: Foreign Direct Investment Statistics, IMF, 2003 
Table 4. 3 Primary Data Sources for the Most Comprehensive FDI Flow 








Sources, Press Reports, 
Bilateral Sources) 
 Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward 
OECD 1997 
(29) 
13 11 8 8 2 0 0 0 
OECD 2001 
(30) 
12 11 2 1 0 0 1 0 
Changes -1 0 -6 -7 -2 0 +1 0 
Source: Foreign Direct Investment Statistics, IMF, 2003 
 
The database of foreign direct investment corresponds to the Statistical Annexes of 
the UNCTAD World Investment Report 2016 (WIR, 2016). This Report was released 
in June of each year, containing annual data up to the previous year. However, the 
data for the most recent year is preliminary and will be re-edited by the national 
authorities. The UNCTAD reports statistics of FDI is on a directional basis along with 
the implementation of the guidelines from the balance of payments and international 
investment position manual (BPM6, 2009). On the contrary, a few countries halted the 




Furthermore, the data from UNCTAD statistics is regularly collected from the official 
annual data of each country in both published and unpublished FDI data. In addition, 
this statistic database is supported by some other international organisations, such as 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Economic Commission for Europe 
(ECE), and the Economic Commission for Latin America and Caribbean (ECLAC). 
(WIR, 2016). Table 4.1.2 gives information about the data resources of FDI flows in 
30 OECD Countries, shown in Appendix 4.1. In this table, the focus is on: the 
national institution reporting FDI in each country, the reporting system used to collect 
the FDI data, the evaluation system used, and the data source used in the WIR. In this 
thesis, the focus will be on the flow of FDI, followed bythe details of stock FDI in the 
Methodological Note of the World Investment Report 2016. 
 
The UNCTAD defined that the data on FDI flows is on a net basis (capital 
transactions’ credits fewer debts between direct investor and their foreign affiliates). 
(WIR, 2016). Therefore, the net decreases in FDI outward or net increases in FDI 
inward are recorded with a positive sign in the balance of payment. On the contrary, 
the net increases in FDI outward or net decreases in FDI inward are recorded with a 
negative sign in the BoP. Table 4.4 and 4.5 indicate the details of the FDI inward 
flows, and FDI outward flows, separately. In each table, the summary of FDI flow 
data can be found with mean, median, maximum, minimum, standard deviation, and 
the observations in 30 OECD countries from 1981 to 2015. The negative FDI flow in 
the table represents disinvestment or reinvestment outside of the country. For example, 
the parent company may borrow money from its affiliate, or the affiliate pays off a 







Table 4. 4 Foreign Direct Investment: Inward Flow 
 Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. Obs. 
Australia 16,265 7,825 58,981 -28,294 19,885 35 
Austria 4,057 2,669 25,484 115 4,975 35 
Belgium 25,324 11,018 119,693 -12,271 32,778 34 
Canada 23,968 9,634 116,821 -445 27,055 35 
Czech Republic 4,643 4,974 11,653 653 3,045 23 
Denmark 3,552 1,132 33,823 -10,716 7,389 35 
Finland 3,339 1,088 17,302 -1,144 4,379 35 
France 19,783 16,628 63,500 -2,574 15,121 35 
Germany 32,533 24,199 198,277 -10,193 41,906 26 
Greece 1,219 984 5,355 -289 1,150 35 
Hungary 4,010 3,323 14,409 554 2,912 26 
Iceland 572 83 6,824 -76 1,369 35 
Ireland 11,495 1,443 100,542 -31,689 23,112 35 
Italy 10,753 4,961 43,849 -10,835 12,491 35 
Japan 3,482 1,284 24,425 -6,506 6,394 35 
Korea 5,357 5,042 13,643 121 4,596 35 
Luxembourg 18,660 8,678 143,003 -29,679 33,797 34 
Mexico 14,853 12,830 45,855 1,541 11,614 35 
Netherland 22,742 11,724 119,636 -7,184 26,459 35 
New Zealand 1,400 1,347 4,229 -2,788 1,505 35 
Norway 4,345 2,409 18,774 -4,239 5,579 35 
Poland 5,924 4,030 21,643 11 6,110 35 
Portugal 2,921 1,793 10,594 60 2,868 35 
Slovakia 2,128 2,275 5,865 -604 1,962 23 
Spain 18,981 10,666 76,993 1,622 17,574 35 
Sweden 10,480 6,350 61,135 -41 12,799 35 
Switzerland 11,312 5,484 68,838 -951 15,384 33 
Turkey 5,126 885 22,047 46 6,994 35 
United 
Kingdom 
47,760 30,461 183,822 -347 48,620 35 
United States 121,989 84,455 379,894 11,518 100,182 35 
Total OECD 446,254 360,289 1,291,802 34,134 364,827 35 
World 702,574 550,589 1,902,244 50,392 598,392 35 





Table 4. 5 Foreign Direct Investment: Outward Flow 
 Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. Obs. 
Australia 4,223 2,864 30,396 -35,783 10,528 35 
Austria 6,461 2,768 35,840 44 8,446 35 
Belgium 21,871 10,250 122,304 -69 28,165 34 
Canada 26,303 22,924 79,277 2,402 22,689 35 
Czech Republic 921 206 4,323 -327 1,258 23 
Denmark 5,497 3,070 26,549 -10,365 6,916 35 
Finland 3,628 2,217 24,030 -10,538 6,040 35 
France 40,951 30,124 161,948 1,841 38,678 35 
Germany 60,743 53,681 169,321 5,569 41,214 26 
Greece 865 412 5,246 -785 1,323 29 
Hungary 1,891 1,248 11,703 -4 2,565 24 
Iceland 647 27 10,186 -4,209 2,746 30 
Ireland 12,873 4,629 101,616 -1,165 20,495 29 
Italy 16,900 7,326 96,231 969 21,161 35 
Japan 45,457 31,557 135,749 3,612 39,852 35 
Korea 8,859 3,967 30,632 61 10,665 35 
Luxembourg 19,101 8,119 122,304 -69 29,367 34 
Mexico 7,235 1,058 89,806 -263 16,803 35 
Netherland 28,609 17,243 106,009 2,613 26,433 35 
New Zealand 8,333 447 113,429 -1,566 24,104 35 
Norway 5,253 1,604 23,678 -456 7,243 35 
Poland 3,194 31 19,561 -300 6,163 35 
Portugal 1,516 601 8,055 -9,782 3,181 35 
Slovakia 883 95 13,435 -8,206 3,820 23 
Spain 20,934 3,425 137,052 -313 32,541 35 
Sweden 15,217 11,215 40,907 409 11,969 35 
Switzerland 24,527 16,152 85,701 -3,327 23,614 33 
Turkey 3,856 143 41,164 -3,982 10,632 35 
United 
Kingdom 
59,842 32,199 319,330 3,707 71,823 35 
United States 101,614 70,277 393,518 -3,327 104,626 35 
Total OECD 568,022 457,450 1,858,982 25,536 465,455 35 
World 691,209 497,471 2,165,190 27,291 589,870 35 




4.3.2 International Trade 
The dataset of international trade in UNCTAD database is collected from Balance of 
Payment Manual 5
th
 Edition (BPM5) and 6
th
 Edition (BPM6), See Table 4.6 and Table 
4.7. BPM5 published in 1993. Thus it has a historical data set than BPM6. According 
to the description of international trade database, the exports and imports of goods and 
services annual data from 1980 to 2013 comes from BPM5, while from 2005 to 2015, 
the data is collected from BPM6. Both BPM5 and BPM6 are published by the 
International Monetary Fund. One of the purposes of BPM is to improve the 
international comparability of data through the promotion of adaptable guidelines in 
the world. In addition, BPM may close the links with other macroeconomic statistics 
to enhance the consistency between different databases. (BMP6, 2009). 
Table 4. 6 International Trade: Export 
 Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. Obs. 
Australia 115,226 79,498 324,237 23,952 95,142 35 
Austria 110,808 87,297 234,756 23,967 72,247 35 
Belgium 223,417 209,711 443,414 58,368 123,590 35 
Canada 289,770 254,375 565,450 78,295 166,265 35 
Czech 
Republic 
85,892 76,736 171,693 18,952 56,203 23 
Denmark 88,004 66,347 190,221 21,095 57,515 35 
Finland 56,036 48,493 126,414 14,704 33,976 35 
France 433,146 374,120 860,180 125,563 242,261 35 
Germany 993,244 790,355 1,756,753 442,965 477,832 26 
Greece 33,341 21,466 82,707 6,957 25,583 35 
Hungary 49,235 28,977 125,653 9,200 43,672 34 
Iceland 3,895 2,886 9,147 1,026 2,628 35 
Ireland 107,263 68,067 288,950 8,905 95,440 35 
Italy 334,467 302,459 644,742 90,600 183,796 35 
Japan 506,595 462,923 931,768 160,220 241,443 35 
Korea 254,895 165,434 725,127 25,860 232,383 35 
Luxembourg 121,339 108,481 240,724 36,346 61,391 35 
Mexico 163,141 129,201 418,952 26,394 130,316 35 
Netherland 291,043 243,199 770,836 78,093 228,153 30 
Source: UNCTAD Statistics, 2017 
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Table 4.6 International Trade: Export (Cont.) 
 
 Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. Obs. 
New Zealand 23,607 18,456 56,343 6,594 15,686 35 
Norway 90,905 64,900 214,316 25,164 64,235 35 
Poland 82,431 39,638 258,509 12,455 83,575 35 
Portugal 40,509 34,126 94,011 5,730 28,211 35 
Slovakia 43,226 31,358 92,094 7,391 32,317 23 
Spain 197,066 161,395 449,575 32,159 142,894 35 
Sweden 125,164 102,674 262,191 33,097 78,421 35 
Switzerland 175,022 108,857 487,793 42,397 142,859 35 
Turkey 75,696 50,827 220,782 5,967 70,564 35 
United 
Kingdom 
425,225 381,572 848,959 121,033 248,337 35 
United States 1,047,947 934,936 2,343,204 266,019 664,910 35 
Total OECD 6,244,898 5,319,896 13,903,449 1,387,665 4,085,024 35 
World 9,664,923 6,963,164 23,778,485 2,169,496 7,242,712 35 
Source: UNCTAD Statistics, 2017 
Table 4. 7 International Trade: Import 
 Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. Obs. 
Australia 121,587 79,917 335,243 26,729 97,544 35 
Austria 105,530 86,451 219,594 23,941 66,294 35 
Belgium 216,940 194,447 441,638 57,656 124,156 35 
Canada 281,770 242,773 587,079 66,790 171,699 35 
Czech 
Republic 
82,827 76,620 158,405 18,457 51,124 23 
Denmark 78,812 59,691 178,685 20,475 51,960 35 
Finland 51,441 38,705 115,446 14,279 33,104 35 
France 430,943 342,440 882,498 123,294 259,093 35 
Germany 888,755 701,152 1,509,273 427,770 388,116 26 
Greece 44,039 28,182 124,316 9,860 33,175 35 
Hungary 47,918 29,898 125,005 8,853 40,955 34 
Iceland 3,909 3,168 9,068 1,002 2,581 35 
Ireland 91,784 61,703 239,456 10,062 80,014 35 
Italy 323,641 270,654 664,553 88,678 184,172 35 
Japan 471,179 419,557 1,014,601 147,870 270,393 35 
Korea 237,776 171,312 662,850 28,293 212,551 35 
Luxembourg 106,235 92,268 224,702 23,934 58,956 35 
Source: UNCTAD Statistics, 2017 
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Table 4. 7 International Trade: Import (Cont.) 
 Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. Obs. 
Mexico 170,901 138,380 433,977 16,325 137,615 35 
Austria 105,530 86,451 219,594 23,941 66,294 35 
Netherland 254,670 217,088 641,746 73,029 186,161 30 
New Zealand 22,920 17,362 54,176 6,858 15,172 35 
Norway 66,381 50,544 147,966 20,852 42,151 35 
Poland 85,580 51,961 251,481 12,444 84,576 35 
Portugal 48,605 45,568 106,987 8,448 30,308 35 
Slovakia 43,595 32,637 88,189 8,031 31,230 23 
Spain 208,213 161,006 497,171 32,882 149,595 35 
Sweden 109,889 87,523 231,716 31,528 67,211 35 
Switzerland 150,100 93,632 412,308 43,036 118,939 35 
Turkey 88,262 48,757 266,224 9,035 86,935 35 
United 
Kingdom 
455,673 395,778 903,662 117,610 272,194 35 
United States 1,348,402 1,101,073 2,851,528 298,682 871,350 35 
Total OECD 6,328,643 5,194,192 13,844,668 1,396,265 4,166,959 35 
World 9,510,733 6,845,794 23,168,052 2,202,135 7,032,611 35 
Source: UNCTAD Statistics, 2017 
4.3.3 Gross Domestic Product 
The source of the gross domestic product in UNCTAD statistic is collected from the 
National Accounts Main Aggregates Database. This database presents the national 
accounts data from more than 200 countries and areas of the world from 1999, which 
was published by the Statistics Division of the Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs in the United Nations. The Statistics Division sends the United Nations 
National Accounts Questionnaire (UN-NA Q) to these countries and areas annually, 
for the collection of national accounts data. In some cases, when the countries did not 
report their data to the Statistics Division, the data is supplemented by national 
publications or other sources. The UNSD also co-operates with other international 
organisations to reduce the burden of reporting by countries, such as Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (ECE) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) on behalf 
of their constituents. (UN DESA, 2017).  
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Table 4. 8 Gross Domestic Product 
 Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. Obs. 
Australia 613,197 408,865 1,578,361 181,698 448,873 35 
Austria 239,661 212,980 438,376 67,821 121,574 35 
Belgium 292,570 258,872 531,762 83,794 147,425 35 
Canada 889,823 652,818 1,842,627 306,213 506,786 35 
Czech 
Republic 
130,493 118,976 235,205 40,452 69,627 23 
Denmark 196,280 176,991 353,359 59,105 97,623 35 
Finland 154,908 133,935 283,753 51,013 74,809 35 
France 1,669,049 1,503,094 2,930,051 533,678 773,813 35 
Germany 2,741,311 2,548,542 3,879,277 1,764,944 703,763 26 
Greece 162,447 143,150 354,474 47,816 91,746 35 
Hungary 70,868 47,209 157,291 23,303 45,210 35 
Iceland 9,667 8,146 21,295 2,789 5,118 35 
Ireland 123,211 90,112 283,716 20,127 92,681 35 
Italy 1,361,546 1,248,527 2,390,818 425,855 606,762 35 
Japan 3,981,366 4,445,659 6,203,213 1,129,895 1,441,672 35 
Korea 605,856 556,129 1,411,334 72,426 420,160 35 
Luxembourg 27,421 21,375 65,372 4,582 19,640 35 
Mexico 614,776 470,125 1,294,695 154,119 370,672 35 
Netherland 492,214 432,486 936,263 142,011 260,434 35 
New Zealand 81,757 59,919 198,734 23,948 53,594 35 
Norway 225,361 162,287 522,746 61,628 153,588 35 
Poland 230,106 169,717 545,152 56,017 173,145 35 
Portugal 133,143 121,545 262,017 25,221 76,380 35 
Slovakia 52,895 43,056 100,761 13,753 34,075 23 
Spain 779,634 625,970 1,635,050 170,481 464,317 35 
Sweden 310,624 266,802 578,742 103,534 147,128 35 
Switzerland 351,455 294,092 709,369 106,581 187,484 35 
Turkey 349,579 243,933 823,256 80,641 253,889 35 
United 
Kingdom 
1,657,154 1,613,139 3,063,179 461,483 851,403 35 
United States 9,771,103 9,144,014 18,139,554 3,227,080 4,620,866 35 
Total OECD 28,095,899 25,746,969 49,269,446 8,926,670 13,334,961 35 
World 38,057,792 31,696,129 78,612,131 12,444,583 21,330,095 35 
Source: UNCTAD, Statistics, 2017 
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4.3.4 Research and Development 
Research and development expenditure statistical dataset is reported in the OECD 
statistic website, which is collected according to the Frascati Manual in 2015 edition. 
This database describes the gross domestic spending on the research and development 
sector in total intramural. Additionally, it displays the R&D expenditure by source of 
funds, such as: the business enterprise, government funds, education funds and private 
non-profit funds. The database provides detail on methods used in the member 
countries and selected non-member economies. These two groups of economies were 
submitted in the International Survey of Research and Development twice a year in 
March and July and published as the Main Science and Technology Indicators in 
OECD Statistics database. (OECD, 2017). 
 
Figure 4. 1 Growth in R&D (GERD as a percentage of GDP), 1981 and 2015 
 





















































































































































































































































Figure 4.1 shows the growth in R&D intensity in 30 OECD countries in 1981 and 
2015. It is clear that the government in Germany, United Kingdom, and the United 
States had greater budgets for research and development area in 1981 as compared to 
other OECD countries, which came to 2.25% of GDP. This was followed by 
Switzerland, Japan, and Sweden, with this ratio being approximately 2% in 1981. In 
2015, most of OECD countries’ government had allocated a greater budget in their 
R&D sector, with the exception of the United Kingdom (decreased by 0.5%). 
Moreover, the growth in R&D intensity vastly increased in Austria, Denmark, Finland, 
and Iceland. The ratio in these four countries saw an average raise of 1.5% to 2%, 
implying that the government increasingly focused on research and development. 
 
The differences between R&D and innovation need to be identified before 
progressing to the next section. R&D is the fundamental research, which usually 
generates new knowledge and applied research, like the development of applications, 
or conducting experimental development. By contrast, people use innovation only if a 
something is created and becomes value-added, like new ideas, product innovation, 
system innovation, and business model innovation. In this thesis, we will focus on the 
R&D in one country and try to find the link with foreign direct investment instead of 
estimating the innovation ability in a country. The statistic of R&D is presented in 
Table 4.9, with the application of the global innovation index ranking for the selected 











Table 4. 9 Research and Development 
 Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. Obs. 
Australia 8,620 6,701 20,956 1,608 6,616 17 
Austria 4,681 3,540 11,030 951 3,304 34 
Belgium 5,277 5,012 10,603 1,872 2,588 29 
Canada 14,557 12,173 25,393 3,880 7,770 33 
Czech Republic 2,644 2,098 5,813 1,254 1,329 23 
Denmark 3,256 2,566 7,513 579 2,288 31 
Finland 3,741 3,127 7,892 553 2,497 32 
France 31,159 28,475 55,218 10,967 13,169 33 
Germany 51,033 43,259 100,991 18,511 24,256 33 
Greece 1,271 1,422 2,285 133 730 21 
Hungary 1,502 1,438 3,250 614 795 23 
Iceland 155 112 338 20 118 26 
Ireland 1,230 967 3,271 161 1,031 32 
Italy 15,019 13,208 26,850 4,984 6,446 33 
Japan 91,682 87,778 160,247 25,809 40,548 33 
Korea 28,977 22,507 68,937 7,140 18,771 23 
Luxembourg 574 594 684 387 99 12 
Mexico 4,351 4,171 8,058 1,351 2,056 19 
Netherland 8,063 7,476 15,377 2,673 3,790 33 
New Zealand 828 681 1,767 289 475 16 
Norway 2,686 2,664 5,520 511 1,670 25 
Poland 3,325 2,609 7,918 1,620 1,872 24 
Portugal 1,532 931 4,377 175 1,416 32 
Slovakia 581 500 1,191 368 234 24 
Spain 8,715 5,610 20,555 1,128 6,803 33 
Sweden 8,794 10,380 14,151 2,079 4,093 22 
Switzerland 5,880 4,818 13,251 2,108 3,594 10 
Turkey 4,602 2,927 13,315 779 3,928 24 
United 
Kingdom 
26,656 23,945 39,859 12,246 8,986 31 
United States 233,279 205,250 453,544 72,750 114,897 32 
Total OECD 586,229 505,103 1,147,773 160,720 313,411 35 




4.4 Country Profile Factors 
This section will introduce country profile factors in five aspects and will be used to 
analyse the regression result in each empirical chapter. Subsequently, the focused 
aspects are: government institutions, market sophistication, knowledge input, 
knowledge and technology output, and product market regulations. The reason behind 
choosing these factors is the motivation of multinational enterprises. For example, if a 
country has a more flexible political environment, it may attract more foreign 
investment from other countries. It reflects that the MNEs prefer to seek a good 
investment environment to reduce risk. This way, it could be a type of 
resource-seeking or political resource seeking factor.  
 
Moreover, the condition of the market in one country should also be considered, such 
as: market size, local market competition, and market openness, which reflects on 
market seeking. Finally, efficiency-seeking and knowledge seeking gain more 
importance in being motivations for MNEs’ activities. For instance, if a country has 
sufficient skilled labours, a higher innovation efficiency ratio and a higher level of 
knowledge output, it can be said that it has a comparative advantage in knowledge 
area as compared to countries. Therefore, such countries can develop faster than 
others. Therefore, the country’s ranking in each factor will be used to divide them into 
different groups and explain how these factors may influence the pattern of foreign 
direct investment (See Chapter 9). 
 
4.4.1 Government Institutions 
The first aspect focuses on institutions, which represents the framework of a country 
along with being the first thing that MNEs consider when employing their subsidiaries 
into a foreign country. Governance indicators are used to present the situation of the 
government institutions in one country. Table 4.13 shows the scores of 30 OECD 
countries in six categories (control of corruption, government effectiveness, political 
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stability and absence of violence, regulatory quality, the rule of law, and voice and 
accountability) in 2016. Additionally, the changing score between 1996 and 2016 
(under the Δ column) indicates whether their score had huge differences during the 
last two decades. For example, 25 countries got a negative sign of the changing score 
in the PV category, which indicates that most OECD countries had worse political 
stability and more violence in the past 20 years, especially in France (-32.31), 
Belgium (-30.59), and Italy (-28.61). 
 
When compared within the countries, Turkey is at the bottom of the list (see the 
number in the brackets). In the PV category, Turkey only got 5.71 in 2016, at quite a 
substantial distance from other countries on the list. The reason might be a civil war in 
Turkey, thereby presenting its precarious government institutions. Another country to 
be mentioned here is Greece. The government debt crisis created a shock in 2010, 
which also reflected in the indicators. Therefore, the score reduced from 1996, 
especially in the RL, PV, and GE category. 
 
According to this table, it can be observed how the government institution changed in 
long-run. Data was collected from these categories in selected years: 1996, 2006, and 
2016, which is presented in Appendix (Table 4.2.1 to Table 4.2.6). Analysing the 
modifications of each of the years would yield no results, despite these indicators 
being annually available in the World Bank. This is because political changes in a 
country need an extended period of the process; only after which, can the policy 























2016 Δ 2016 Δ 2016 Δ 2016 Δ 2016 Δ 
Australia 93.27(13) -0.28 92.31(13) -3.32 81.90(11) -14.37 97.60(04) 7.38 95.19(10) -1.29 94.09(13) 1.09 
Austria 91.35(16) -1.13 91.83(14) -1.07 72.86(16) -23.95 91.35(15) -4.85 95.67(09) -1.81 93.10(15) -0.40 
Belgium 92.31(15) 3.60 86.54(19) -4.72 61.43(22) -30.59 88.46(17) 3.68 88.94(18) -1.01 95.57(10) 3.07 
Canada 95.19(09) -1.04 95.19(08) 1.75 93.33(05) 3.44 94.23(10) 2.93 96.63(08) 1.66 96.06(09) -2.94 
Czech 
Republic 
67.79(23) -6.94 79.81(23) 7.68 83.33(09) -4.43 80.77(22) -1.30 84.13(22) 4.24 80.79(21) 2.79 
Denmark 99.04(03) -0.96 99.04(02) 4.50 74.76(15) -23.11 92.31(13) -5.52 97.60(06) -0.39 98.03(05) 2.03 
Finland 99.52(02) 0.06 96.63(05) 4.28 80.95(12) -16.39 96.63(06) 2.07 99.04(03) 0.04 99.01(03) 4.01 
France 90.38(18) 5.44 89.90(17) 4.11 44.29(27) -32.31 83.17(20) 1.65 89.42(17) -2.54 82.27(19) -6.73 
Germany 93.75(12) -0.34 94.23(10) 2.43 70.95(17) -21.07 96.15(07) 5.39 91.35(14) -2.62 94.58(12) 4.58 
Greece 56.73(28) -7.79 62.50(28) -15.10 41.90(28) -21.93 59.13(30) -8.26 59.13(28) -24.28 68.97(26) -7.53 
Hungary 61.06(26) -13.14 69.23(27) -9.46 69.05(18) -10.21 71.63(27) -3.91 70.19(26) -9.20 57.14(28) -19.86 
Iceland 95.67(08) 2.66 90.38(16) -5.79 96.19(03) 2.04 86.54(18) 0.13 89.90(16) -3.56 95.07(11) 1.07 
Ireland 92.79(14) 0.85 88.46(18) -1.70 76.67(14) -18.55 94.71(09) 1.78 90.38(15) -2.58 93.60(14) 2.10 
Italy 59.62(27) -7.59 71.63(26) -6.51 58.10(25) -28.61 75.00(26) -1.09 61.06(27) -23.36 79.31(22) -5.19 
Japan 90.87(17) 6.46 95.67(07) 14.25 86.19(08) -2.11 90.38(16) 17.56 88.46(19) -0.99 77.83(23) -3.17 
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, World Bank 
 
Notes: 1) CC indicates Control of Corruption; 2) GE indicates Government Effectiveness; 3) PV indicates Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence; 4) RQ indicates Regulatory Quality; 5) RL indicates Rule of Law; 6) VA indicates Voice and Accountability; 7) Δ indicates the 
differential of rank between 1996 and 2016 in each category; 8) Number in the brackets indicates the country’s ranking in each category. 
60 
 















2016 Δ 2016 Δ 2016 Δ 2016 Δ 2016 Δ 
Korea, Rep. 66.83 (24) 1.24 80.77 (22) 13.56 51.90 (26) -14.05 84.13 (19) 18.92 86.06 (20) 14.70 67.00 (27) -0.50 
Luxembourg 97.60 (06) 2.97 93.27 (11) -6.18 97.62 (02) 1.87 93.75 (11) -3.53 93.75 (11) -2.23 96.55 (08) 0.05 
Mexico 23.08 (30) -12.94 59.62 (29) -2.68 20.00 (29) -0.74 64.42 (28) 4.64 33.17 (30) 6.04 43.84 (29) -6.66 
Netherlands 94.71 (10) -2.06 96.15 (06) -2.21 77.62 (13) -22.38 98.56 (02) 0.19 97.12 (07) 1.64 98.52 (04) 1.52 
New Zealand 100.00 (01) 2.15 97.12 (04) 2.03 99.05 (01) 4.37 99.04 (01) 0.13 98.08 (05) -0.42 97.04 (07) -2.96 
Norway 98.08 (05) -0.31 98.56 (03) -0.35 91.43 (06) -8.04 92.79 (12) -0.69 99.52 (02) 0.02 100.00 
(01) 
2.50 
Poland 76.44 (21) 0.64 73.56 (25) -1.85 63.33 (20) -10.60 79.81 (23) 7.53 74.52 (25) 3.66 72.41 (25) -7.59 
Portugal 80.77 (20) -8.48 85.58 (20) -0.76 88.10 (07) -2.86 76.44 (25) -8.88 85.10 (21) -3.85 86.21 (17) -8.29 
Slovak 
Republic 
63.46 (25) 0.56 76.44 (24) 10.32 66.67 (19) -8.87 78.85 (24) 7.65 75.00 (24) 17.71 75.37 (24) 8.37 
Spain 68.75 (22) -14.05 83.17 (21) -6.44 61.90 (21) 8.71 81.73 (21) -2.51 80.77 (23) -9.68 81.28 (20) -8.22 
Sweden 98.56 (04) -0.37 94.71 (09) -2.56 82.38 (10) -17.09 97.12 (05) 7.98 100.00 
(01) 
3.02 99.51 (02) 4.01 
Switzerland 96.15 (07) 0.45 99.52 (01) 5.53 95.71 (04) -3.75 98.08 (03) 2.97 98.56 (04) -1.44 97.54 (06) 5.54 
Turkey 50.48 (29) -1.13 54.81 (30) -0.93 5.71 (30) -4.92 61.06 (29) 1.82 48.56 (29) 1.32 29.56 (30) -15.94 
United 
Kingdom 
94.23 (11) -0.93 92.79 (12) -3.93 59.05 (23) -19.68 95.19 (08) -4.26 91.83 (13) -2.65 90.64 (16) 3.64 
United States 89.90 (19) -1.49 91.35 (15) 2.28 58.57 (24) -19.09 91.83 (14) -3.83 92.31 (12) -0.15 84.24 (18) -6.76 
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, World Bank 
 
Notes: 1) CC indicates Control of Corruption; 2) GE indicates Government Effectiveness; 3) PV indicates Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence; 4) RQ indicates Regulatory Quality; 5) RL indicates Rule of Law; 6) VA indicates Voice and Accountability; 7) Δ indicates the 
differential of rank between 1996 and 2016 in each category; 8) Number in the brackets indicates the country’s ranking in each category.. 
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Table 4. 11 Country Profile Factor: Institutions 
 2015 2017  
Country Rank Score Rank Score Rank Change 
Finland 1 95.8 4 92.2 -3 
Norway 3 94 5 91.8 -2 
Denmark 4 93.1 6 91.4 -2 
New Zealand 5 93 2 93.4 3 
Canada 6 92.7 7 91 -1 
Netherlands 7 91.9 11 88.2 -4 
Sweden 9 90 10 88.3 -1 
Switzerland 10 89.6 8 89.5 2 
Australia 11 89.3 14 87.4 -3 
Austria 12 88.7 15 87.1 -3 
Iceland 13 87.8 16 86.6 -3 
United Kingdom 14 87.3 9 88.4 5 
Ireland 15 87.2 12 87.6 3 
United States 16 86.8 17 86.2 -1 
Japan 17 86.5 13 87.4 4 
Luxembourg 18 83.5 19 82.6 -1 
Belgium 19 83.3 26 80.5 -7 
Germany 20 83.2 18 83.5 2 
France 21 81.7 24 80.7 -3 
Portugal 25 80.6 23 80.8 2 
Czech Republic 32 76.4 30 77.6 2 
Korea, Rep. 33 76.2 35 74.5 -2 
Poland 34 75.3 33 75.6 1 
Spain 35 75.2 32 75.9 3 
Slovakia 36 75.1 34 74.5 2 
Italy 38 73.8 38 71.9 0 
Hungary 40 73.4 40 70.7 0 
Greece 52 68.2 59 65.2 -7 
Mexico 66 61.5 68 58.5 -2 
Turkey 84 55.8 95 50.6 -11 
OECD Average Score .. 82.6 .. 81.3 .. 
World Average Score .. 62.1 .. 63.0 .. 





Moreover, in the business environment, Canada was at the first place in 2015 but 
decreased to seventh in 2017. Other OECD countries, like Finland, Korea, Norway, 
Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom entered top 10 in both 2015 
and 2017. These countries have a relatively simple environment to start a new 
business, or preferential tax policies in their country. These could attract more 
multinational enterprises to establish their subsidiaries in their country and attract 
more foreign direct investment inflow from other countries. 
4.4.2 Market Sophistication 
The second aspect for MNEs to consider conducting investment in the foreign 
countries is market sophistication or market seeking (through the motivation way). 
The score under market sophistication measures the conditions and transactions of the 
market. Table 4.12 gives information about the rank of market sophistication of 30 
OECD countries in 2015 and 2017. Unsurprisingly, the United States ranked first in 
both 2015 and 2017, followed by the United Kingdom (74.3, rank third), Canada 
(73.5, rank fourth), Switzerland (72.3, rank fifth), and Denmark (68.3, rank seventh). 
Table 4.2.2 (in Appendix 4.2) shows the division of market sophistication into three 
categories: country credit, investment, and trade and competition. In the first category, 
the United States ranked at the first place with 79.2 in 2015 and 85.5 in 2017. This 
implies that the United States has a stable economic outlook, balance of payment, 
with the government having high solvency, which attracts MNEs to conduct 
investment. In addition, four more OECD countries are entering into top 10 of credit 
in 2017, consisting of New Zealand, Denmark, Australia, and the United Kingdom. 
 
With regards to the investment category, if one country could deal with venture capital, 
and the degree of market capitalisation, it could protect the minority investors. The 
top five countries under this category are: the United States, Switzerland, Canada, the 
United Kingdom, and Korea. In accordance, the investment environment in these 
countries is better than other OECD countries. Thus, they can attract more foreign 





The final category in the market sophistication is trade and competition. This category 
represents if the local market has intense competition with the foreign company, 
alongside presenting the scale of the domestic market. In this case, Japan, the United 
Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, and Netherland have a comparative advantage over 
OECD countries. However, Belgium dropped to the 24
th
 position, and the United 
States reached the first place in 2017. 
Table 4. 12 Country Profile Factor: Market Sophistication 
 2015 2017  
Country Rank Score Rank Score Rank Change 
United States 1 81.5 1 83.4 0 
United Kingdom 3 74.3 5 70.2 -2 
Canada 4 73.5 3 73.7 1 
Switzerland 5 72.3 7 67.5 -2 
Denmark 7 68.3 6 70.2 1 
New Zealand 8 67.6 8 66.3 0 
Australia 9 66.7 9 65.3 0 
Spain 10 64.7 18 59 -8 
Japan 12 64.3 12 64.3 0 
Ireland 13 64 25 55 -12 
Sweden 14 63.7 10 64.9 4 
Korea, Rep. 16 63.3 14 61.6 2 
Netherlands 17 61.8 17 59 0 
Finland 19 61.5 13 61.6 6 
Germany 22 59.2 16 60 6 
France 25 59 11 64.3 14 
Norway 29 56.5 22 57.2 7 
Austria 30 56.5 30 53.1 0 
Luxembourg 31 56.2 78 43.4 -47 
Portugal 34 55.4 43 51.1 -9 
Belgium 35 54.9 40 51.8 -5 
Italy 39 53.6 36 52.6 3 
Iceland 43 52.7 24 55.2 19 
Czech Republic 45 52.4 47 50.2 -2 
Greece 49 51.2 48 50.2 1 
Slovakia 53 50.4 67 45.8 -14 
Turkey 58 49.5 57 47.8 1 
Poland 60 49 55 48.2 5 
Mexico 69 47 49 50 20 
Hungary 77 46 91 41.5 -14 
OECD Average Score .. 59.9 .. 58.1 .. 
World Average Score .. 32.2 .. 47.2 .. 
Source: The Global Innovation Index, 2015 and 2017 
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4.4.3 Knowledge Input 
The third aspect is knowledge input to measure how advantageous a country needs to 
be for creating innovation. Table 4.13 indicates a summary of knowledge input in 30 
OECD countries in 2015 and 2017. Luxembourg got the 2
nd
 place for knowledge 
input ranking in 2015, with the score being 60.3 and decreasing to 7
th
 position in 2017. 
Six additional countries entered into top 10 around the world in 2015. The 
Netherlands, in particular, went up to 1
st
 place in 2017 with 63.7. Moreover, Table 
4.2.3 (in Appendix 4.2) provides detail information about the knowledge input divided 
it into two categories. The first category is total knowledge workers in each country. 
Sweden achieved 2
nd
 place with 80.7 in 2017, followed by Finland, Switzerland, 
Ireland, and Denmark. The more knowledge work in one country, the more products 
can be created. 
 
The second category under the knowledge input aspect is knowledge absorption, 
described the ability of one country to attract knowledge from another country. Three 
countries of OECD entered into top 10 in 2015, including Luxembourg (4
th
 place with 
61.7), Netherlands (7
th
 with 55.5, with the first place in 2017), and Finland (9
th
 place 
with 52.7). This implies that these three countries had a greater advantage in 
absorption of knowledge over other OECD countries. Therefore, they may excel more 







Table 4. 13 Country Profile Factor: Knowledge Input 
 2015 2017  
Country Rank Score Rank Score Rank Change 
Luxembourg 2 60.3 7 57.8 -5 
Switzerland 3 60 3 62.6 0 
Finland 4 58.8 6 60.1 -2 
Ireland 5 58.4 10 54.5 -5 
Sweden 7 56.9 4 62.6 3 
United States 9 55.4 8 56.4 1 
Netherlands 10 55.3 1 63.7 9 
United Kingdom 13 53.6 13 52.2 0 
Belgium 14 51 22 48.5 -8 
Japan 16 50.4 11 54.5 5 
Denmark 17 49.7 12 52.5 5 
Canada 18 49.3 24 47.8 -6 
France 19 49.3 18 50.6 1 
Germany 20 49.2 15 51.4 5 
Australia 23 47.5 27 45.4 -4 
Austria 24 47 19 50.3 5 
Iceland 25 46.4 20 29.8 5 
New Zealand 26 45.8 28 44 -2 
Norway 27 45.8 23 48.3 4 
Czech Republic 28 45.3 26 45.9 2 
Korea, Rep. 30 45.2 17 51.1 13 
Italy 39 40.6 35 39.6 4 
Spain 47 38.2 37 38.4 10 
Mexico 56 36.9 71 30.8 -15 
Hungary 57 36.8 40 37.8 17 
Slovakia 58 36.7 38 38.3 20 
Portugal 65 35.3 50 35.4 15 
Poland 66 35.2 42 37.4 24 
Greece 90 30.8 80 28.8 10 
Turkey 117 26.3 75 29.3 42 
OECD Average Score .. 46.6 .. 46.9 .. 
World Average Score .. 28.4 .. 35.0 .. 








4.4.4 Knowledge and Technology Output 
The fourth aspect is of the knowledge and technology output, which gives information 
about how the countries transfer the knowledge (or innovation) into other countries. 
Table 4.14 shows the knowledge and technology output in 30 OECD countries in 
2015 and 2017. Eight countries of OECD entered into top 10 in 2015, consisting of 
Switzerland, Sweden, the United States, Korea, Netherlands, Ireland, the United 
Kingdom, and Germany. These countries are good at knowledge output, owing to 
latest technology. Their knowledge or technology could be used to create new value in 
the foreign countries. In Appendix 4.2, the Table 4.2.4 provides additional information 
about this aspect, divided into three categories, including knowledge creation, 
knowledge impact, and knowledge diffusion.  
 
In terms of knowledge creation, Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States, and 
Germany rank in top 5. As a result, these countries have a strong knowledge and 
technology background, which could help them frequently create new products. 
Moreover, in the knowledge impact category, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, the 
United States, and Italy are the leading countries that use their knowledge to influence 
other countries. They have adequate high technology, which can be sold to foreign 
countries to impact people in improving their lifestyle. The final category in this 
aspect is knowledge diffusion, which measures how the amounts of high technology 
or innovation are exported into foreign countries. Switzerland, Ireland, Luxembourg, 












Table 4. 14 Country Profile Factor: Knowledge and Technology Output 
 2015 2017  
Country Rank Score Rank Score Rank Change 
Switzerland 1 72.4 1 69.1 0 
Sweden 2 60.5 3 62.5 -1 
United States 4 58 7 54.4 -3 
Korea, Rep. 5 56.7 6 54.7 -1 
Netherlands 6 55.9 2 62.9 4 
Ireland 7 55.7 5 55.9 2 
United Kingdom 8 54.9 13 46.5 -5 
Germany 10 53.4 8 51.1 2 
Finland 11 51.9 10 48.8 1 
Luxembourg 13 49.1 15 45 -2 
Japan 14 48.6 12 47.1 2 
Czech Republic 15 46.7 14 45.8 1 
Denmark 16 46.1 16 43.9 0 
Austria 17 43 21 38.2 -4 
New Zealand 20 42 29 34.2 -9 
Canada 21 41.9 19 38.7 2 
Italy 22 41.2 26 36.1 -4 
France 23 41.1 20 38.5 3 
Iceland 24 40.7 18 39.9 6 
Spain 25 39.9 24 36.3 1 
Norway 27 39.2 22 37.5 5 
Belgium 36 36.1 31 33.2 5 
Australia 39 34.8 34 32.1 5 
Hungary 40 34.8 33 32.3 7 
Slovakia 41 33.7 30 33.5 11 
Portugal 42 33.2 39 29.9 3 
Mexico 50 29.4 64 21.5 -14 
Poland 56 28.4 44 27.9 12 
Turkey 60 27.3 46 27.6 14 
Greece 71 26 74 20.4 -3 
OECD Average Score .. 44.1 .. 41.5  
World Average Score .. 28.2 .. 25.8  






4.4.5 Product Market Regulation 
Product market regulation is one of the essential indicators of multinational 
enterprises to consider conducting investment in foreign countries. Both table 4.15 
and 4.16 provide information about the regulation of total economy of OECD 
countries in 2013. Table 4.18 is focusing on the overall product market regulation in 
all OECD countries, thereby introducing three different groups of countries according 
to the various levels of the regulatory environment. Additional details are displayed in 
table 4.19 where product market regulation is divided into three categories: state 
control (STC), barriers to entrepreneurship (BTE), and obstacles to trade and 
investment (BTI). Subsequently, there can be more ideas for regulation in each 
country. 
 
a) Most Competition-Friendly Regulatory Environment 
Among OECD countries, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have the most 
competition-friendly regulatory framework. The Netherlands especially has three 
‘Green’ signs in state control, barriers to entrepreneurship, and obstacles to trade and 
investment. In accordance to that, multinational enterprises are welcome to conduct 
investment in the Netherlands. 
 
State control of businesses in the United Kingdom is deficient, regardless of public 
ownership or involvement in the business operation. At the industry level, such as: 
electricity, rail, gas, and telecoms, the state control or state ownership is almost 
nonexistent in this country. However, the level of regulatory environment in BTE and 
BTI just arrived at ‘Yellow’ degree, implying that the United Kingdom has no 
comparative advantage to attract inward investment from other countries. The 
manager of MNEs may treat the market of the United Kingdom similar to other 
European countries due to the neutral level of barriers. 
 
b) Around OECD Average Regulatory Environment 
Austria will be discussed as the first country, because the total economy has an 
average in the OECD countries, with a ‘Green’ sign in both state control and barriers 
to entrepreneurship. When compared to the United Kingdom, Austria has a more 
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competition-friendly environment in the BTE area, but Austria still has an OECD 
average for regulatory environment. This could be due to many limitations of 
regulation in network industries, retail industry, and some professional services. For 
instance, if there is a strict regulation of registration and licensing in the retail, which 
means it easily leading a monopoly in the market. The purpose of the government is 
to restrict licensing in the retail industry to protect existing companies, although 
suitable for attracting foreign investment inflow into Austria. 
 
Secondly, Denmark, Italy, New Zealand, and Slovakia are excellent locations to start a 
new business because the barriers to entrepreneurship are lower than the average 
score in the OECD countries. For example, the professional services, such as: 
accounts, lawyer, architects, and engineers, have a low entry regulation and conduct 
regulation, which encourages people to establish a new company. Furthermore, the 
regulation of retail industry in New Zealand has a more competition-friendly 
environment. The registration and licensing stay at the neutral level, but the manager 
has ample space in the price control of goods. The government of Slovakia has 
established some rules to minimise protection for the existing business to encourage 
new business or entrepreneurs for entering the market. 
 
Thirdly, the regulation of state control is less competition-friendly in Greece, Poland, 
Switzerland, and the United States.  Greece, in particular, had a government-debt 
crisis that damaged the whole country, which led the credit rating to drop to junk bond 
level. However, the Greece government introduced a series of reforms to raise their 
competition and credit after the Crisis. At the same time, the regulatory environment 
in the total economy came to the average level, maintaining the neutral trend in the 
BTE and BTI areas, while the government still had strict control of the regulation and 
price in business operation. Contrarily, in Poland and Switzerland, the strict state 
control contributed to the public ownership sector, especially in the gas and telecom 
industry. 
 
In addition, Iceland and Spain have a less competition friendly regulatory 
environment in the BTE area, which means that these two countries may not attract 
new businesses, although the government minimised the impact of politics to reduce 
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the interference. Comparatively, Canada is the only country with a strict regulation in 
barriers to trade and investment. 
 
Canada has an explicit barrier to FDI, including limits on foreign equity, employment 
of foreigners, restrictions on the number of branches, and the limitation of capital 
repatriation. Therefore, the environment of foreign investment in Canada is not 
beneficial for multinational enterprises to develop their businesses, since it has a less 
comparative location advantage over countries. The probability of the limitation for 
FDI could be because of a relatively relaxed investment in the previous years with a 
significant impact on the local business. This regulation may guarantee that the local 
business had competition with foreign companies. 
 
Furthermore, the remaining thirteen countries indicate a regulatory environment in the 
state control sector; BTE sector and BTI sector are staying at the average level of the 
OECD countries. Hence, these countries have an average degree of competition. For 
example, Australia has released the condition of import tariffs and lowered barriers to 
trade and investment for attracting investment from another country. Moreover, in the 
professional services, the entry regulation in accountants and architects also has a 
friendly competitive environment. Accordingly, the more professional people might 
consider developing their career in Australia. Another example is Japan as one of the 
developed countries in the Asia, it considers regulatory environment as a significant 
indicator for MNEs in terms of investment. According to Kojima’s work in 1978, 
Japan has a comparative location advantage over other countries. However, the 
regulatory environment is average level around OECD countries in all three categories. 
Specific to the regulation area, Japan has no comparative advantage over other OECD 
countries. 
 
c) Less Competition-Friendly Regulatory Environment 
Three countries, including Korea, Mexico, and Turkey, have a less competition 
friendly environment in their regulatory framework. For instance, Korea has a high 
barrier to investment and tariff. Therefore, it may not in Korea’s favor to attract 
foreign investment, which could be due to the government of Korea wanting to 
protect local business. 
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Moreover, the regulatory environment in the BTE and BTI area indicates a less 
competition friendly situation in Mexico, but the state control sector was at the 
average level of OECD countries. Therefore, it is difficult to start a new company, 
owing to substantial administrative burdens on sole proprietor businesses, including 
barriers in transport industries. 
 
Finally, the regulatory environment in Turkey is stringent, and the regulation of total 
economy indicates less competition in a friendly way. For state control, the 
government holds the largest company in the networks industry, like gas, transport, 
telecoms, and electricity. Moreover, Turkey’s government also controls the price for 
public transport. On the contrary, it is not a good choice to start a new business in 
Turkey, because the government makes several rules to protect incumbents, and also 
has a sophisticated system for licenses and permits. Consequently, the high barriers to 
entrepreneurship may limit the development of new businesses. Considering the trade 
and investment section, the barriers to FDI and commerce are not very strict, but a 
high obstacle to the trade facilitation exists along with  the treatments of foreign 
suppliers being  different. As a result, it is difficult for the multinational enterprises 
to develop a new market in Turkey, indicating that it is a conservative country in the 
regulation sector. 
 
Evidently, a healthy competition environment in the open market is quite remarkable. 
The regulation market constrains the behaviours of the producer, investor, governors, 
and consumers. Additionally, it has the advantage to allow new businesses to enter 
into the market to challenge the incumbents, and boost the economic growth in their 
own country. To get a more competition-friendly regulatory environment in the 
product market, the government in OECD should set up a series of approaches to 
improve market supervision. Furthermore, the government should have a frame of 






Table 4. 15 Regulation of Total Economic in OECD 




Netherlands 0.92 More 
Competition-Friendly United Kingdom 1.08 
















































The United States* 1.59 
Korea 1.88 Less 











Table 4. 16 Details of Regulation in the OECD Countries 







Australia Y Y Y Y 
Austria G G Y Y 
Belgium Y Y Y Y 
Canada Y Y R Y 
Czech Republic Y Y Y Y 
Denmark Y G Y Y 
Finland Y Y Y Y 
France Y Y Y Y 
Germany Y Y Y Y 
Greece R Y Y Y 
Hungary Y Y Y Y 
Iceland Y R Y Y 
Ireland Y Y Y Y 
Italy Y G Y Y 
Japan Y Y Y Y 
Korea Y Y R R 
Luxembourg Y Y Y Y 
Mexico Y R R R 
Netherlands G G G G 
New Zealand Y G Y Y 
Norway Y Y Y Y 
Poland R Y Y Y 
Portugal Y Y Y Y 
Slovakia Y G Y Y 
Spain Y R Y Y 
Sweden Y Y Y Y 
Switzerland R Y Y Y 
Turkey R R R R 
United Kingdom G Y Y G 
The United 
States* 




Note: ‘G’ for ‘Green’ and indicates the country has the most competition friendly in 
this category; ‘Y’ for ‘Yellow’ and indicates the country has an average level of 




4.5 Reliability and Validity of Data 
Data collection should have reliability and validity to ensure that the result of research 
can be more complete. The UNCTAD Statistics database provides a collection of 
indicators and statistics for the analysis of international trade, investment and 
development. It allows all users, like policymakers, academics, international 
organisations, and research specialists to access cross-comparable sets of data. The 
UNCTAD Statistics is continuously updated and enhanced, thus providing users with 
the latest available data. For OECD statistics, the data is collected directly or 
indirectly from countries’ official statistics producers. This statistic producer uses 
questionnaires, online platforms, and Web Queries to collect raw data. Moreover, the 
OECD cooperates with other organisations, like Eurostat, UN agencies, who exchange 
their data with primary users. 
4.6 Data Limitation 
The first challenge of data collection is the time-period. We expect to measure all 
variables from 1981 to 2015 in each country. However, in some countries the data is 
either unavailable or inaccurate. For example, the same data is used for Belgium and 
Luxembourg from 1981 to 2001 since they form an economic alliance, but from 2002 
onwards the data covers Belgium and Luxembourg separately. Regarding Germany, 
according to the UNCTAD dataset, the data is available for Federal Republic of 
Germany only from 1971 onward until 1989, and there is no available data for 
Democratic Republic of Germany. Therefore, we collect data for all variables from 
1990 to 2015, as the German reunification. 
 
In addition, the collection for R&D variable is concerning since a good resource is not 
available. Hence, six countries (Australia, Greece, Luxembourg, New Zealand, 
Sweden, and Switzerland) only have 11 observations in this variable. We were unable 
to use VAR model to estimate the relationship between FDI and R&D in these 
countries, due to an insufficient number of observations. Therefore, the regression for 
other 24 countries is individually undertaken alongside pooling all 30 countries 
together to measure the causality (see Chapter 7). 
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Finally, country profile factors were added in this thesis and grouped countries 
according to their ranking in each factor. However, it was difficult to find the history 
ranking for every factor, which is why a bias exists in the process of grouping 
countries. To reduce the bias, governance indicators were added to capture the 
longitudinal form of a government institution in each country. 
4.7 Conclusions 
This chapter reviewed the key variables used in the regression equation that included 
FDI inward flow, FDI outward flows, export, import, GDP, and R&D. The necessary 
information of each variable in every single country, like mean, median, maximum, 
minimum, standard deviation, and observations of variables was also discussed. This 
was followed by the four aspects: institutions, market sophistication, knowledge input, 
and knowledge and technology output as a country profile. These factors are used to 
explain the regression result in chapter 9, although not as an independent variable in 
the regression equation. The following chapter will discuss the econometric and 




















1. OECD Membership: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile*, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia*, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, 
Ireland, Israel*, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia*, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia*, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. (The countries with 
‘Star’, are not measuring in this thesis) 
2. UNCTAD Statistic Categories: International trade in goods and services, Economic 
Trends, Foreign direct investment, External financial resources, Population and labour 
force, Commodities, Information Economy, Creative economy, and Maritime 
transport. 
3. OECD Statistic Categories: General Statistics, Agriculture and Fisheries, 
Demography and Population, Development, Economic projections, Education and 
Training, Environment, Finance, Globalisation, Health, Industry and services, 
Information and communication technology, International trade and balance of 
payments, Labour, National Accounts, Monthly economic indicators, Prices and 
Purchasing power parities, Productivity, Public sector, taxation and market regulation, 
Regions and Cities, Science, technology and patents, Social protection and well-being, 
and Transport. 
4. Most Comprehensive Data 
This term refers to the direct investment statistics that disseminated and based on the 
most comprehensive regularly available data sources. These data may be preliminary 
and subject to revision. If a country compiles and disseminates data that have the 
same periodicity and based on the same sources and coverage, the “most 
comprehensive data” is the same as the “most timely data.” 
5. Most Timely Data 
The term refers to the direct investment statistics that are the first disseminate; that is, 
the data with the shortest lapse of time between the end of the reference period (or the 
reference date) and dissemination of the data. Although disseminated, such data may 
be preliminary and subject to revision. 
6. EUR: Europe; LCN: Latin America and the Caribbean; NAWA: Northern Africa 
and Western Asia; NAC: Northern America; SEAO: South East Asia, East Asia, and 
Oceania; HI: High Income; UM: Upper-Middle Income 
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Chapter 5 Econometric Methods 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will describe the main econometric techniques used in this thesis-VAR 
and ARDL Model. As previously mentioned several variables will be used in the 
model, which includes GDP, FDI inward flows, FDI outward flows, exports, imports, 
and the data of R and D (See Chapter 4). The structure of this chapter is as follows:  
 Section 5.2 will display the process of the established model with the 
empirical study and regression result in chapters 6, 7, and 8.  
 Section 5.3 will discuss the stationary of variables with unit-root test and 
cointegration test 
 Section 5.4 will introduce an alternative method of Engle-Granger two step 
approach. 
 Section 5.5 will include applications and conclusions of this chapter 
5.2 Establishing Model 
5.2.1 VAR Model 
Firstly, considering a simple OLS model with two variables, 𝑦𝑡 and 𝑥𝑡, we get an 
equation to indicate the relationship between  𝑦𝑡 and 𝑥𝑡: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼10 + 𝛽10𝑥𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡                                              (5.1) 
𝑦𝑡−1 = 𝛼10 + 𝛽10𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑡−1                                         (5.2) 
According to AR (1) Model, we can have 𝑣𝑡 = ℎ𝑣𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑡, where 𝜇𝑡 = 𝐸(𝜇𝑡) = 0; 
𝐸(𝜇𝑡
2) = 𝜎2; 𝐸(𝜇𝑡, 𝜇𝑡−𝑛) = 0, 𝑛 ≥ 1; ℎ represents unit-root. 
If ℎ = 1, which means there is a unit root in the time series sequence, the original 
sequence is nonstationary, then we need do the different to make the sequence 
stationary. 
 
𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡−1 = 𝛽(𝑥𝑡 − 𝑥𝑡−1) + (𝑣𝑡 − 𝑣𝑡−1) 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽∆𝑥𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 
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where, 𝜇𝑡 = 𝑣𝑡 − 𝑣𝑡−1 
 
On the contrary, if −1 < ℎ𝑖 < 1, (𝑖 = 1, 2, 3, 4), which implies that there is no unit 
root in the original time series sequence, then, 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡 
ℎ𝑦𝑡−1 = ℎ𝛼 + ℎ𝛽𝑥𝑡−1 + ℎ𝑣𝑡−1 
So,  
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼(1 − ℎ) + ℎ𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑥𝑡 − ℎ𝛽𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑡                           (5.3) 
 
Then we perform the simultaneous equation to get: 
𝑦1𝑡 = 𝛼11 + 𝛽11𝑥1𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑥2𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑥3𝑡 + 𝑣1𝑡 
𝑦2𝑡 = 𝛼21 + 𝛽21𝑥1𝑡 + 𝛽22𝑥2𝑡 + 𝛽23𝑥23 + 𝑣2𝑡 
Because 
𝑣1𝑡 = ℎ1𝑣1𝑡−1 + 𝜇1𝑡 
𝑣2𝑡 = ℎ2𝑣2𝑡−1 + 𝜇2𝑡 
 
Followed by a new simultaneous equation, written as: 
   𝑦1𝑡 = 𝛼11(1 − ℎ1) + ℎ1𝑦1𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝑥1𝑡 − ℎ1𝛽11𝑥1𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑥2𝑡 − ℎ1𝛽12𝑥2𝑡−1 
        +𝛽13𝑥3𝑡 − ℎ1𝛽13𝑥3𝑡−1 + 𝜇1𝑡                                (5.4) 
   𝑦2𝑡 = 𝛼21(1 − ℎ2) + ℎ2𝑦2𝑡−1 + 𝛽21𝑥1𝑡 − ℎ2𝛽21𝑥1𝑡−1 + 𝛽22𝑥2𝑡 − ℎ2𝛽22𝑥2𝑡−1 
         +𝛽23𝑥3𝑡 − ℎ2𝛽23𝑥3𝑡−1 + 𝜇2𝑡                               (5.5) 
where, 𝑦1 indicates FDI; 𝑦2 indicates exports; 𝑥1 indicates gross domestic product; 
and 𝑥2 indicates research and development; 𝑥3 in equation 5.4 indicates exports and 
in the equation 5.5 indicates FDI. These two equations show that the FDI lagged one 
year and export lagged one year, which may influence current FDI and exports. Due 
to the competitive market, policy influence may have a delayed impact. 
Now, considering the interaction between these variables, we established a VAR 
Model with four variables: 
 
𝑦1𝑡 = 𝑎11 + 𝑏12𝑦2𝑡−1 + 𝑏13𝑦3𝑡−1 + 𝑏14𝑦4𝑡−1 + 𝑐11𝑥1𝑡 + 𝑐12𝑥2𝑡 + 𝑣1𝑡       (5.6) 
𝑦2𝑡 = 𝑎12 + 𝑏21𝑦1𝑡−1 + 𝑏23𝑦3𝑡−1 + 𝑏24𝑦4𝑡−1 + 𝑐21𝑥1𝑡 + 𝑐22𝑥2𝑡 + 𝑣2𝑡       (5.7) 
𝑦3𝑡 = 𝑎13 + 𝑏31𝑦1𝑡−1 + 𝑏32𝑦2𝑡−1 + 𝑏34𝑦4𝑡−1 + 𝑐31𝑥1𝑡 + 𝑐32𝑥2𝑡 + 𝑣3𝑡       (5.8) 
𝑦4𝑡 = 𝑎14 + 𝑏41𝑦1𝑡−1 + 𝑏42𝑦2𝑡−1 + 𝑏44𝑦3𝑡−1 + 𝑐41𝑥1𝑡 + 𝑐42𝑥2𝑡 + 𝑣4𝑡       (5.9) 
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where, 𝑦1  represents inward FDI flow; 𝑦2  represents outward FDI flow; 𝑦3 
represents exports; 𝑦4 represents imports; 𝑥1 represents gross domestic product; and 
𝑥2 represents research and development. The variables of 𝑦1, 𝑦2, 𝑦3, and 𝑦4 are 
endogenous in this VAR model, while variables of 𝑥1, and 𝑥2 are exogenous in the 






















)  (5.10) 





], and  
E(𝜇𝑖𝑡) = 0, (𝑖 = 1, 2, 3, 4; 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇); E(𝜇𝑖𝑠, 𝜇𝑗𝑡) = 0, (𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, 2, 3, 4; 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇); 
E(𝜇𝑖𝑡2) = 𝜎𝑖
2, (𝑖 = 1, 2, 3, 4; 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇). 
 
The difference between the simultaneous equation and this VAR model is that: firstly 
we treat GDP and R&D as exogenous variables, with more focus on the causality 
between FDI and the international trade. Secondly, we do not add a previous year of 
the dependent variable in the equation, but focus further on the interaction between 
these four variables. Finally, there are 16 estimators that need to be measured in the 
equation 5.10, but the essential estimators are the coefficient indicated as 𝜙14, 𝜙23, 
𝜙33, and 𝜙42. The coefficient of 𝜙23, and 𝜙33 measures the causality between FDI 
outward where the export lagged 1 year, and the causality between the export at 
current year where the FDI outward lagged 1 year, respectively. Similarly, the 
coefficient of 𝜙14, and 𝜙42 is to estimate the relationship between FDI inward (or 










5.2.2 ARDL Model 
Generally, autoregressive distributed lag models are linear time series models with p 
lags on dependent variable yt and q lags on the explanatory variable xk. (Patterson, 
2000). Therefore, the general ARDL (p,q) model is given by: 
 
(1 − ∑ Ψ
𝑖
𝐿𝑖𝑝𝑖=1 )𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐿
𝑗𝑞
𝑗=0 𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                             
(5.11) 
where, 𝜀𝑡  are the error term, 𝛼0  is a constant, and Ψ𝑖 , 𝛽𝑗  are the coefficients 
associated with lags of yt, and lags of xj, for j=1,…, k. Subsequently, L could indicate 
the usual lag operator and define Ψ(L) and β (L). If we let Ψ(L) = (1 − ∑ Ψ𝑖𝐿
𝑖𝑝
𝑖=1 ) 
and β(L) = ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐿
𝑗𝑞
𝑗=0 , then the ARDL (p, q) model can be written as: 
Ψ(L)𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽(𝐿)𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                          (5.12) 
 
In the thesis, we will use ARDL (1, 1) model, which could be written as: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡                                (5.13) 
 
When adding variables into the equation (5.13), and using the first empirical study as 
example, we have three models to measure the relationship between FDI inward 
(outward) flows and economic growth (see equation 5.14 to equation 5.16). 
 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑂𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡    (5.14) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑂𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑡    (5.15) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛾2𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝛾4𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑂𝑡 + 𝛾5𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 + 𝜈𝑡    (5.16) 











5.3 Unit-root and Cointegration Test 
5.3.1 The definition of stochastic process 
A set of random variables {yt} is a stochastic process if it depends on the time. There 
is a specific example of the stochastic process, called white noise. If in a pure 





 is constant, for any t; and (iii) Cov(yt, ys)= E(yt* ys)=0, t≠s. 
This stochastic process is white noise. 
 




, for any 
t] of a stochastic process are constant over the time. The covariance in any two 
periods depends only on the distance or lag, not at time t (𝛾𝑘 = E[(𝑦𝑡 − 𝜇)(𝑦𝑡+𝑘 −
𝜇)], for any t), then this stochastic process is stationary. 
 
However, if there is no cointegration relationship between a set of nonstationary time 
series, the regression model is likely to appear spurious regression. In case the 
spurious regression, and the residual is a non-stationary sequence, and it cannot reflect 
the real causality of the dependent variables and independent variables, this regression 
has a good R-square and p-value. The solution for spurious regression is that adding 
or reducing independent variables sometimes make use of the first difference for the 
original equation, to make the regression stable. 
5.3.2 The Unit-root Test 
This section will discuss the test for a unit root. There are four tests always used to 
measure the unit-root, involving ADF test, PP test, LLC test (if there is a common 
root in the panel data), and IPS test (if there is an individual unit root in the panel 
data). In general, ADF test and PP test are always used to verify unit-root in the time 
series data. This thesis will discuss the ADF test. The unit-root test result of each 
country is displayed in the Appendices of chapter 5, section 5.1. 
 
Dickey and Fuller in 1979 put forward a test to estimate whether the unit-root exists in 
an autoregressive model. Furthermore, the DF test measures the remaining term, not 
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the original data, so we cannot use the standard t-statistics, but use Dickey-Fuller 
statistics instead. 
 
First of all, we need a general autoregressive model 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑝𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑡                                                    (5.11) 
Where 𝜇𝑡  is a white noise with zero mean, constant variance and none 
serial-correlation. Subsequently, we can have more equations with previous time 
periods. 
𝑌𝑡−1 = 𝑝𝑌𝑡−2 + 𝜇𝑡−1                                                (5.12) 
𝑌𝑡−2 = 𝑝𝑌𝑡−3 + 𝜇𝑡−2                                                (5.13) 
… 
𝑌𝑡−𝑁 = 𝑝𝑌𝑡−𝑁−1 + 𝜇𝑡−𝑁                                             (5.14) 
 
Then we put equation (5.11), (5.12), and (5.13) into the equation (5.14), toget 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑝
𝑁𝑌𝑡−𝑁 + 𝑝𝜇𝑡−1 + 𝑝
2𝜇𝑡−2 + ⋯ + 𝑝
𝑁𝜇𝑡−𝑁 + 𝜇𝑡                      (5.15) 
 
According to equation (5.15), p-value has three different situations. (a) if p<1,  
𝑁 → ∞, then 𝑝𝑁 → 0, the sequence will be stationary over the time; (b) if p>1, 
𝑁 → ∞, then  𝑝𝑁 → ∞, the sequence is nonstationary and it will increase over the 
time; (c) if p=1, 𝑁 → ∞, then  𝑝𝑁 = 1, the sequence is also nonstationary and it will 
experience no change over the time. 
 
For equation (5.11), the DF test measures the coefficient of Yt-1 is significant or not. 
Thus, the null hypothesis is H0: p=1, if the result of test rejects the null hypothesis, it 
indicates Yt does not have unit-root. However, if the test accepts the null hypothesis, 
then Yt has unit-root, with the sequence being known as random walk series. 
Moreover, if we make the first difference for equation (5.11), we can get 
∆𝑌𝑡 = (𝑝 − 1)𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 = 𝜃𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡                                  (5.16) 
 
Then, the null hypothesis becomes to H0:𝜃 = 0, if we accept the null, the equation 
will be ∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝜀𝑡, as a stationary series. This process is called integrated of order 1, 
written as I (1). In the practice, most time series data in the financial area is not 
stationary because they can change in every time point no matter in the short term or 
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long term (such as money demand, price level, exchange rate, and trading volume). 
Therefore, the difference process is necessary if we do a regression analysis with 
non-stationary time series. 
 
DF test is accomplished through three models: the first model does not include any 
intercept and time trend, written as∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝜃𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡; the second model contains only 
the intercept, written as∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝜃𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡; the third model includes both intercept 
and time trend, written as∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑇 + 𝜃𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡. The null hypothesis of these 
three models is H0: 𝜃 = 0. 
 
For example, if we test whether a variable is stationary, this variable should reject one 
of these three models. Otherwise, we consider one unit-root in the series. The levels of 
unit root test start with a sequence of basic level, and take the first-order differential 
test (if there is a unit-root in the primary level), and do the second-order differential in 
the last (if there still is a unit-root in the previous level). Thus, in the DF test, we need 
to keep conduct unit-root until the sequence is smooth. 
 
Furthermore, if the error term has a serial correlation, we need to adjust the third 
model and add lag dependent variable into the model. Thus, we will get: 
∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑇 + 𝜃𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖 ∑ ∆𝑌𝑡−1
𝑚
𝑖=1 + 𝜀𝑡                           (5.17) 
 
This equation based on the DF test, also known as Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
(ADF). In the time series variable, time-trend is one of the factors that may lead the 
variable to be non-stationary, since the variable will become more flexible with the 
increase of time. Table 5.1 to Table 5.30 indicates the test result of unit-root for 30 
OECD countries (See Appendices for Chapter 5). We are using the model with 
intercept. This model also has two pairs of hypotheses. The first pair is ‘I (2) vs I (1)’, 
which means the null hypothesis in this variable has a unit root at I (2) and the 
alternative hypothesis is that this variable has a unit root at I (1). If the test result has 
rejected the null hypothesis, it means the variable is stationary at I (1), and vice versa. 
We performed the same process in the second pair ‘I (1) vs I (0)’. If the test result has 
rejected the null hypothesis, it means that the variable is stationary at I (0), and vice 
versa. Moreover, for most variables we are using automatic selection and the 
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maximum lags are eight. However, we reduce the maximum lags to four for R and D 
variables, which because there are too much missing values in this variable. Moreover, 
there is no test result of R and D variable in Australia, New Zealand, and Switzerland 
that because the sample is too small and discontinued, thus we cannot do unit-root test 
for these countries. The p-value has been used in the unit-root test is 5%. 
5.3.3 Cointegration test 
The previous section discussed the set of nonstationary time series data may lead to 
the appearance of spurious regression. The solution to avoid the spurious regression, 
we can do the cointegration test. EG test (Engle and Granger test) and CRDW 
(Cointegration Regression Durbin-Watson test) always used to measure the spurious 
regression. Assume, if we have two random walk series, Xt and Yt, and both of them 
is I (1). Under the EG test, we need to run an OLS regression for 𝑦𝑡 = α + 𝛽𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡, 
then we can test whether the residual is stationary, because of if Xt and Yt has no 
cointegration relationship, then any of their linear combinations are nonstationary, as 
same as the residuals. 






where, the null hypothesis is H0: DW=0. In the equation et is a random walk, so we 
expect the (et-et-1)=0, if the test result rejects the null, we can say there is a 










5.4 Alternative Method: Engle-Granger Two Step Approach 
This approach is testing for non-cointegration variables. According to the unit-root 
test, we can find that most variables used in this thesis are nonstationary and 
integrating in the different level. Therefore, we will use this method as alternative 
model to test selected countries. 
 
Basically, in Engle-Granger approach, if yt and xt are stationary at I(1), then we have 
the cointegrating regression 𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡. Alternatively, suppose we added a 
third variable zt, then the correct cointegrating regression is  
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑧𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡                                          (5.25) 
Therefore, the Engle-Granger two steps approach will established as follow: 
i) yt and xt are stationary at I(1): yt ~ I(1) and xt ~ I(1). 
Then we use OLS to estimate yt and xt equation: 
ii) 𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡                                             (5.26) 
where, et ~ I(0), then we have the correct cointegrating regression: 
iii) Δ𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1Δ𝑥𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝑧𝑡 + 𝜈𝑡                            (5.27) 
 
 
According to the unit-root test (see Table 5.31 to 5.33 in Appendices for Chapter 5), 
we put 30 OECD countries into five group (Table 5.34). We will test one country in 
each group and will total estimate five countries. Moreover, we are using FDI inward 
flows as dependent variable; and FDI outward flows, GDP, export, import, and R and 
as independent variables. In order to measure how these factors effects on FDI inward 
flows. The Engle-Granger test can be found from Table 5.35 to Table 5.38; 
cointegrating regression result display from Table 5.39 to Table 5.42, and error 
correction model displayed from Table 5.39 to Table 5.42 in the Appendices. 
 
The first group has two countries, Australia and the United Kingdom. The 
characteristic of these them is the variable of FDI outward flows is stationary at I(0), 
we could use equation (5.27) to estimate it. In addition, the zt could be any stationary 
variable when we run the error correction model, but in this case, FDI outward flows 
variable represents zt. Type B is including ten countries and all the variables are 
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stationary at I(1), then we do the difference log for each variable and run error 
correction model. For type C, there are nine countries and in this group FDI inward 
flows stationary at I(0); while the remaining variables are stationary at I(1). Moreover, 
we cannot logarithm for FDI outward variable that because it could be negative in the 
flow data. Then we use ΔFDIOt / FDIOt-1 to measure its growth rate. In the fourth 
group is including five countries, which FDI inward and outward flows are stationary 
at I(0), but the remaining variables are stationary at I(1). Therefore, we do the 
difference log method for the remaining variables and then measured by 
Engle-Granger model. 
 
Three countries exist in the last group, Hungary, Luxembourg, and New Zealand, and 
we could not use Engle-Granger model for them. The reason is the result of unit-root 
test in some variables are stationary at least in I(2). For example in Hungary, GDP and 
export are stationary at I(2); in Luxembourg, the GDP variable is stationary at I(2); 
and in New Zealand, FDI outward flows and export variable are stationary at I(2). 
Moreover, we have only 35 years data for each variable; therefore, we could not do 
the breakpoint unit-root test, since we do not have longer enough dataset.  
 
When we do the regression test for these countries, we have to drop R and D variable 
for some countries, like Korea, Poland, Switzerland, and Turkey in type B; and Spain 
in type C. The reason because there are too many missing value in R and D variable 
of these countries, which makes it has a stationary at least on I(2). 
 
Moreover, we do not need to do the Engle-Granger test if all the variables are 
cointegration, which because the definition of cointegration is a relationship between 
non-stationary variable. Since, we use Engle-Granger test and error correction model 
for selected country, so we will give general interpretation of model. For example, if 
there is a positive significant relationship between economic growth and FDI inward 
flows. That means the growth rate of GDP is another factor that can influence FDI 
inward flows and outflow. Because, if a country there is an increase in the growth rate 
of GDP, this means this country is a good place to invest for. This implies that there is 




This chapter reviewed several econometric models, OLS model and VAR model. The 
application of unit-root problem in the time series database and the solution of this 
issue to make data series becomes stationary was also discussed. The final part of this 
chapter used motor vehicles industry as a case study and discusses the pattern of the 
relationship between FDI and international trade. The result of case study points out if 
the situation is varying, the causality of this relationship should also be different. 
Therefore, the four significant coefficients in section 5.5.2 could be positive or 
negative. Further details will be discussed in the final empirical study (See Chapter 8). 

























Chapter 6 Empirical Study 1: The Causality of FDI and 
Economic Growth 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins analysing our three empirical studies, arranged as follows: chapter 
6 discusses the essential link between foreign direct investment and economic growth. 
Chapter 7 analyses the second causality of this thesis, the relationship between FDI 
and R&D. The final empirical study will explain the causality of the foreign direct 
investment and international trade, in chapter 8. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to answer the first research question established in 
Chapter 1—what is the relationship between FDI and economic growth? The analysis 
of 30 countries in OECD will be done by using autoregressive distributed lag and 
pooling data analysis. The variable used in this empirical study includes FDI inward 
flow, FDI outward flows, and GDP. The regression result can be found from page 53 
to page 82 in Appendices. 
 
To interpret the relationship between foreign direct investment and economic growth, 
country profile factors analyse the regression result in four categories, including, FDI 
regulatory restriction, institutions, market sophistication, and product market 
regulation. 30 countries will be segregated into two main groups, based on the 
condition of FDI regulatory restriction. Subsequently, the focus will shift to how 
country characteristics work on the links between FDI and economic growth. 
The structure of this chapter is organised as follows: 
 Section 6.2 will display the regression result of the relationship between FDI 
and economic growth, including the stationary test  
 Section 6.3 will consist of the pooling data analysis  
 Section 6.4 will discuss the interpretation of the country profile analysis  
 Section 6.5 will focus on the conclusion of this chapter 
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6.2 The causality of Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth 
According to the GDP equation, the investment (portfolio investment and foreign 
investment) will affect economic growth in one country. Therefore, foreign 
investment flow out of the total investment in a country measured if it had a 
significant influence on economic growth by its own. Figure 6.1 indicates the 
summary of the relationship between FDI and economic growth. 18 countries show 
causality between FDI and economic growth, with the remaining countries failing to 
display a significant relationship between these two variables. The countries with a 
significant relationship are divided into three groups, including the bi-direction 
relationship (13 countries), the influence of FDI on economic growth (2 countries), 
and the effects of economic growth on FDI (3 countries). 
 
Figure 6.2 displays the details of countries in each bi-direction and single direct 
relationship, consisting of two bi-direction causalities and four single direction 
relationships. The figure displays red box to indicate single direction from FDI flows 
to economic growth; while the single opposite direction from economic growth to FDI 
flows is presented in the light blue box. Additionally, we list country (indicated by the 
country code, which could find in Appendices for Chapter 6, Table 6.1) under each 
box. Moreover, some country code with a ‘*’ suffix exists, implying that the 
regression result is not stationary and will be discussed in section 6.3. Therefore, 
section 6.2.1 will discuss the first bi-direction causality of FDI inward flows and 
economic growth, along with the second bi-direction relationship between FDI 
outward flows, and economic growth is indicated in section 6.2.2. The pooling data 















































































6.2.1 Foreign Direct Investment Inward and Economic Growth 
Firstly, the first single direction from FDI inward flows to economic growth will be 
analysed. According to the regression result, 13 (out of 30) countries indicate that FDI 
influences economic growth. Australia, Germany, Korea, Luxembourg, Norway, Spain, 
United Kingdom, and the United States show that FDI inward flows in the current 
year had a significantly positive effect on economic growth. Accordingly, the FDI 
inward flow from abroad supports their economic growth in these six countries. 
Bi-direction 
FDI & Economic Growth 
(2 Countries-Korea & 
Luxembourg) 
Bi-direction 






























































Therefore, they attract more inflow from FDI , thereby significantly improving the 
economy of their country. However, the remaining five countries, Austria, Denmark, 
Germany, Hungary, Sweden, indicted that inward foreign direct investment may not 
support economic growth. Therefore, they had an adverse impact on their economies. 
With regards to these countries, the government should reduce inward FDI to ease the 
harm for the economic growth. 
 
The second single relationship in this section is the causality for economic growth 
affecting foreign direct investment inward flows. 13 countries exist under this 
relationship as well, which occupied 43.3% of the total OECD countries. Furthermore, 
the variable of GDP in Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Mexico, and New Zealand 
indicates a negative effect on outward FDI. While the remaining eight countries 
displayed that current GDP had a positive influence on outward FDI flow. It may 
confirm that with regards to most of the countries economic growth will attract more 
inward investment from other countries. On the contrary, the booming economy in 
one country maybe one of the major reasons to attract foreign investment from 
abroad. 
6.2.2 Foreign Direct Investment Outward and Economic Growth 
This section separates the bi-direction causality into two single direction relationships 
and analyses them one by one. The first single relationship focuses on the foreign 
direct investment outward flow effects on the economic growth. There are eight 
countries indicates in this one-way link. The regression result suggested that FDI 
outward has an influence on economic growth, but most of them have a positive 
impact, including Austria, Czech Republic, Ireland, Korea, and Sweden. Therefore, 
when the government conducts investment into other countries from these countries, it 
may enhance their economic growth. On the other hand, FDI outward lagged in the 
one year variable in Norway and the United Kingdom, with the current year of FDI 
outward variable in Luxembourg illustrating a significantly negative influence on 
economic growth. Only in these three countries, the regression result suggests that the 




The focus shifts to the second single direction relationship from economic growth to 
FDI outward flows. Five countries (out of 30) displayed that their GDP had a 
significant impact on FDI outward. The regression result in Luxembourg suggested 
that the economic rise may not support or conduct investment abroad. In other words, 
in case of economic growth in their countries, investment in the foreign countries 
reduced. However, the result of other four countries (Australia, Czech Republic, 
Korea, and Sweden) indicates that with increase in the economic growth of their 
country, they will encourage more investment in other countries. The next section will 
use four country profile factors, which are: FDI regulatory restriction, institutions, 
market sophistication, and product market regulation, analysis of the bi-direction 
between foreign direct investment and economic growth in more detail. 
6.2.3 Stationary Test of Model 
According to the lag structure test, three countries (Ireland, the Netherlands, and New 
Zealand) indicate that their regression result is not stationary. Therefore, the first 
difference of each variable will be used and the regression will be re-run. The 
unit-root test in each country can be found in chapter 5 (Econometric Methods) 
Appendix.  
 
According to the unit-root test in Ireland, the variables of FDI inward flows, FDI 
outward flows, and GDP are stationary at I (1). Subsequently, the regression result 
suggests that FDI outward flows and economic growth had a positive influence on 
each other. Moreover, in the Netherlands, all of the variables were stationary at first 
difference, except for the FDI inward flows, which were stationary in the original time 
series data. Upon re-running the VAR model in this country, the regression result 
indicated that the lack of a relationship between foreign direct investment and 
economic growth. In case of New Zealand, the vector error correction model could 
not be performed since FDI outward flow variable is stationary in I (2), but GDP 
variable is stationary at I(1), and FDI inward flows is stationary at the original time 
series. The precondition of VECM regression is to make sure each variable is 
stationary at I (1). However, all the OECD countries could not be pooled together to 
get the general causality of FDI and economic growth. The explanation is in the 
following section, which compares its regression result with each of the OECD 
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countries to find the difference between the general causality and the causality of the 
individual countries. 
6.3 Pooling Data Analysis 
The previous two subsections gave a general idea of the relationship between foreign 
direct investment and economic growth in each OECD country. The focus now shifts 
to the pooling data method to analyse the general causality in 30 OECD countries. 
Table 6.1 shows the regression result of pooling data analysis with 992 observations. 
According to the regression result, the foreign direct investment inward flows had a 
significant influence on economic growth in both lagged one year and lagged two 
years’ variable. However, FDI outward flows indicated an adverse effect of economic 
growth in the lagged one year and lagged two years’ variables. In accordance with this, 
if an OECD country could attract more foreign investment into their country, their 
economy would experience a significant rise; whereas if they conducted investment 
abroad at the same time, the speed of economic growth may reduce. 
 
On the contrary, the variable of economic growth did not indicate a significant effect 
of foreign direct investment in both inward and outward flows. This implies that the 
economic growth increased in one country, but it may not influence the amount of 
inward and outward FDI flows. The exogenous variables export display an adverse 
effect for FDI inward flows, FDI outward flows, and economic growth. However, the 
import variable shows positive influence on these three variables. In this case, export 
may ‘substitute’ causality with FDI flows, but import had a ‘complementary’ causality 
with FDI flows. Additional details of the relationship between FDI and trade will be 











Table 6. 1 Pooling Data Result 
 
 FDINF FDIOF GDP 
FDINF(-1) 
 
0.322*** 0.012 0.764** 
(0.037) (0.045) (0.347) 
FDINF(-2) 
 
0.094** 0.039 0.686** 
(0.037) (0.045) (0.348) 
FDIOF(-1) 
 
0.049* 0.503*** -1.927*** 
(0.029) (0.035) (0.272) 
FDIOF(-2) 
 
-0.069** -0.022 -0.704** 
(0.031) (0.037) (0.286) 
GDP(-1) 
 
0.001 -0.004 0.798*** 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.031) 
GDP(-2) 
 
-0.002 -0.003 -0.114*** 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.027) 
Constant 
 
6,479.375 24,351.968*** 1,294,209.350*** 
(7,662.110) (9,321.225) (71,770.705) 
Export 
 
-0.067*** -0.066*** -1.608*** 
(0.016) (0.020) (0.154) 
Import 
 
0.107*** 0.115*** 2.848*** 
(0.019) (0.023) (0.176) 
DUMAUL 
 
-1,355.545 -25,699.562*** -1,252,687.357*** 
(8,056.905) (9,801.507) (75,468.738) 
DUMAUS 
 
-8,011.034 -23,811.623** -1,346,522.213*** 
(8,327.388) (10,130.560) (78,002.342) 
DUMBEL 1,628.201 -21,397.112** -1,444,548.247*** 
(8,712.771) (10,599.392) (81,612.213) 
DUMCAN -2,108.377 -18,966.914* -1,298,141.378*** 
(8,222.628) (10,003.115) (77,021.059) 
DUMCZE -6,784.663 -27,267.875** -1,356,111.993*** 
(8,814.455) (10,723.094) (82,564.683) 
DUMDEN -6,751.012 -23,477.413** -1,304,743.387*** 
(8,314.789) (10,115.233) (77,884.332) 
DUMFIN -6,012.632 -24,077.321** -1,295,477.982*** 
(8,285.534) (10,079.644) (77,610.303) 
DUMFRA -10,349.547 -13,660.418 -1,185,610.290*** 
(7,935.275) (9,653.541) (74,329.436) 
DUMGER -13,159.230 -10,931.357 -1,227,556.989*** 
(9,034.778) (10,991.125) (84,628.441) 
DUMGRE -8,069.566 -26,193.520*** -1,356,500.861*** 
(8,220.252) (10,000.225) (76,998.801) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: ‘FDINF’ means FDI Inward Flows; ‘FDIOF’ means FDI Outward Flows; ‘DUABC’ 





Table 6.1 Pooling Data Result (Cont.) 
 
 FDINF FDIOF GDP 
DUMHUN -6,423.399 -25,564.589** -1,327,427.144*** 
(8,388.272) (10,204.627) (78,572.643) 
DUMICE -6,306.481 -24,227.371** -1,296,991.625*** 
(8,315.148) (10,115.669) (77,887.693) 
DUMIRE -1,008.570 -20,539.551** -1,332,044.034*** 
(8,427.425) (10,252.259) (78,939.390) 
DUMITA -12,527.759 -23,545.325** -1,191,563.266*** 
(7,844.481) (9,543.086) (73,478.971) 
DUMJAP -19,173.442*** 6,038.502 -414,968.526*** 
(6,519.694) (7,931.437) (61,069.739) 
DUMKOR -10,744.892 -26,887.501*** -1,391,660.082*** 
(8,281.014) (10,074.144) (77,567.959) 
DUMLUX 3,269.329 -17,287.614* -1,404,329.955*** 
(8,620.407) (10,487.028) (80,747.041) 
DUMMEX -4,721.664 -26,316.552*** -1,308,658.640*** 
(8,174.610) (9,944.700) (76,571.275) 
DUMNET -1,793.042 -20,777.587** -1,387,382.588*** 
(8,672.315) (10,550.176) (81,233.263) 
DUMNEW -7,455.608 -19,202.287* -1,297,662.274*** 
(8,282.806) (10,076.324) (77,584.748) 
DUMNOR -4,625.337 -23,521.235** -1,245,367.436*** 
(8,242.060) (10,026.755) (77,203.081) 
DUMPOL -6,386.526 -25,569.638** -1,332,283.288*** 
(8,311.249) (10,110.927) (77,851.175) 
DUMPOR -7,140.211 -25,869.715** -1,328,533.219*** 
(8,317.551) (10,118.593) (77,910.200) 
DUMSLO -7,008.308 -25,758.285** -1,335,293.902*** 
(8,792.453) (10,696.328) (82,358.590) 
DUMSPA -3,616.800 -20,458.742** -1,276,781.897*** 
(8,142.025) (9,905.060) (76,266.059) 
DUMSWE -3,292.210 -18,742.672* -1,295,840.547*** 
(8,270.751) (10,061.659) (77,471.830) 
DUMSWI -2,572.898 -13,967.583 -1,271,569.322*** 
(8,483.547) (10,320.533) (79,465.079) 
DUMTUR -8,299.617 -25,981.387*** -1,310,026.231*** 
(8,208.332) (9,985.724) (76,887.152) 
DUMUK 4,142.731 -8,754.130 -1,244,794.509*** 
(8,167.497) (9,936.047) (76,504.649) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: ‘FDINF’ means FDI Inward Flows; ‘FDIOF’ means FDI Outward Flows; ‘DUABC’ 





Table 6.1 Pooling Data Result (Cont.) 
 FDINF FDIOF GDP 
R-squared 0.705 0.638 0.993 
Adj. R-squared 0.693 0.624 0.993 







Histogram-Normality 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Serial Correlation 0.000 0.006 0.000 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: ‘FDINF’ means FDI Inward Flows; ‘FDIOF’ means FDI Outward Flows; ‘DUABC’ 
means Dummy Variable in each Country (See Table 6.2 in Appendices). 
 
6.4 Country Profile Analysis 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the country profile helps analyse the regression result. 
Therefore, four factors of the country profile will be used to interpret the regression 
result: FDI regulatory restriction, institution, market sophistication, and product 
market regulation. Firstly, FDI regulatory restriction divide 30 OECD countries into 
two groups. Table 6.1 shows the first situation of the country having an FDI 
regulatory restriction, including 11 countries. Moreover, Table 6.2 indicates 19 
countries in the second situation, which has no FDI regulatory restriction in the 
country. Subsequently, ‘Y’ (for Yes) and ‘N’ (for No) displays whether the country 
satisfied the other three countries profile factors. 
 
The condition of the first situation is that it has an FDI regulatory restriction. 
According to Table 6.1, Australia, Austria, Korea, Norway, and the United States 
indicated a bi-direction relationship between foreign direct investment and economic 
growth. Especially Korea and Norway ranked relatively high in one of the country 
profile factors. The regression result shows that if there is a rise in their GDP, they 
may attract more FDI inward flows into the country. The reason behind this could be 
that Norway’s institution and Korea’s market environment, when compared to Austria 
and the United States, which had a high ranking in the institution factors. The 
regression result indicates that both of them had a significant positive bi-direction 
between FDI flows and economic growth. Therefore, the foreign investment inward 
98 
 
may encourage economic growth and at the same time, if GDP in these two countries 
increased, more investment will be conducted into foreign countries. 
 
Furthermore, three countries display a single direction from economic growth to FDI 
flows, including New Zealand, Iceland, and Mexico. The country profile of New 
Zealand indicated high-level institution with a healthy environment competitive 
market and comparative ease product market regulation. Thus, the regression result 
displayed that FDI inward flows could enhance economic growth in this country. By 
contrast, Iceland and Mexico had a low ranking in the market sophistication and 
product market regulation, implying that the regression result suggested that economic 
growth had a negative influence on FDI inward flows. Therefore, the country profile 
factors may affect the causality of FDI flows and economic growth. Moreover, no 
countries indicated that the other single direction of FDI flows affect economic 
growth in this group. 
 
The countries in the second situation had a less strict FDI regulatory restriction or lack 
thereof. The bi-direction relationship included eight countries, where Denmark and 
the United Kingdom had a high level of country profile factors. The FDI inward flows 
had a positive influence on economic growth, but at the same time, the economic 
growth may reduce inward investment in Denmark and attract more investment in 
Britain. Germany, Spain, and Sweden had relatively high-ranking in two of the factors. 
The regression result shows that FDI inward flows had a negative effect of economic 
growth in Germany and Sweden, but a positive influence on Spain. On the other hand, 
GDP had a positive effect on FDI flows in both Spain and Sweden, but an adverse 
effect in Germany. 
 
In the single direction causality, only two countries showed that FDI had a significant 
influence on economic growth, with no country indicating that economic growth 
could affect FDI flows. According to the Table below, Ireland had a better country 
profile as compared to Hungary, which had a high level of institutions, ease product 
market regulation, and friendly market competition environment. The FDI outward 
flows may significantly encourage the economy in Ireland. In addition, Hungary’s 
regression result indicated that FDI inward flows may reduce the speed of economic 
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growth, while FDI outward flows could increase GDP. The remaining six countries 
showed no relationship between FDI flows and economic growth. This consists of 
Belgium, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, France, and Turkey.
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Table 6. 2 Situation 1: If the country has an FDI Regulatory Restriction 
 





Australia Y* Y* Y* 3Y Bi-direction 
Austria Y* N* Y* 2Y1N Bi-direction 
United States Y* Y N* 2Y1N Bi-direction 
Korea, Rep. N* Y* N 1Y2N Bi-direction 
Norway Y N* N* 1Y2N Bi-direction 
New Zealand Y Y* Y* 3Y GDP on FDI 
Iceland Y* N* N* 1Y2N GDP on FDI 
Mexico N N N 3N GDP on FDI 
Canada Y Y Y* 3Y None 
Switzerland Y* Y N* 2Y1N None 
Poland N* N N* 3N None 
Notes: Y indicates the country has a high-level ranking in this country profile factor; Y* indicates the country has an upper average level ranking in this 
country profile factor; N indicates the country has a lower average level ranking in this country profile factor; N*indicates the country has a low-level 










Table 6. 3 Situation 2: If the country does not have an FDI Regulatory Restriction 
 





Denmark Y Y* Y* 3Y Bi-direction 
United Kingdom Y* Y Y 3Y Bi-direction 
Germany Y* N* Y* 2Y1N Bi-direction 
Spain N* Y* Y* 2Y1N Bi-direction 
Sweden Y* Y* N* 2Y1N Bi-direction 
Czech Republic N* N* Y* 1Y2N Bi-direction 
Luxembourg Y* N* N* 1Y2N Bi-direction 
Greece N* N* N* 3N Bi-direction 
Ireland Y* Y* Y* 3Y FDI on GDP 
Hungary N* N Y* 1Y2N FDI on GDP 
Finland Y Y* Y* 3Y None 
Japan Y* Y* Y* 3Y None 
Netherlands Y* Y* Y 3Y None 
Belgium Y* N* Y* 2Y1N None 
Italy N* N* Y* 1Y2N None 
Portugal N* N* Y* 1Y2N None 
Slovakia N* N Y* 1Y2N None 
France N* N* N* 3N None 
Turkey N N N 3N None 
Notes: Y indicates the country has a high-level ranking in this country profile factor; Y* indicates the country has an upper average level ranking in this 
country profile factor; N indicates the country has a lower average level ranking in this country profile factor; N*indicates the country has a low-level 




This chapter measured the first empirical analysis of the relationship between foreign 
direct investment and economic growth. In general, according to the pooling data 
regression result, GDP could not effect the FDI flows of both the inward and outward 
sides. Therefore, economic growth could not support either FDI inward flows or FDI 
outward flows in the OECD countries. However, the regression result suggested that 
FDI inward flows had a positive effect on economic growth, and FDI outward flows 
may have a negative influence on economic growth at the same time. 
 
To conclude, Figure 6.3 and 6.4 show the bi-direction of FDI inward flow (or FDI 
outward flows) and economic growth, respectively. According to figure 6.3, ten 
countries show a relationship between FDI inward flows and economic growth, with 
nine of them having a positive effect (Australia, Denmark, Spain the United Kingdom, 
Greece, Korea, Luxembourg, Norway, and the United States). However, the same 
causality had an adverse influence on Germany. Compared to figure 6.4, only four 
countries came under the causality of FDI outward flows and economic growth, 
especially the Czech Republic, Korea, and Sweden, which showed a positive 
relationship, with a negative influence of this causality in Luxembourg. 









AU DE DK ES GB GR KR LU NO US
FDI Inward Flows on GDP
GDP on FDI Inward Flows
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Figure 6. 4 The Bi-direction of FDI Outward Flows and Economic Growth 
 
 
Moreover, figure 6.5 and 6.6 indicate two single direction causalities of FDI inward 
(outward) flows and economic growth. According to figure 6.5, only Ireland, in the 
single direction from FDI inward flows to economic growth, showed a positive effect 
of this relationship. By contrast, the second situation of single direction causality went 
from FDI outward flows on economic growth, only in Hungry, which indicated a 
positive influence on this relationship. Lastly, figure 6.6 indicates that three countries 
had another single direction relationship from GDP to FDI flows, which did not exist 
in the pooling data analysis. According to the Figure, economic growth had an adverse 
effect on FDI inward flows only in Iceland, Mexico, and New Zealand. The regression 
result did not show that any country had a significant effect of economic growth on 








CZ KR LU SE
FDI Outward Flows on GDP
GDP on FDI Outward Flows
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Figure 6. 5 The Single Direction: FDI Flows on Economic Growth 
 
 














FDI Inward Flows on GDP









GDP on FDI Inward Flows
GDP on FDI Outward Flows
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Chapter 7 Empirical Study 2：The Causality of FDI and 
Technology 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 discussed the relationship between foreign direct investment and economic 
growth in 30 OECD countries. The focus is now on the second empirical study— the 
causality of foreign direct investment and research and development. According to the 
previous empirical studies (See Chapter 3, section 3.3), few researchers focused on 
the relationship between FDI flows and local R and D activities. Knowledge seeking 
FDI and efficiency seeking FDI is an essential motivation of MNEs, which desired to 
conduct FDI in the foreign country. Currently, in particular, the latest technology from 
more than 20 or 30 years ago, like artificial intelligence (AI) is developing. This 
technology will change people’s lives in the future and bear the brunt of the trade and 
investment area. Thus, R&D and innovation are increasingly gaining importance 
around the globe. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to measure how FDI and R&D affect each other, along 
with analysis of the characteristics of each country. The same dataset will be used 
from the previous chapter, with the exception of the data of R&D in Australia, New 
Zealand, and Switzerland being unavailable. Therefore, total 27 countries are 
observation in this empirical study. The econometric method used in this chapter is the 
ARDL model and pooling data method. The variable in the model includes FDI 
inward flow, FDI outward flow, GDP and R&D. The regression result for 27 countries 
was displayed from page 83 to page 109 (See Appendices for Chapter 7). Since the 
data of R&D in some countries is not enough to measure, pooling data is used to 
estimate how these variables work together in total 30 countries. Moreover, the 
country profile factors will be used for analysis, including, FDI regulatory restriction, 
institutions, market sophistication, knowledge input, and knowledge and technology 
output.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows:  
 Section 7.2 discusses the causality between FDI and R&D with a 
stationary test of modal  
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 Section 7.3 focuses on the pooling data research analysis  
 Section 7.4 consists of the country profile analysis  
 Section 7.5 concludes the chapter 
7.2 The Causality of FDI and Research and Development 
This section will explain the causality of foreign direct investment and innovation 
(measured by R&D). The four sub-sections include the FDI inward flows had 
influence R&D, the effect of R&D on foreign direct investment. Figure 7.1 indicates 
all the sub-relationship between FDI and R&D. Total four sub-relationships uare 
indicated through different colours. The single direction from FDI inward and 
outward flow to R&D, is in the green box, and another single direction from R&D to 
FDI inward and outward flow, is in the yellow box. 
 
Consequently, the first bi-direction of FDI inward flows and R&D will be discussed in 
section 7.2.1. Section 7.2.2 will discuss the second bi-direction causality of FDI 
outward flows and R&D. The econometric part uses VAR (1) for analysis. In 
accordance with the previous chapter, FDI inward flow, FDI outward flows, GDP, and 
R&D as an endogenous variable; and trade (export and import) would be the 

















7.2.1 Foreign Direct Investment Inward and R&D 
Firstly, the relationship between foreign direct investment inward flow and research 
development will be discussed. Two countries indicated that the foreign direct 
investment inward flows had an adverse effect on R&D, implying that if increased 
investment came into in France and Korea, lesser R&D they will be produced. 
However, in Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, and the United Kingdom, the lag one 
year FDI inward flows variable had a positive influence on the current R&D. On the 
contrary, three countries displayed a single direction from R&D to FDI inward flow. 
Norway, United Kingdom, and the United States showed a positive influence of R&D 
to inward FDI. 
 









































According to the regression result, the R & D and FDI inward flow had an tense 
relationship in most of the country. Therefore, if developed countries possess high 
technology, they would wish to conduct foreign investment in developing countries, 
thereby fuelling their efficiency seeking motivation instead of attracting foreign 
investment from another developed country. In this stage, developed countries had 
ownership comparative advantages over other countries. Subsequently, according to 
Vernon’s product cycle model (1977), when the product is at the mature level, export 
to another country could maximise the return of profit. 
7.2.2 Foreign Direct Investment Outward and R&D 
Two single direction relationships exist under this bi-direction causality. In particular, 
the first one-way causality (FDI outward flows effect on R&D) includes ten countries. 
In terms of Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, 
and Portugal, the FDI outward will promote that their R&D significantly increased. 
The remaining country, Finland, showed an adverse influence of FDI outward flows 
on R&D. The reason could be that it had a high technology background, thereby 
proving that knowledge seeking is not their primary motivation. Thus, they do not 
need to use foreign investment to encourage their technology. 
 
Moreover, the second single direction causality of R&D effects on FDI outward flows 
showed six countries in this relationship. Demark; in particular, indicated an increase 
in R&D factor and a decline in FDI outward flows. Thereofre, the government 
preferred spending more money on their innovation to improve their unique 
technology for a comparative advantage instead of conducting foreign investment in 
other countries. On the contrary, in Czech Republic, Ireland, Japan, Korea, and Poland, 
the current R&D variable had a significant positive influence on FDI outward flows. 
Thus, if technology improved in these countries, they might prefer to conduct 
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Moreover, compared to Turkey and other OECD countries, the former turned out to be 
a conservative country. Tukey could not satisfy any of the six country profile factors, 
implying that it had a stringent market entrance policy, low level of knowledge input, 
and technology output. Therefore, if Turkey wanted to enhance their innovation, the 
better choice would be to invest in other countries and import mature products later. 
The country profile analysis will be displayed in section 7.4. 
7.2.3 Stationary Test of Model 
This section will discuss the stationary test for the VAR model. According to the 
inverse roots of AR characteristic polynomial of each country, eight countries are not 
stationary in the VAR model, when compared to the unit-root test in chapter 5. The 
results indicated that Iceland and Norway could not perform the VAR regression with 
the first different variable because the R&D variables in these two countries were not 
enough to pass the unit-root test. Therefore, the level of stationary in R&D variable 
could not be identified. However, the unit-root test of variables in Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Poland, and Slovakia did not have the same stationary level, thereby 
disallowing the VECM regression. 
 
However, in Austria and the United Kingdom, the variables had a same stationary 
level after a re-run of the regression test. Subsequently, the result suggested that 
innovation had a positive influence on FDI inward flows in Austria. If newer 
technology was created in Austria, more foreign capital entered the country. 
Furthermore, in the United Kingdom, R&D had a significant positive effect on both 
inward and outward flows; whereas the FDI inward flows may reduce the speed of 
innovation. The next section will pool all of 30 OECD countries’ data together and 
analyse the general relationship between foreign direct investment and innovation. 
Finally, the regression result will be compared in general causality and the individual 




7.3 Pooling Data Analysis 
This section pools the 30 OECD countries together with FDI inward flows variable, 
FDI outward flows variable, and R&D variable to analyse the general relationship 
between foreign direct investment and technology. Table 7.31 gives information about 
the pooling data regression result. The regression result suggests that FDI inward 
flows in both lagged one-year variable and lagged two years variable did not have a 
significant influence on R&D variable. Therefore, regardless of the FDI inward flows 
in the host country, the technology or the development of R&D Department may not 
significantly change. However, FDI outward flows variable displayed a negative 
effect of R&D development in both lagged one-year variable and lagged two years’ 
variable. Thus, if capital remove increases in a foreign country, it may be harmful to 
the technology development in the host country. This result may suggest that the 
government should focus on their technology development to get comparative 
ownership advantages, rather than blindly conduct investment abroad. 
 
Contrarily, R&D lagged one-year variable had a positive influence on both inward and 
outward FDI flows, whereas the lagged two years of R&D variable indicated an 
adverse effect of FDI flows. This regression result suggested that technology should 
be constantly updated. For instance, when a new technology is introduced, almost 
every country will wish to be familiar with it. Therefore, initially, the developed 
countries could execute export to developing countries. However, at the end of the 
product life-cycle, new technology might replace the old one, and an updated product 
will be produced by other countries. This explains why the lagged two-year R&D had 
a negative influence in both FDI inward flows and outward flows, since the old 










Table 7. 1 Pooling Data Result 
 
 FDINF FDIOF RD 
FDINF(-1) 
 
0.295*** -0.044 -0.003 
(0.045) (0.054) (0.009) 
FDINF(-2) 
 
0.101** 0.057 0.008 
(0.045) (0.054) (0.009) 
FDIOF(-1) 
 
0.045 0.531*** -0.011* 
(0.035) (0.042) (0.007) 
FDIOF(-2) 
 
-0.078** -0.050 -0.028*** 
(0.036) (0.043) (0.007) 
RD(-1) 
 
0.901** 1.926*** 0.973*** 
(0.402) (0.483) (0.078) 
RD(-2) 
 
-0.975** -2.145*** -0.135* 
(0.401) (0.481) (0.077) 
Constant 
 
6,143.095 5,838.739 18,250.211*** 
(8,324.650) (9,982.530) (1,604.606) 
Export 
 
-0.083*** -0.069*** -0.027*** 
(0.019) (0.022) (0.004) 
Import 
 
0.125*** 0.107*** 0.047*** 
(0.021) (0.025) (0.004) 
DUMAUL 
 
-1,721.658 -3,183.323 -18,334.313*** 
(23,038.585) (27,626.790) (4,440.769) 
DUMAUS 
 
-7,342.762 -5,692.409 -19,000.397*** 
(9,196.532) (11,028.050) (1,772.664) 
DUMBEL 
 
5,916.756 1,555.316 -21,337.699*** 
(9,957.416) (11,940.467) (1,919.327) 
DUMCAN 
 
-693.521 -348.354 -20,056.511*** 
(9,321.514) (11,177.923) (1,796.755) 
DUMCZE 
 
-6,467.534 -8,399.206 -19,235.458*** 
(9,632.791) (11,551.191) (1,856.755) 
DUMDEN 
 
-6,915.012 -4,802.026 -18,953.251*** 
(9,308.046) (11,161.773) (1,794.159) 
DUMFIN 
 
-5,425.294 -5,466.343 -18,467.921*** 
(9,112.825) (10,927.672) (1,756.530) 
DUMFRA 
 
-9,291.138 3,059.329 -19,073.256*** 
(9,103.155) (10,916.076) (1,754.666) 
DUMGER 
 
-9,938.404 7,721.638 -18,918.150*** 
(10,347.231) (12,407.914) (1,994.466) 
DUMGRE 
 
-9,756.487 -11,196.733 -27,494.522*** 
(10,223.724) (12,259.810) (1,970.659) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: ‘FDINF’ means FDI Inward Flows; ‘FDIOF’ means FDI Outward Flows; ‘DUABC’ 





Table 7.1 Pooling Data Result (Cont.) 
 
 FDINF FDIOF RD 
DUMHUN 
 
-5,983.307 -7,125.997 -19,129.953*** 
(9,542.356) (11,442.746) (1,839.323) 
DUMICE 
 
-6,075.058 -5,804.655 -18,409.994*** 
(9,740.452) (11,680.293) (1,877.507) 
DUMIRE 
 
-2,521.914 -3,419.456 -19,137.709*** 
(9,261.379) (11,105.811) (1,785.164) 
DUMITA 
 
-10,933.616 -6,565.363 -20,941.830*** 
(9,450.313) (11,332.372) (1,821.581) 
DUMJAP 
 
-16,687.080** 14,890.099* -6,895.459*** 
(7,558.135) (9,063.361) (1,456.858) 
DUMKOR 
 
-13,192.848 -8,954.280 -16,339.785*** 
(8,995.660) (10,787.173) (1,733.945) 
DUMLUX 
 
9,277.781 8,760.691 -18,335.508*** 
(10,740.296) (12,879.259) (2,070.230) 
DUMMEX 
 
-3,483.795 -9,478.905 -22,182.638*** 
(10,035.826) (12,034.492) (1,934.441) 
DUMNET 
 
-212.099 -331.642 -20,216.515*** 
(9,652.249) (11,574.525) (1,860.505) 
DUMNEW 
 
-12,006.549 -6,723.779 -21,795.270*** 
(13,506.594) (16,196.474) (2,603.444) 
DUMNOR 
 
-2,149.608 -2,191.628 -17,992.818*** 
(9,989.794) (11,979.292) (1,925.568) 
DUMPOL 
 
-5,998.448 -7,854.639 -19,781.876*** 
(9,550.970) (11,453.075) (1,840.983) 
DUMPOR 
 
-6,909.557 -7,417.431 -19,116.840*** 
(9,217.874) (11,053.642) (1,776.778) 
DUMSLO 
 
-6,698.691 -6,973.166 -19,043.260*** 
(9,638.207) (11,557.685) (1,857.799) 
DUMSPA 
 
-3,162.875 -3,204.915 -20,178.189*** 
(9,321.887) (11,178.370) (1,796.827) 
DUMSWE 
 
-2,115.977 3,553.292 -19,356.681*** 
(10,394.946) (12,465.131) (2,003.663) 
DUMTUR 
 
-8,107.839 -8,703.005 -19,712.181*** 
(9,534.262) (11,433.040) (1,837.763) 
DUMUK 
 
8,325.777 12,217.222 -21,978.742*** 
(10,022.274) (12,018.241) (1,931.829) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: ‘FDINF’ means FDI Inward Flows; ‘FDIOF’ means FDI Outward Flows; ‘DUABC’ 






Table 7.1 Pooling Data Result (Cont.) 
 
 FDINF FDIOF RD 
R-squared 0.717 0.656 0.996 
Adj. R-squared 0.702 0.638 0.996 







Histogram-Normality 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Serial Correlation 0.000 0.005 0.000 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: ‘FDINF’ means FDI Inward Flows; ‘FDIOF’ means FDI Outward Flows; ‘DUABC’ 
means Country’s Dummy Variable (See Table 6.2 in Appendices). 
7.4 Country Profile Analysis 
This section will use four country profile factors to analyse the regression result and 
interpret the second causality in this thesis: the relationship between foreign direct 
investment and R&D. The second research question is, ‘will the high technology in 
one country will attract MNEs to conduct investment into the host country?’ since 
they have a comparative over other countries. Subsequently, if one country had a high 
technology, they might use the high-tech to invest in another country. Therefore, two 
more factors are added: knowledge input and knowledge and technology output, to 
interpret how R&D and FDI influenced each other. 30 OECD countries are divided 
into two groups. The first group focuses on if the country had an FDI regulatory 
restriction with 11 countries being a part of the group (see Table 7.32). The second 
group has no FDI regulatory restriction in their countries, with the remaining 19 
countries (see Table 7.33). 
 
Firstly, the first situation combines the regression result from Chapter 7. Korea 
indicated a bi-direction causality of FDI flows and R&D. FDI inward flows showed a 
negative effect of R&D, but a positive influence of R&D on FDI outward flows, 
implying that if higher technology is produced in Korea, more investment might be 
conducted in foreign countries. Moreover, in Iceland and Mexico, the regression result 
indicated that FDI outward flows had a positively significant influence on R&D. On 
the contrary, the regression result suggested that R&D had a significant effect on 
foreign direct investment in three countries. R&D indicated a positive effect of 
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foreign direct investment inward flows in Norway and the United States, and showed 
a positive effect of FDI outward flows in Poland. Three of the remaining five 
countries, (Australia, New Zealand and Switzerland), did not have regression result 
because of a shortage in the R&D database. Two countries, (Canada and Austria), 
indicated no relationship between R&D and foreign direct investment. 
 
The second situation suggested a lack of or weakness in FDI regulatory restriction of 
the country. 19 countries are considered in this situation. Seven of them (Netherlands, 
Sweden, Luxembourg, Spain, Italy, and Turkey) showed no relationship between FDI 
flows and R&D. The remaining 12 countries indicated that the regression result 
showed a bi-direction relationship and single-way causality from FDI to R&D, 
respectively. 
 
Furthermore, in Denmark, Finland, Japan, Czech Republic, Ireland, and the United 
Kingdom, the regression result showed a bi-direction relationship between R&D and 
foreign direct investment. With regards to Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Japan, in 
particular, research and development and FDI outward flows had a positive effect on 
each other. Therefore, these countries might invest abroad more if they had a strong 
R&D department in their country. On the contrary, the United Kingdom showed that 
FDI inward flows and R&D had a positive influence on each other. Similarly, Finland 
might see improvement in R&D attract more inward investment entry into the 
country. 
 
The second situation only includes a single direction relationship between FDI flows 
and R&D, including five countries, Germany, Belgium, France, Hungary, and 
Portugal. Foreign Direct Investment outward flows had a positive influence on R&D 
in Germany, France, Hungary, and Portugal. Therefore, outward FDI will support the 
government to focus more on the improvement of R&D. However, FDI inward flows 
showed a positive effect on R&D in Belgium as medium level of country profile 
factor. On the contrary, R&D had a negative effect of inward foreign direct investment 




Table 7. 2 Situation 1: If the country has an FDI Regulatory Restriction 







Summary Relationship between 
FDI and R&D 
Korea, Rep. N* Y* N* Y* 2Y2N Bi-direction 
Iceland Y* N* N* N* 1Y3N FDI on R&D 
Mexico N N N* N* 4N FDI on R&D 
United States Y* Y Y* Y 4Y R&D on FDI 
Norway Y N* N* N* 1Y3N R&D on FDI 
Poland N* N N* N* 4N R&D on FDI 
Canada Y Y Y* N* 3Y1N None 
Austria Y* N* Y* N* 2Y2N None 
Switzerland Y* Y Y Y 4Y .. 
Australia Y* Y* Y* N* 3Y1N .. 
New Zealand Y Y* N* N* 2Y2N .. 
Notes: Y indicates the country has a high-level ranking in this country profile factor; Y* indicates the country has an upper average level ranking in this 
country profile factor; N indicates the country has a lower average level ranking in this country profile factor; N*indicates the country has a low-level 








Table 7. 3 Situation 2: If the country does not have an FDI Regulatory Restriction 








Summary Relationship between 
FDI and R&D 
Denmark Y Y* Y* Y* 4Y Bi-direction 
Finland Y Y* Y Y* 4Y Bi-direction 
Ireland Y* Y* Y Y* 4Y Bi-direction 
Japan Y* Y* Y* Y* 4Y Bi-direction 
United Kingdom Y* Y Y* Y* 4Y Bi-direction 
Czech Republic N* N* N* Y* 1Y3N Bi-direction 
Germany Y* N* Y* Y* 3Y1N FDI on R&D 
Belgium Y* N* Y* N* 2Y2N FDI on R&D 
France N* N* Y* N* 1Y3N FDI on R&D 
Hungary N* N N* N* 4N FDI on R&D 
Portugal N* N* N* N* 4N FDI on R&D 
Netherlands Y* Y* Y* Y* 4Y None 
Sweden Y* Y* Y* Y 4Y None 
Luxembourg Y* N* Y Y* 3Y1N None 
Spain N* Y* N* N* 1Y3N None 
Italy N* N* N* N* 4N None 
Turkey N N N N 4N None 
Slovakia N* N N* N* 4N None 
Greece N* N* N* N 4N None 
Notes: Y indicates the country has a high-level ranking in this country profile factor; Y* indicates the country has an upper average level ranking in this 
country profile factor; N indicates the country has a lower average level ranking in this country profile factor; N*indicates the country has a low-level 




This chapter analysed the second research question about the relationship between 
foreign direct investment and technology in 30 OECD countries. According to the 
pooling data regression (See Table 7.1), no bi-direction relationship exists between 
FDI inward flows and technology. However, the technology had a diminishing effect 
on both FDI inward flows and outward flows, implying that the technology will 
support FDI flows at the current and lagged one year; while having a different 
influence in the following years. This could be due to the technology having 
timeliness and the requirement of being frequently updated, otherwise losing the 
ownership advantage in the global market. 
 
By contrast, with individual countries (see Figure 7.3 to Figure 7.6), only the United 
Kingdom displayed bi-direction between FDI inward flows and technology, 
specifically that FDI inward flows and R&D had a positive influence on each other. In 
addition, in the bi-direction of FDI outward flows and technology, this causality in 
Japan had a positive influence on each other. However, Denmark showed a 
significantly positive effect on R&D; whereas the R&D had a negative influence on 
FDI outward flows. 











FDI Inward Flows on RD
RD on FDI Inward Flows
119 
 
Figure 7. 4 The Bi-direction of FDI Outward and Technology 
 
 
With regards to the single direction of FDI flows on technology, FDI inward flows 
had a positive influence on R&D in Belgium, Czech Republic, and Finland, with a 
negative influence on France and Korea. The remaining seven countries indicated that 
FDI outward flows could promote technology development (see Figure 7.5). In terms 
of the second single direction relationship from technology to FDI flows, for instance, 
Czech Republic, Ireland, Korea, and Poland showed that R&D had a positive effect of 
foreign direct investment inward flows. Additionally, in Norway and the United States, 
R&D indicated a positive influence on foreign direct investment outward flows. The 
pattern of the relationship between FDI and technology will be discussed further in 
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Figure 7. 5 The Single Direction: FDI Flows on Technology 
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Chapter 8 Empirical Study 3: The Causality of FDI and 
International Trade 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter will talk about the last empirical study in the thesis: causality of foreign 
direct investment and international trade. The primary purpose of this chapter is to 
answer the third research question, could the FDI and trade be ‘complementary’ or is 
their relationship a ‘substitute’ for each other?’ The same database and 
vector-auto-regression model is used to analyse this research question. The regression 
result is in the alphabetical order and listed in Appendix. The variables of ARDL 
consist of FDI inward flow, FDI outward flows, and export, import. 
 
With regards to interpreting the relationship between foreign direct investment and 
international trade, it will be divided into into two categories: to analyse the effect of 
international trade on FDI, and to measure the effect of FDI on international trade. 
Total eight small relationships will be looked at in these two categories. However, 
four of them are the crucial relations and will be discussed in further detail. These 
four key relationships are: the effect of import on FDI inward, the effect of FDI 
inward on import, the effect of export on FDI outward, and the effect of FDI outward 
on export. 
 
In addition, the six country profile factors will also be considered to analyse the 
regression result. Those factors are: FDI regulatory restriction, institutions, market 
sophistication, product market regulation, knowledge input, and knowledge and 
technology output. The characteristics of each factor are in chapter 4. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows:  
 Section 8.2 will explain the influence of international trade on FDI in 
details  
 Section 8.3 will discuss the effects of FDI on international trade  
 Section 8.4 will consist of the residual analysis for VAR model and the 
country profile analysis  
 Section 8.5 will include the conclusion of the chapter 
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Figure 8. 1 Summary of the Relationship between FDI and International Trade 
 
8.2 The Causality of Foreign Direct Investment and International 
Trade 
This section will discuss the relationship between foreign direct investment and 
international trade, divided into two sub-sections: the effect of international trade on 
FDI, and the effect of FDI on international trade. Each sub-section has four more links 
among FDI inward, FDI outward, import, and export. In terms of econometrics, GDP 




















































will be exogenous variable and the regression result of 30 countries is attached from 
page 251 to page 310. Figure 8.2 indicates the details of countries in  eight coloured 
boxes (4 in purple and 4 in blue) at the fourth level (from top to bottom), presenting 
different causalities of FDI and trade. The details of the F four purple boxes will be 
explained in section 8.2.1, followed by the details of relationship in the blue boxes in 
section 8.2.2. Furthermore, the Figure uses country code, the details of which will be 
displayed in the Appendix. 
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8.2.1 International Trade on Foreign Direct Investment 
a) Exports on FDI inward flows 
According to the first purple box, four countries indicate that export affects FDI 
inwards. In Australia and Ireland, the current year of export has a positive effect on 
inward FDI. In addition, the lagged one year of exports variable indicated a significant 
positive influence on foreign direct investment inward flows in Denmark and Poland. 
Therefore, the exports in these countries could attract more investment. 
b) Exports of FDI outward flows 
Several empirical studies analysed this relationship and the effect of FDI 
outwards on exports. The purpose of these studies is to find a way to explore the 
precise causality of exports and FDI outwards. Some of them think the exports and 
FDI outwards should be ‘complementary’, but others believe their relationship could 
also be ‘substitutes’. 
 
This thesis found that the exports of nine countries had a relationship with FDI 
outward. In Australia, France, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, and Portugal, the export 
(current year variable or lagged one year variable) indicated that a significant positive 
effect on current FDI outward. However, the remaining three countries (Greece, 
Poland, and Slovakia) have an opposite effect on the FDI outward flow. According to 
the description of regression result a precise conclusion cannot be derived about the 
relationship between export and FDI outward. Consequently, the thesis discussed the 
effect of FDI outward on export in section 6.3.1 to get more information.. 
c) Imports on FDI inward flows 
Five countries showed that imports affect FDI inwards. Out of those, four countries 
indicated that imports in current year or lagged one year variable had a negative 
influence on current FDI inwards. Furthermore, only Poland displayed that the current 
year variable of imports had a positive sign for inflows FDI. The remaining countries, 
Denmark, France, Ireland, and the United States showed opposite signs of imports at 
the current year and lagged one year variable. 
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This relationship is similar to the former one between exports and outward FDI. It is 
also important to consider whether the inward FDI may ‘substitute’ import or if it has 
a ‘complementary’ relationship with import.  The relationship of inward FDI on 
import should be compared to get the more accurate result . 
d) Imports on FDI outward flows 
This relationship consists of 33.3% (3 countries out of 9) countries that indicate a 
negatively significant relation of imports in the current year or lagged one year 
variable on current FDI outwards. Only Denmark shows that imports in lagged 1 year 
had a positive effect on FDI outwards. The last four countries, France, Greece, Japan, 
and Spain showed a positive significant effect of current FDI outward flows. Iceland, 
in particular, indicated a positive influence on both the current year of imports 
variable and lagged one-year variable. It is important to compare the coefficient of 
these two variables and find out which variable’s influence is more advantageous for 
FDI outward. 
8.2.2 Foreign Direct Investment on International Trade 
a) FDI outward flows on exports 
Seven out of four countries under this relationship showed a significantly negative 
effect, with three of them indicating a positively significant effect. In terms of the 
negative effect of this relationship, France and Spain displayed that the current year of 
export variables works on this influence, whereas the other two countries, Austria and 
Portugal, the variable of exports lagged one year. On the contrary, the current year 
FDI outflows variable in Norway had a positive significant influence on current 
exports, but in Japan and Poland, this influence made by exports lagged one-year 
variable. 
b) FDI outward flows on imports 
This relationship showed that nine countries indicated that their FDI outward had a 
positively significant effect on import. Greece and Iceland, in particular, showed the 
variable of FDI outward current year and lagged one-year variable both showed a 
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strong positive influence, while only FDI outward at current year variable had the 
same effect in other countries (France and Spain). Moreover, this causality in 
Denmark, Korea, Norway, and Poland was negative, implying that the current year 
FDI outward variable or the lagged one-year FDI outward may reduce the magnitude 
of the current import. The sign of FDI outward current year variable and FDI lagged 
one-year variable were opposite in Japan. Thus, the key is to consider the coefficient. 
c) FDI inward flows on exports 
Nine countries are displayed in this relationship, concerning that the FDI inward 
(current year or lagged one-year) variable had an influence on current exports. Six 
countries showed significantly positive effects in the relationship: Australia displayed 
the effect of FDI inward current year variable; the variable of FDI inward lagged 
one-year in Norway and Portugal; these variables of FDI inward flows both worked 
on current export in France, Iceland, and Ireland. Furthermore, the remaining three 
countries showed a negative effect for FDI inward on exports, including Greece, 
Poland, and Slovakia. 
d) FDI inward flows on imports 
The final relationship to be discussed in this chapter is the important causality of 
foreign direct investment and international trade . The causality of the general idea of 
whether the FDI inward and import is ‘complementary’ or ‘substitute’ for each other 
is analysed. 
 
Five of the seven countries indicated a significant adverse effect of FDI inward 
variable on current import. France and Ireland, in particular, displayed that both 
current year FDI inward and lagged one-year variable had a negative correlation 
between FDI inward and import. Therefore, the relationship between inward FDI and 
import may display ‘substitute’. However, the remaining two countries, Poland and 
Slovakia, showed a positively significant influence of this causality. Moreover, in 
Poland, the variable of FDI inward at current year, and FDI lagged one-year both 
indicated a positive effect on this relationship. Hence, the FDI inward supported the 
import, are ‘complementary’. 
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8.2.3 Pooling Data Analysis 
This section will analyse the regression result of the causality of foreign direct 
investment and international trade with the pooling data (See Table 8.31). The 
regression includes FDI inward flow, FDI outward flows, export, and import as an 
endogenous variable, and GDP as exogenous variable. In addition, dummy variables 
of each country were present to control the country variable. The regression result 
indicated that both FDI inward flows and FDI outward flows had no significant effect 
in both export and import in OECD countries, except that the lagged one year of FDI 
outward flows had a positive significant effect on import. 
 
On the contrary, export and import variable showed an opposite influence on FDI 
inward flows. The regression result displayed that export lagged one year will have an 
adverse effect on FDI inward flows, but import lagged one-year variable showed 
support for inward FDI flows. However, the export and import variables displayed 
that no significant impact on export. Therefore, in general, the export and FDI 
outward flows could not be either ‘complementary’ or ‘substitute’ causality. 
Consequently, no bi-direction relationship exists between FDI inward flows and 

















Table 8. 1 Pooling Data Regression Result 
 FDINF FDIOF Export Import 
FDINF(-1) 
 
 0.209**  0.181***  5.153***  5.065*** 
 (0.094)  (0.057)  (3.332)  (3.284) 
FDINF(-2) 
 
 0.155***  0.087***  2.578***  2.504*** 
 (0.098)  (0.059)  (3.466)  (3.416) 
FDIOF(-1) 
 
 0.442***  0.450*** -0.181 -0.185 
 (0.099)  (0.060)  (3.503)  (3.453) 
FDIOF(-2) 
 
 0.312***  0.201***  6.932***  6.764*** 
 (0.115)  (0.069)  (4.049)  (3.990) 
Export (-1) 
 
-0.240***  0.190* -22.099*** -22.401*** 
 (0.112)  (0.067)  (3.950)  (3.892) 
Export (-2) 
 
 0.031  0.053 -0.220 -0.270 
 (0.052)  (0.031)  (1.825)  (1.799) 
Import (-1) 
 
 0.237*** -0.199***  22.248***  22.556*** 
 (0.113)  (0.068)  (4.000)  (3.942) 
Import (-2) 
 
-0.037 -0.057  0.107  0.161 
 (0.052)  (0.032)  (1.848)  (1.821) 
Constant 
 
-209.790*** -55.243*** -9,344.282*** -9,223.872*** 
 (10.602)  (6.391)  (374.141)  (368.732) 
GDP 
 
 0.217***  0.065***  9.620***  9.495*** 
 (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.167)  (0.164) 
R-squared  0.742  0.553  0.815  0.816 
Adj. R-squared  0.739  0.549  0.813  0.814 









Histogram-Normality 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Serial Correlation 0.216 0.224 0.058 0.057 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: ‘FDINF’ means FDI Inward Flows; ‘FDIOF’ means FDI Outward Flows. 
8.3 Stationary test of Model 
As mentioned in the introduction section, original data will be used to measure the 
model, but the unit-root for each variable in each country will be checked. The result 
of unit-root test is displayed in Appendix of chapter 4. According to the regression 
result, only five countries indicated that the model is not stationary, including Austria, 
Germany, Japan, Portugal, and Turkey. Subsequently, re-run of the model with first 
differential data in these countries was conducted, (the unit-root test indicated the 
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variables are stationary in I (1), except Turkey), the regression result of which, is 
displayed in the Appendix (Section 8.3). Each country has a graph of inverse roots of 
the AR characteristic polynomial, and a table that shows the residual correlation 
matrix of each variable. The results for Turkey could not be interpreted because the 
FDI is stationary at I (2), but GDP, import, and export are stationary at I (1). Thus, 
Turkey is not discussed under this Model. The details of each country will be 
discussed below. 
 
The variable of changing export in Austria both lagged one year and in lagged two 
years, with the variable of changing import lagged in one year or in lagged two years, 
having no significant effect on the current changing FDI inward and changing FDI 
outward variable. However, the changing FDI outward lagged two-years variable 
showed a negatively significant effect on changing international trade. Moreover, the 
changing FDI inward lagged one-year variable also showed significant but positive 
effect on changing of export variable at the current time. 
 
In Germany, the evolution of exports lagged one-year variable had an adverse effect 
on changing current FDI. However, the changing FDI outward lagged one year had a 
significantly positive force on current export and import at changing level. 
Furthermore, the import lagged one-year variable in changing level also indicated a 
significant positive effect on current FDI inward at changing level. 
 
In Japan, the export lagged one year at changing level had a negative effect on current 
FDI at changing level. Furthermore, in the relationship between export and FDI 
outward, Japan displayed significant, but positive force on export lagged one year on 
FDI outward, and adverse effect of FDI outward lagged one year on export. Under the 
causality of FDI inward on import at a changing level, the lagged two-years variable 
of FDI inward had a negative effect on current changing import variable. 
 
In Portugal, no significant signal indicated that the FDI at changing level affects 
international trade at changing level. However, some necessary force on international 
commerce exists on FDI. For instance, the lagged variable of changing export and 
import showed a negative influence of current FDI inward variable at the changing 
130 
 
level. Simultaneously, the lagged one year and lagged two-years variable had an 
opposite effect on changing the level of FDI outward variable. 
8.4 Country Profile Analysis 
The first research question addressed the relationship between foreign direct 
investment and international trade. The conclusion part, will use all the six country 
profile factors to define the pattern flows of FDI and international trade in 30 OECD 
countries. The regression result is shown in Chapter 8. The six factors are: FDI 
regulatory restriction, institutions, market sophistication, product market regulation, 
knowledge input, and knowledge and technology output. 
 
We divided 30 countries into two situations: the first situation focuses on  the 
country having an FDI regulatory restriction including 11 countries (See Table 8.2). 
The second situation discusses if the country does not have an FDI regulatory 
restriction with the remaining 19 countries under this condition (See Table 8.3). The 
table uses ‘Y’ to indicate if one country has a strong comparative advantage in this 
sector; ‘N’ indicates if a country has a comparative weakness advantage over other 
OECD countries. Moreover, ‘Y*’ indicates that the country has a relatively strong 
comparative advantage (the score above the average), and ‘N*’ indicates that it has a 
relative weakness comparative advantage (the score below the average). 
 
The condition of the first situation is that the country has an FDI regulatory restriction, 
with five countries (Australia, Austria, Iceland, Norway, and the United States) 
indicating a bi-direction relationship between FDI and international trade, which 
occupied 45% (5 out of 11 countries). Australia and the United States, in particular 
satisfied any four country profile factors, implying that they had a comparative 
advantage in the institution's environment with a flexible local market and a relatively 
friendly competition environment. The United States showed that import and inward 
FDI flow had a positive bi-direction relationship. Therefore, the import and inward 
FDI flow could be ‘complementary’. Furthermore, FDI inward flows had a positive 
effect on each other, thereby proving that when inward FDI flows increased in Canada, 
the amount of international trade may also increase. 
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However, a positive sign was observed over the relationship between FDI outward 
flows and exports in Norway and Austria. As a result, this relationship could be 
‘complementary’. Iceland, showed a positive sign between imports and FDI outward 
flows, which indicated that when increased export flow moves on to another country, 
the inward FDI flow will increase to Iceland but decrease the amount of FDI outflows. 
Therefore, imports and FDI inward flows could become ‘substitute’ in Iceland. 
 
Three of the remaining six countries in the first situation, (Canada, Switzerland, and 
Mexico) showed no relationship between FDI and international trade, whereas the 
other three countries (Korea and Poland) indicated that FDI had an impact on 
international trade. FDI outward flows in Austria had an adverse effect on import flow. 
Thus, increased investment into another country may reduce the number of trade 
flows. In Poland, where FDI outward will support export, the relationship could be 
‘complementary’, but at the same time, FDI inward flows will have a weakening 
negative effect on export. The same situation exists in FDI inward flows and import, 
which had a positive influence between these two variables. As a result, they are 
‘complementary’. However, the lagged one-year of FDI outward flows indicated a 
negative effect of import flows in Poland. 
 
The second situation indicated no FDI regulatory restriction in a country. According to 
Table 9.6, five of the 19 countries had a bi-direction relationship between FDI and 
international trade, and eight countries showed no relationship, which occupied 26.3% 
and 42.1%, respectively. For instance, both import flow in Ireland and Japan support 
FDI outward flow in their country. Therefore the export (import) and FDI outward 
could have a ‘complementary’ relationship. Furthermore, in Greece, export and FDI 
inward flow had a positive bi-direction relationship that could become 
‘complementary’. 
 
On the contrary, the regression result in Spain suggested that export had a negative 
support to FDI outward flow, and at the same time, FDI inward flow showed a 
decrease in export. Therefore, it is a ‘substitute’ relationship. By contrast, FDI inward 
flows and imports had a positive effect on each other. Greece had a bi-direction 
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causality, with import and FDI inward flow having a positive effect on each other. 
Therefore, the import and FDI inward flow in Italy could be ‘complementary’. 
 
Furthermore, in the single direction, three countries (Belgium, Germany and Portugal) 
showed that FDI had an influence on trade. Three other countries (Denmark, Slovakia 
and the United Kingdom) satisfied a one-way relationship from trade to FDI. The first 
single direction will be discussed in detail for Belgium, where FDI inward flows had a 
negative effect on imports. Therefore, FDI inward flow in this country had a 
‘substitute’ relationship. In Portugal, the FDI inward flow and outward flow only 
worked on the export; and the regression result indicated that the FDI inward flow had 
an increased effect on export, but at the same time, FDI outward flow will experience 
a decrease of influence. Thus, the FDI outward flow and export in Portugal could be 
‘substitute’. Moreover, in Germany, the regression result showed that FDI outward 
flows indicated a positive influence on imports, implying  a ‘complementary’ 
causality between these two variables. Lastly, in Slovakia, foreign direct investment 
inward flows had a positive influence on import, and a negative effect on exports. It 
could not be identified whether they were ‘complementary’ or ‘substitute’. 
 
On the contrary, the second single direction is that the trade affects foreign direct 
investment. In both Denmark and the United Kingdom, export flows showed a 
negative effect on foreign direct investment outward flows, but the imports indicated a 
positive influence on FDI outward flows. It could not be observed whether a 
‘complementary’ or ‘substitute’ relationship exists in these two countries. 
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Table 8. 2 Situation 1: If the country has an FDI Regulatory Restriction 











Summary Relationship between 
FDI and 
International Trade 
Australia Y* Y* Y* Y* N* 4Y1N Bi-direction 
United States Y* Y N* Y* Y 4Y1N Bi-direction 
Austria Y* N* Y* Y* N* 3Y2N Bi-direction 
Iceland Y* N* N* N* N* 1Y4N Bi-direction 
Norway Y N* N* N* N* 1Y4N Bi-direction 
Korea, Rep. N* Y* N N* Y* 2Y3N FDI on Trade 
Poland N* N N* N* N* 5N FDI on Trade 
Canada Y Y Y* Y* N* 4Y1N None 
Switzerland Y* Y N* Y Y 4Y1N None 
New Zealand Y Y* Y* N* N* 3Y2N None 
Mexico N N N N* N* 5N None 
Notes: Y indicates the country has a high-level ranking in this country profile factor; Y* indicates the country has an upper average level ranking in this 
country profile factor; N indicates the country has a lower average level ranking in this country profile factor; N*indicates the country has a low-level 








Table 8. 3 Situation 2: If the country does not have an FDI Regulatory Restriction 












between FDI and 
International Trade 
Ireland Y* Y* Y* Y Y* 5Y Bi-direction 
Japan Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* 5Y Bi-direction 
Spain N* Y* Y* N* N* 2Y3N Bi-direction 
France N* N* N* Y* N* 5N Bi-direction 
Greece N* N* N* N* N 5N Bi-direction 
Germany Y* N* Y* Y* Y* 4Y1N FDI on Trade 
Belgium Y* N* Y* Y* N* 3Y2N FDI on Trade 
Portugal N* N* Y* N* N* 1Y4N FDI on Trade 
Slovakia N* N Y* N* N* 1Y4N FDI on Trade 
Denmark Y Y* Y* Y* Y* 5Y Trade on FDI 
United Kingdom Y* Y Y Y* Y* 5Y Trade on FDI 
Finland Y Y* Y* Y Y* 5Y None 
Netherlands Y* Y* Y Y* Y* 5Y None 
Luxembourg Y* N* N* Y Y* 3Y2N None 
Sweden Y* Y* N* Y* Y 3Y2N None 
Czech Republic N* N* Y* N* Y* 2Y3N None 
Hungary N* N Y* N* N* 1Y4N None 
Italy N* N* Y* N* N* 1Y4N None 
Turkey N N N N N 5N None 
Notes: Y indicates the country has a high-level ranking in this country profile factor; Y* indicates the country has an upper average level ranking in this 
country profile factor; N indicates the country has a lower average level ranking in this country profile factor; N*indicates the country has a low-level 




This chapter analysed the causality of foreign direct investment and international trade. 
The main findings are displayed in Figure 8.2, which shows the summary of 30 
OECD countries under different relationships. According to Figure 8.2, 12 countries 
displayed no relationship between foreign direct investment and international trade. 
However, 18 countries indicated a one-way or bi-direction causality of FDI and 
international trade. Out of these 18 countries, 11 indicated bi-direction links between 
FDI and commerce, while three showed that international trade had a one-way 
direction to FDI and the remaining four countries displayed the FDI affects 
international trade. 
 
As mentioned in the introduction part, four significant links will be focused on in this 
chapter, the details of which will be discussed in section 8.2. In the conclusion section, 
these links are combined into two bi-directions relationships, consisting of the 
relationship between FDI inward flow and import (Figure 8.3), and the relationship 
between FDI outward and export (Figure 8.4). Additionally, it includes information on 
two different single direction ties: the single direction of trade on FDI (Figure 8.5), 
and another single direction of FDI on trade (Figure 8.6). 
 
The bi-direction of FDI inward and import consists of four countries (France, Ireland, 
Poland, and the United States) under this relationship. For instance, in Poland and the 
United States, both the FDI inward and import indicated a positive effect on each 
other. As a result, increased FDI inward will attract more import. Therefore, FDI 
inward and import indicated a ‘complementary’ relationship with each other. On the 
contrary, the FDI inward and import both had an adverse effect on each other. Thus, a 
‘substitute’ link exists between FDI inward and import in France and Ireland. 
 
Five countries including Austria, France, Japan, Norway, and Spain come under the 
relationship of bi-direction of FDI outward and export. According to Figure 8.4, only 
France and Spain indicated that the FDI outward and export are ‘complementary’. The 
actual causality between FDI outward and export of the remaining countries, could 
not be identified. 
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Figure 8. 3 The Bi-direction of FDI Inward Flows and Import 
 
 
Figure 8. 4 The Bi-direction of FDI Outward Flows and Export 
 
 
Two more single directions are displayed in figure 8.5 and 8.6. Under the first 
one-way direction, both export and import in Denmark and the United Kingdom had 
an opposite effect on FDI. They indicated that export had a positive influence on FDI, 
but an adverse effect of import. Finally, figure 8.6 indicates a single direct effect of 
FDI on trade, and only one country indicates that both FDI inward and FDI outward 
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on trade in Belgium and Slovakia, and a negative effect of FDI outward flows on 
trade in Denmark and Korea. 
Figure 8. 5 The Single Direction: Trade on FDI Flows 
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Chapter 9: Conclusions 
9.1 Thesis Summary  
The thesis began with the motivations to investigate the interplay of international 
trade, technology, economic growth, and foreign direct investment (See Chapter 1). 
Subsequently three research questions analysed three causalities among four factors. 
The value was added in this thesis using time series data to analyse 30 OECD 
countries with their country characteristics, since no scholars paid enough attention to 
this type of study in recent years. Chapter 2 reviewed several theories of foreign direct 
investment development in the international business sector. For example, Dunning’s 
work in 1958 provided background knowledge, alongside Hymer’s FDI theory (1976), 
Dunning’s OLI theory (1977), Kojima’s FDI location theory (1978), Dunning’s IDP 
theory, and Vernon’s product life-cycle model (1966). 
 
Chapter 3 reviewed many empirical studies from other researchers to get more 
information about the current research status in the foreign direct investment area. 
Gaps and weakness emerged from these previous studies, thereby providing material 
for analysis in this thesis. Groups of countries in the OECD organisation were chosen 
to analyse whether the causalities have changed in the last 35 years. The data 
description of FDI, trade, R&D and economic growth in each country can be found in 
Chapter 4. The econometric method used in this thesis includes VAR (vector 
auto-regression) model ARDL (autoregressive distributed lag) model, Engle-Granger 
method, and pooling data analysis method, which provided a complete picture of the 
connection in each factor (See Chapter 5). 
 
The following three chapters included three empirical studies. Chapter 6 measured the 
causality of foreign direct investment and economic growth. The relationship between 
foreign direct investment and local R&D activities are presented in chapter 7. The 
final empirical study is displayed in chapter 8 to interpret the link between foreign 





 Section 9.2 will interpret the main findings in three subsections 
 Section 9.3 will discuss the limitation of this thesis  
 The final section will focus on and the implication of future research  
9.2 Overview of Main Findings 
This section will discuss the main findings from empirical studies, and try to answer 
the three research questions stated in Chapter 1. Initially, we restate the classification 
of the country profile to have a clear understanding of the findings. Firstly the FDI 
regulatory restriction factor will divide 30 OECD countries into two categories (See 
Table 9.1). The definition of these factors is displayed in Chapter 4 (Data Description). 
Therefore, the first category is named: the first situation, which presents if the country 
has an FDI regulatory restriction of 11 countries. The second category is situation 
2,indicating that the country does not have an FDI regulatory restriction in the 
remaining 19 countries. 
Table 9. 1 Countries in Two Situations 
Situation 1: The Country has an FDI 
Regulatory Restriction 
Situation 2: The country does not 
have an FDI Regulatory Restriction 
Australia Belgium 
Austria Czech Republic 
Canada Denmark 
Iceland Finland 
Korea, Rep. France 
Mexico Germany 




United States Japan 















Each situation has four levels of country profile, including high level, upper average 
level, lower average level, and low level. A different number of country profile factors 
are used to analyse the regression result in all the empirical studies. Thus, the 
summary of factors is different. Table 9.2 shows the classification of country profile 
factors in three empirical studies. 
Table 9. 2 Classification of Country Profile 
Empirical Study 1: 
Causality of FDI 
and Economic 
Growth 
Empirical Study 2: 
Causality of FDI 
and R&D 
Empirical Study 3: 









No. of Country 
Profile Factors: 3 
No. of Country 
Profile Factors: 4 
No. of Country 
Profile Factors: 5 





Upper Average  
1Y2N 1Y3N 2Y3N 
1Y4N 
Lower Average  
3N 4N 5N Low Level 
Notes: ‘Y’ indicates the country has a high ranking in the country profile factor; ‘N’ 
indicates the country has a low ranking in the country profile factor. 
 
For example, the condition of the high-level country profile is that the country 
satisfied all the country profile factors given in the empirical studies. In the first 
empirical study, three country factors are considered: institution, market sophistication, 
and product market regulation. For instance, if the country ranked high in these three 
factors, ‘3Y’ is put in that country (See Chapter 6, Table 6.2, Example: Canada). 
Similarly, four and five country profile factors exist in the second and the third 
empirical study, separately. Thus, ‘4Y’ and ‘5Y’ indicate that the country has a 
high-level country profile. The example can be found in the empirical studies, such as 
the United States in Chapter 7 (See Table 7.2) and Ireland in Chapter 8 (See Table 8.3). 
The same method measures the remaining levels of the country profile. The following 
three subsections will discuss the main findings of each empirical study, with more 




9.2.1 The Causality of FDI and Economic Growth 
1) What is the relationship between FDI and economic growth? 
This is the first research question in the thesis, which discussed the causality of 
foreign direct investment and economic growth. In all levels of the country profile, 
most countries have a significant bi-direction relationship, regardless of the country 
having a strict FDI regulatory restriction(See Table 9.3 and Table 9.4). Moreover, a 
single direction from GDP to FDI flows in the first situation; while another single 
direction (FDI flows influence on GDP) only exists in the section situation. This could 
be since less restriction exists for FDI flows in the second group. 
 
The example countries are: New Zealand, Iceland, Mexico, Ireland, and Hungary. In 
addition, the countries with less FDI regulatory restriction showed that their FDI had a 
significant effect on economic growth. However, the countries that displayed no 
relationship in this causality also had an increase, which occupied 40%, especially in 
the lower average level and low level of country profile. To conclude, most OECD 
countries show a bi-direction causality (13 countries), including two countries that 
indicate that FDI influences GDP. Four countries indicate that GDP had an impact on 
FDI flows, and a large number of countries (12 countries) showed no significant 














Table 9. 3 Situation 1: If the country has an FDI Regulatory Restriction 
 Summary Relationship between 




Australia 3Y Bi-direction High Level 
New Zealand 3Y GDP on FDI 
Canada 3Y None 
Austria 2Y1N Bi-direction Upper Average 
United States 2Y1N Bi-direction 
Iceland 1Y2N GDP on FDI 
Switzerland 2Y1N None 
Korea, Rep. 1Y2N Bi-direction Lower Average 
Norway 1Y2N Bi-direction 
Mexico 3N GDP on FDI Low Level 
Poland 3N None 
Notes: ‘Y’ indicates the country has a high ranking in the country profile factor; ‘N’ 
indicates the country has a low ranking in the country profile factor. 
 
Table 9. 4 Situation 2: If the country does not have an FDI Regulatory 
Restriction 
 Summary Relationship between 








United Kingdom 3Y Bi-direction 
Ireland 3Y FDI on GDP 
Finland 3Y None 
Japan 3Y None 
Netherlands 3Y None 
Germany 2Y1N Bi-direction  
Upper Average Spain 2Y1N Bi-direction 
Sweden 2Y1N Bi-direction 
Belgium 2Y1N None 
Czech Republic 1Y2N Bi-direction  
Lower Average Luxembourg 1Y2N Bi-direction 
Hungary 1Y2N FDI on GDP 
Italy 1Y2N None 
Portugal 1Y2N None 
Slovakia 1Y2N None 
Greece 3N Bi-direction Low Level 
France 3N None 
Turkey 3N None 
 
Notes: ‘Y’ indicates the country has a high ranking in the country profile factor; ‘N’ 
indicates the country has a low ranking in the country profile factor. 
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The patterns of the relationship between foreign direct investment and economic 
growth are considered. Figure 9.1 indicates four patterns in this relationship. Most 
OECD countries had a bi-direction, located in the pattern 1 and pattern 2, implying 
that they have a high or upper average level of country profile. By contrast, a single 
direction relationship exists in pattern three and pattern four (See Figure 9.2). The 
countries with no relationship between FDI and economic growth appear in pattern 
one and three. 
 
Figure 9. 1 Patterns of Causality of FDI and Economic Growth 
 
 
The first pattern shows that the country has a high rank in institution factor, market 
sophistication factor, and factor of product market regulation. Therefore, in situation 1, 
Australia shows a positive significant bi-direction between FDI flows and economic 
growth, whereas in New Zealand, the economic growth has a negative influence on 
FDI inward flows. Moreover, no sign of this causality can be found in New Zealand 
despite it satisfying all the country profile factors. In situation 2 of this pattern, 
Denmark and the United Kingdom indicate a bi-direction between FDI flows and 
economic growth. Therefore, in this country, the economic growth could either attract 
more FDI inward flows from other countries, or encourage more MNEs to conduct 
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investment in the foreign countries. Consequently, a significant effect of FDI on GDP 
exists in Ireland, but the regression result suggested that inward FDI flows had an 
adverse effect on GDP. On the contrary, Denmark, Japan, and Netherlands, the 
regression result shows no relationship between FDI and economic growth. 
 
The second pattern in this relationship indicates that the country at least has two high 
ranks in the country profile factors. Subsequently, in the first situation, four countries 
exist in this pattern. Austria and the United States indicate a bi-direction of FDI flows 
and GDP; and Iceland indicates that economic growth has a negative effect of FDI 
inward flows. Moreover, in the second situation, four additional countries exist in this 
pattern, and three of them (Germany, Spain, and Sweden) show a bi-direction 
relationship from FDI to GDP, while the remaining country (Belgium) displays no 
relationship. 
 
The third pattern described that the country had a high ranking in one of three country 
profile factors. Therefore, in situation 1, the regression result suggested that Korea 
and Norway had a bi-direction relationship between FDI and economic growth, in that 
economic growth has a positive effect on FDI inward flows. At the same time, both 
FDI inward and outward flow shows an increase in GDP. On the contrary, in the 
second situation, Czech Republic and Luxembourg indicated a single way relationship, 
a single direction from FDI flows to GDP. Furthermore, Portugal and Slovakia 
showed no causality of FDI and economic growth. 
 
The final pattern is of a low ranking in all country profile factors. Therefore, in the 
strict FDI regulatory restriction (situation 1), Mexico and Poland show that the 
economic growth had a positive effect on FDI outward flows. However, FDI flows 
had an adverse influence on GDP growth in Mexico. By contrast, no significant effect 
for this relationship exists in Poland. In the second situation, Greece shows a positive 
bi-direction of causality of FDI inward flows and economic growth; while France and 





Figure 9. 2 Patterns of Relationship between FDI and Economic Growth by 
Number of Countries 
 
 
To summarise, figure 9.2 indicates the number of countries in different relationships 
in the four patterns. The result shows that countries with a high level ranking of 
country profiles indicate a bi-direction relationship. This phenomenon becomes more 
significant in pattern 2 (if the country has high rankings in any two country profile 
factors), indicating that FDI flows and economic growth affected each other. Pattern 3 
has four and three countries in pattern 1 under this causality. In the country that had a 
lower ranking in the country profile factors, the bi-direction relationship becomes 
weak, and more countries display no relationship between FDI flows and economic 
growth. 
 
Therefore, this figure suggests that the country with low ranking country profile needs 
FDI inward flows to promote economy, at the same time, the economy sees vast 
improvement, thereby encouraging the local companies abroad to conduct investment 
into other countries. However, the countries with high level of country profile have a 
bi-direction relationship because of a high economic background. For example, the 
only thing the United States wish to do is find a new investment opportunity in other 
countries to get more profits, meanwhile, they also require inward investment to 
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9.2.2 Main Findings of the Relationship between FDI and Technology 
2) What is the relationship between FDI and local R&D activities? 
The second research question is whether the high technology in one country attracts 
inward flow FDI because the country has a comparative advantage over other 
countries. The observation included discovering whether a country has a high 
technology, and if it uses that to invest in another country. Chapter 7 uses GERD 
(government expenditure on research and development) to measure the R&D 
activities in each country. R&D had a positive effect on FDI flows if a less FDI 
regulatory restriction exists in a country. Table 9.5 and Table 9.6 indicate the causality 
in each country (notice that country has different country profile level). 
Table 9. 5 Situation 1: If the country has an FDI Regulatory Restriction 
 Summary Relationship 




United States 4Y R&D on FDI High Level 
Switzerland 4Y .. 
Canada 3Y1N None  
 
Upper Average 
Australia* 3Y1N .. 
Korea, Rep. 2Y2N Bi-direction 
Austria 2Y2N None 
New Zealand* 2Y2N .. 
Iceland 1Y3N FDI on R&D Lower Average 
Norway 1Y3N R&D on FDI 
Mexico 4N FDI on R&D Low Level 
Poland 4N R&D on FDI 
Notes: ‘Y’ indicates the country has a high ranking in the country profile factor; ‘N’ 
indicates the country has a low ranking in the country profile factor; Country with ‘*’ 
means the R&D data unavailable. 
 
Most countries display single direction causality, either from FDI flows to R&D or 
from R&D to FDI flows in the first situation, especially in the lower average and 
low-level country profile. Iceland and Mexico indicate that FDI flows had a 
significant effect of R&D, while Norway and Poland show that R&D influence FDI 
flows. On the contrary, only Korea shows a bi-direction causality of FDI flows and 
R&D. In this case, the regression result suggested that R&D encourage FDI outward 
flows in this country. Moreover, in the second situation, most countries showed a 
bi-direction in the high-level country profile and a single way from FDI to R&D in the 
upper average and low level of country profile. 
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Table 9. 6 Situation 2: If the country does not have an FDI Regulatory 
Restriction 
 Summary Relationship between 
FDI and R&D 
Country Profile 
Level 







Ireland 4Y Bi-direction 
United Kingdom 4Y Bi-direction 
Japan 4Y Bi-direction 
Denmark 4Y None 
Netherlands 4Y None 
Sweden 4Y .. 
Belgium 2Y2N FDI on R&D Upper Average 
Germany 3Y1N FDI on R&D 
Luxembourg 3Y1N None 
Czech Republic 1Y3N Bi-direction  
Lower Average France 1Y3N FDI on R&D 
Spain 1Y3N None 
Hungary 4N FDI on R&D  
 
Low Level 
Portugal 4N FDI on R&D 
Slovakia 4N None 
Italy 4N None 
Turkey 4N None 
Greece 4N None 
Notes: ‘Y’ indicates the country has a high ranking in the country profile factor; ‘N’ 
indicates the country has a low ranking in the country profile factor; Country with ‘*’ 
means the R&D data unavailable. 
 
In the countries with lower average level and low level country profile, Czech 
Republic, France, Hungary, and Portugal, for example, showed a bi-direction 
relationship between foreign investment and innovation. Moreover, no country 
indicated that R&D has a significant effect of FDI flows, and eight countries display 
no causality in the low-level country profile. 
 
Later on, the patterns of relationship between FDI and R&D will be discussed. As 
shown in Figure 9.3, five patterns of this relationship exist. The first pattern indicates 
that the country has a high ranking in all of the countries profile factors and nine 
countries are included in this pattern, occupying 30% in total OECD countries. 
Bi-direction is the most common relationship in this pattern is, for example Finland, 
Ireland, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Subsequently, the single direction from R&D 
to FDI flows, including the United States, had a positive effect of FDI inward flows. 
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Figure 9. 3 Patterns of Relationships between FDI and R&D 
 
The second and third pattern show that if countries had a low ranking in any one or 
two country profile factors, the regression result suggested that the most country in 
these two patterns indicated a single relationship from FDI to R&D, such as Belgium 
and Germany. In these two countries, FDI flows had a positive effect on R&D, 
thereby proving that the more FDI is conducted in these countries, the more 
innovation will be produced. The fourth pattern presented the countries that had a low 
ranking in any three country profile factors for example, Iceland, Norway, Spain, 
Czech Republic and France. According to the regression result, no relationship exists 
between FDI and R&D in Spain; and in Iceland and France, a single negative 
direction from FDI to R&D exists along with a positive single direction from R&D to 
FDI in Norway. Furthermore, the result suggests that FDI outward flows can support 
R&D improvement in the Czech Republic. 
 
Finally, eight countries in the fifth pattern indicated a low ranking in each country 
profile factor. In particular, none of them had a bi-direction relationship between FDI 
flow and R&D. Moreover, in Hungary, Portugal, and Mexico, the FDI outward flows 
displayed a positive effect on R&D. Therefore, these three countries could use new 
technology to conduct investment in the other countries. As another single direction 
from R&D to FDI flows, Poland showed that R&D had a positive effect on FDI 
149 
 
outward flows. To conclude, figure 9.4 gives information about the patterns of 
relationship between FDI and R&D by numbers of countries. According to the figure, 
it is clear that the single direction of FDI flow to R&D is a strong causality that exists 
in each pattern, especially in pattern three and four. By contrast, the bi-direction 
relationship is stronger in pattern 1 and very weak in other four patterns. 
 
Therefore, the pattern graph suggested that countries prefer to do both investment and 
R&D in a country with high level of country profile (pattern1). This could be because 
they have more comparative advantages over other countries, regardless of the capital 
or the level of latest technology. Thus, they presented interest in selling their new 
technology to other countries to get more foreign capitals back to their home country; 
or because they had enough capital and therefore could invest abroad to learn new 
technology. However,  countries with a low ranking in all country profile factors (if 
they were rich and had enough capital) were interested in buying new technology or 
new products from other countries (the countries with high technology). For example, 
the Arabic countries can use crude to exchange new technology from the United 
States. Therefore, it would be a beneficial strategy in resource seeking (the United 
States) and knowledge (or efficiency) seeking (the Arabic countries). 

































In addition, the countries of pattern 2 and 3 have only one or two country profile 
factors with a low ranking. According to these patterns, FDI flows had significant 
flow on R&D, since these countries may have high technology, they could attract 
more inward FDI flows, or enough capital to buy or conduct investment in the foreign 
countries. 
9.2.3 Main Findings of the Link between FDI and International Trade 
3) What is the relationship between Foreign Direct Investment and 
International Trade?  
This is the last research question in the thesis, which addressed the relationship 
between foreign direct investment and international trade. It was discovered that if the 
country has more high-level country profile factors in less FDI regulatory restriction, 
said country will have a bi-direction relationship between FDI and international trade 
(See Table 9.7 and Table 9.8). 
Table 9. 7 Situation 1: If the country has an FDI Regulatory Restriction 





Australia 4Y1N Bi-direction Upper Average 
United States 4Y1N Bi-direction 
Canada 4Y1N None 
Switzerland 4Y1N None 
Austria 3Y2N Bi-direction 
New Zealand 3Y2N None 
Korea, Rep. 2Y3N FDI on Trade Lower Average 
Iceland 1Y4N Bi-direction 
Norway 1Y4N Bi-direction 
Poland 5N Bi-direction Low Level 
Mexico 5N None 
Notes: ‘Y’ indicates the country has a high ranking in the country profile factor; ‘N’ 
indicates the country has a low ranking in the country profile factor. 
 
To begin with, it is clear that most countries displayed a bi-direction relationship 
between foreign direct investment and international trade in the above average and 
lower average level of country profile, which occupied 55.5%. Moreover, with a 
single direction relationship, FDI flows had a significant effect on trade flows in 
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Korea. By contrast, with the second situation, more countries displayed a bi-direction 
causality, which may be because of low FDI regulatory restriction in these countries. 
They ranked at the high level and lower average level of country profile. Denmark 
and the United Kingdom represented that trade had significant effects on FDI flows. 
While four countries indicate FDI flows had a significant influence on trade: Germany, 
Belgium, Portugal, and Slovakia. 
Table 9. 8 Situation 2: If the country does not have an FDI Regulatory 
Restriction 
 Summary Relationship 
between FDI and 
International Trade 
Country Profile Level 
Ireland 5Y Bi-direction  
 
High Level 
Japan 5Y Bi-direction 
Denmark 5Y Trade on FDI 
United Kingdom 5Y Trade on FDI 
Finland 5Y None 
Netherlands 5Y None 
Germany 4Y1N FDI on Trade  
Upper Average Belgium 3Y2N FDI on Trade 
Luxembourg 3Y2N None 
Sweden 3Y2N None 




Czech Republic 2Y3N None 
Portugal 1Y4N FDI on Trade 
Slovakia 1Y4N FDI on Trade 
Hungary 1Y4N None 
Italy 1Y4N None 
France 5N Bi-direction  
Low Level Greece 5N Bi-direction 
Turkey 5N None 
Notes: ‘Y’ indicates the country has a high ranking in the country profile factor; ‘N’ 
indicates the country has a low ranking in the country profile factor. 
 
The following context will discuss the patterns of the relationship between FDI and 
international trade. In this empirical study, six patterns were found under this 
relationship, due to a total of five country profile factors adding to help interpret the 
regression result (See Figure 9.5). The first pattern indicated that the country has a 
high-level ranking in all of the country profile factors. 
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Thus, the regression result suggested that most countries in the pattern 1 and 2 could 
perform both FDI flows and trade together. The example country is including Ireland, 
Japan, Australia, and the United States. Moreover, the single way causality from trade 
to FDI flows becomes more significant in pattern 2. However, no countries display 
that trade ha a significant influence on FDI in this pattern. The second pattern 
indicates that the country has a high ranking in any four country profile factors. In this 
pattern, the FDI flows had a stronger influence on trade compared to pattern 1. 
Figure 9. 5 Patterns of Flow for FDI and International Trade 
 
 
The third pattern shows that countries had a high-level ranking in any three out of five 
country profile factors. In this pattern, Austria shows a bi-direction relationship 
between FDI flows and trade, and a single direction in either FDI flows influence on 
trade in Belgium. The fourth pattern displays that the country has a high-ranking level 
only one country profile factor. Three countries fall under this pattern, including 
Czech Republic, Korea, and Spain, none of which indicate causality, a single 





In the final pattern, countries with a low level in each country profile factors are: 
France, Greece, Poland, Mexico, and Turkey. The former three countries indicate a 
bi-direction relationship between FDI and international trade. The final pattern 
indicates countries that do not satisfy any of these three factors. In this pattern, 
according to the regression result, countries prefer to do more trade instead of foreign 
direct investment. For instance, France and Poland had a bi-direction relatioship 
between outward FDI and export, implying that they conduct investment in another 
country to support trade. 
Figure 9. 6 Patterns of the Relationship between FDI and International Trade by 
Number of Countries 
 
 
To conclude, figure 9.6 shows the number of countries in each pattern of the link 
between foreign direct investment and international trade. According to this figure, the 
pattern of FDI and international trade flows in situation 2 had a more flexible than 
situation 1. Therefore, said country has less restriction on FDI and more impact on 
international trade. A bi-direction relationship exists in the most of patterns, except for 
pattern 3. The number of countries in bi-direction causality is around three or four. If 
compared to pattern three and four, only one country includes a bi-direction 
relationship, and two in other patterns under this causality. Single causality only exists 
































more significant influence on FDI flows when the country has a good trade 
environment. 
9.3 Limitation of the Research 
Four limitations of this thesis are to be discussed in this section. First: limited run of 
annual data. The period examined in the empirical study is 35 years (from 1981 to 
2015). Since the annual data was used current data could not be obtained before the 
official website was published. However, this question was later answered with more 
data. Second: the observations of aggregate across the section over time. The 
quarterly data by section would be ideal, but it was unavailable in the R&D database. 
Third: the assumption of fixed parameters estimated is timely within countries, which 
is difficult to avoid. The final limitation of this thesis lacks standardised data of good 
quality in institutional characteristics likely to influence foreign direct investment. 
Therefore, most of these limitations are unavoidable. The basic pattern in the 
available data is summarised by mean, variance, and covariance, and the VAR model 
being a useful method of interpreting theses within a causal framework. 
9.4 Contribution of the Thesis 
In this thesis, several respects of contributions have been developed, including recent 
data to analysis of 30 OECD countries individually. The reason is because that each 
country has their characteristics. Additionally, three econometrics methods are used 
(VAR model, ARDL model, and Engle-Granger method) to estimate these countries 
and to make sure the result is robust. Three causalities are measured, including FDI 
flows and economic growth; FDI flows and R&D; and FDI flows and international 
trade. 
 
Moreover, six types of countries profile factors were added to the group of 30 OECD 
countries to estimate how the links of these causalities changed in the different level 
country profile. A significant bi-direction of these three causalities was found in case 
the country has a high level or upper average level of country profile factors. 
Dunning’s IDP theory suggested that when a country has developed into the 
knowledge economy, substantial inward and outward investment occurs in the county. 
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(Dunning, 2002). Compared to our empirical studies, when a country has a high level 
of country profile factors (as this country has good institutions, open market, less 
restriction of foreign direct investment, and lower trade barriers), a positive 
bi-direction can exist between FDI and economic growth. Moreover, this country will 
attract more FDI flows due to a high-ranking in the knowledge input and output 
factor. 
9.5 Implications for Future Research 
Two major directions of focus in the future research are: a better link between micro 
and macro level of FDI theory is required. Since Hymer (1976) put forward a 
micro-level FDI theory, more researches on disaggregated industries or sectors took 
place along with appropriate disaggregation of region, city, and industrial destination. 
 
The first research question is, can country characteristics could attract more FDI flows 
into host country? The same country profile is used quantify them as a dummy 
variable. Subsequently, different numbers rank indicates different levels in each 
country characteristics. For example, in this thesis, six country profile factors with 
four different levels are considered. Therefore, accurate influence of country 
characteristics on patterns relationships between FDI, trade, and economic growth 
could be found. The second direction of future research placed emphasis on the 
sweeping generation and heterogeneity. For example, what ‘groups’ should be 
distinguished. These groups include, but are not limited to, developing countries, 
BRICS country, Western European, Asian, deregulated countries, and highly regulated 
countries. Subsequently, the same group countries could be considered in a different 
period. Each period could be 20 years or 30 years, followed by the regression test for 
each period group for comparison of the result. This could provide  some ideas about 
whether the developing countries have a massive change in foreign direct investment. 
To expand this research question, adding country profile factors in the regression 
could help find out whether the country profiles have positive or negative externalities 
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Appendices for Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Classification of Country Profile Factors in 30 OECD Countries 
Table 1. 1 Situation 1: If the country has a FDI Regulatory Restriction 








Summary Country Profile 
Level 






Austria Y* N* Y* Y* N* 4Y1N 
Canada Y Y Y* Y* N* 4Y1N 
Switzerland Y* Y N* Y Y 4Y1N 
United States Y* Y N* Y* Y 4Y1N 
New Zealand Y Y* Y* N* N* 3Y2N 
Korea, Rep. N* Y* N N* Y* 2Y3N  
Lower Average 
 
Iceland Y* N* N* N* N* 1Y4N 
Norway Y N* N* N* N* 1Y4N 
Mexico N N N N* N* 5N Low 
 Poland N* N N* N* N* 5N 
Notes: Y indicates the country has a high level ranking in this country profile factor; Y* indicates the country has a upper average level ranking in this 
country profile factor; N indicates the country has a lower average level ranking in this country profile factor; N*indicates the country has a low level 
ranking in this country profile factor. 
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Table 1. 2 Situation 2: If the country does not have a FDI Regulatory Restriction 








Summary Country Profile 
Level 






Finland Y Y* Y* Y Y* 5Y 
Ireland Y* Y* Y* Y Y* 5Y 
Japan Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* 5Y 
Netherlands Y* Y* Y Y* Y* 5Y 
United Kingdom Y* Y Y Y* Y* 5Y 




Sweden Y* Y* N* Y* Y 4Y1N 
Belgium Y* N* Y* Y* N* 3Y2N 
Luxembourg Y* N* N* Y Y* 3Y2N 







Spain N* Y* Y* N* N* 2Y3N 
France N* N* N* Y* N* 1Y4N 
Hungary N* N Y* N* N* 1Y4N 
Italy N* N* Y* N* N* 1Y4N 
Portugal N* N* Y* N* N* 1Y4N 
Slovakia N* N Y* N* N* 1Y4N 
Greece N* N* N* N* N 5N Low 
 Turkey N N N N N 5N 
Notes: Y indicates the country has a high level ranking in this country profile factor; Y* indicates the country has a upper average level ranking in this 
country profile factor; N indicates the country has a lower average level ranking in this country profile factor; N*indicates the country has a low level 
ranking in this country profile factor. 
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Appendices for Chapter 3 Empirical Background 
3.1 Previous Empirical Study 1: Relationship between FDI and Economic Growth 
Table 3. 1 Previous Studies of the Relationship between FDI and Economic Growth 
Author/Year Sample Size/Time 
Period 







Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia. 
Ghana, Nigeria, and 
Sierra Leone 
1970-2005 
Granger Causality; Vector 




De: Difference in economic growth; Difference in 
FDI; Difference in banking credit to the private 
sector 
In: DEG (lagged 1year, lagged 2 years); DFDI 
(lagged 1 year, lagged 2 years); DBCPS (lagged 1 





Vector Error Correction 
Model; Granger Causal 
World Bank De: Export 
In: GDP lagged one year; Export lagged one year; 








Statistics Yearbook; World 
Development Indicators; 
Tunisia Central Bank 
De: Real GDP per capita (Y), Total sum of exports 
and imports/GDP (T), Volume of the total labour 
force (L), Real value of gross fixed capital 
formation (K) 




Table 3.1 Previous Studies of the Relationship between FDI and Economic Growth (Cont.) 
 
Author/Year Sample Size/Time 
Period 
Econometric Methods Data Source Variables 
(Dependent/Independent) 





OLS, Pooled OLS, GMM World Bank Database 
(averaged over each the 
seven-5 year periods); 
International Monetary 
Funds 
De: Rate of real per capita GDP growth 
In: Initial income per capita, Average years of 
schooling, Inflation, Government size, Openness to 
trade, Black market premium, Private sector credit, 




95 Developed and 
Developing Countries 
1983-2006 
Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) 
World Bank Database De: Real GDP per capita growth rate (RGDPGR) 
In: First Indicator: Liquid Liabilities (LIQUID); 
Second Indicator: Deposit money bank domestic 
assets plus central bank domestic assets 
(DEPOSIT); Third Indicator: Ratio of credits 
provided by financial intermediaries to the private 











De: Real GDP per capita growth rate  




13 MENA Countries 
1990-2010 




De: Economic growth, Domestic capital, Foreign 
direct investment 
In: Growth of GDP/L, Growth of K/L, Growth of 
FDI/L, Growth of HCP (the growth rate of the real 
spending on higher education), CPI, OPENS 
(openness of the economy) CRD/GDP (total credit 
of the private sector as a percentage of GDP), 
GE/GDP (government expenditure as a share of 
GDP), RER (real exchange rate), Growth of GDP, 





Fully Modified OLS; 
Dynamic OLS 
AMECO Database De: GDP at 2005 constant price 
In: Log FDI, Dummy (Eurozone membership 




Table 3.1 Previous Studies of the Relationship between FDI and Economic Growth (Cont.) 
 
Author/Year Sample Size/Time 
Period 








Time Series Econometric 
Techniques 
World Development 
Indicators; the State Bank of 
Pakistan 
De: Log of real GDP 
In: Log of foreign remittances, Log of foreign direct 
investment, Log of imports 
Tekin, R. 
(2012) 
18 Least Developed 
Countries 
1970-2009 
Potential Granger Causality 
UNCTAD De: GDP; Export; FDI 
In: GDP lagged one year; Export lagged one year; 






OLS Electronic Data Distribution 
System of the Central Bank 
of the Republic of Turkey 
De: DLGDP (first difference log GDP) 
In: DLGDP (lagged one year, lagged two years, 
lagged three years, lagged four years), DLFDI, 
DLFDI (lagged one year, lagged two years, lagged 





23 OECD countries 
1975-2004 
Simultaneous Equation, 
OLS, TSLS, 3SLS, GMM 
World Development 
Indicator Online Database; 
Penn World Table 
Eq.1:  
De: Growth rate of FDI 
In: Growth rate of GDP, Growth rate of exports, 
One year lagged of FDI growth rate 
Eq.2: 
De: Growth rate of GDP 
In: Growth rate of FDI, Growth rate of exports, One 






United Kingdom, and 
the United States 
1980-2003 
Feasible Generalized Least 
Squares (FGLSs) 
OECD Structural Statistic 




De: the Growth rate of value added 
In: Log of labour, Log of FDI, Interaction term 
between FDI and the log of labour, Log of capital, 





3.2 Previous Empirical Study 2: Relationship between FDI and R&D 
Table 3. 2 Previous Studies of the Relationship between FDI and R&D 
 
Author/Year Sample Size/Time 
Period 






Companies in Ireland 
2003-2009 
Qualitative Nature 
fdi Markets Database 22 Companies from the Software and IT Sector; 
16 Companies from the Financial Services Sector 
Barrell, R;  
Pain, N 
(1997) 
A number of OECD 
Countries 
1980-1992 
Dynamic Model Survey of Current Business FDI (stock); Output; Patents; Labour Cost; Gearing; 






A Dynamic General 







Bennett, S  
(2017) 
32 OECD Countries 
1970-2016 




Indicator from World Bank 
PAR; PAN; PAT; R&D Expenditure; Researchers in 
R&D; Innovation; Per Capita Economic Growth; 
Government Consumption Expenditure; Gross 
Capital Formation; Trade Openness; FDI; 






3.3 Previous Empirical Study 3: Relationship between FDI and International Trade 
Table 3. 3 Previous Studies of the Relationship between FDI and International Trade 
Author/Year Sample Size/Time 
Period 











De: Unit Value: is the unit value (value of 
exports/quantity of exports) of product p expected 
by country c at time t 
In: Sector targeted, Lagged one year ST, Lagged 
two years ST, Lagged three years ST, Lagged 
one-year export value, Lagged one year GDP per 




.. Develop a general model of 
trade by international 
differences in production 
technology 
.. Purpose is to find a relationship between the 




11 OECD Countries 
1970-1992 
OLS WTO; UNCTAD De: Total volume of manufactured exports from 
country 
In: World demand, Relative price of home country 
exports, Product quality, Constant price stocks of 







Fixed Effects Estimator UNCTAD’S Handbook of 
Statistics; WTO; Penn world 
Table 
De: FDI 
In: FTA-CU lagged one year, PSA lagged one year, 
Polity lagged one year, BIT (bilateral investment 
treaties) lagged one year, GATT-WTO (membership 
in international organisations--General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade-World Trade Organization) 
lagged one year, FTA-CU*Polity lagged one year, 




Table 3.3 Previous Studies of the Relationship between FDI and International Trade (Cont.) 
 
Author/Year Sample Size/Time 
Period 








Robust Dynamic Panel Data 
World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators; 
IMF 
De:  Log NBTT (Net barter terms of trade) 
In: Log NBTT lagged 1 year; FDI stock/GDP 
lagged 1 year; FDI/GDP; South Asia lagged 1 year; 
Agricultural and raw material export; Current 
account balance (% of GDP); Current account 
balance lagged 1 year; Real GDP per capita; 
Industry value added (% of GDP); Inflation 
(annual %); Labour participation rate; 
Manufacturing exports (%); Real interest rate; 
Services value added (% of GDP); Growth 
deviation; Growth Deviation lagged 1 year; 














3.4 Previous Empirical Study 4: Relationship between FDI and Other Factors 
Table 3. 4 Previous Studies of the Relationship between FDI and Other Factors 
Author/Year Sample Size/Time 
Period 








Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) 
IMF’s World Economic 
Outlook Database; World 
Development Indicators; 
International Country Risk 
Guide; UNCTAD’s World 
Investment Report 
De: Domestic Investment/ GDP 
In: Eq.1: FDI outflows/GDP, FDI inflows/GDP, 
Saving/GDP; RGDPG, Openness, Inflation; 
M2/GDP 
Eq.2: Lagged (Dependent Variable), FDI 
outflows/GDP, FDI inflows/GDP, Openness, 





14 Home Countries 
and 39 Host 




 Static and Dynamic 
Gravity Model 
.. De: Trade; FDI 
In: GDP; POP; DIFGDP; SIML; RER; FDI; CO2; 









Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 
De: TopDecile (a commonly used measure of 
income inequality in the United States the 
percentage income share of the top 10% of income 
earners 
In: FDI/GSP (FDI in percent of gross state product) 
Luiz, R. 
De Mello, Jr. 
(1999) 
32 Countries (15 
Countries in OECD; 
17 Countries in 
non-OECD) 
Time Series, Panel Data .. De: Output/ Capital accumulative/ TFP 
In: FDI, One year lagged output; one year lagged 




Appendices for Chapter 4 Data Description 
4.1 Foreign Direct Investment Variable 
Table 4.1. 1 FDI Statistics Standard Components 
Transactions Data a) Direct Investment Income 1) Income on Equity 
2) Reinvested Earnings and Undistributed Branch Profits 
3) Income on Debt 
b) Direct Investment Financial Flows 1) Equity Capital 
2) Reinvested Earnings 
3) Other Capital 
Position Data Direct Investment Positions 1) Equity and Reinvested Earnings 
2) Other Capital 





Table 4.1.2 Data Resources of Foreign Direct Investment Flows in 30 OECD Countries 
Country National Institution 
Reporting FDI 
Reporting System Used Valuation System 
Used 
Data Sources Used in the 
Report 
Australia Australian Bureau of 
Statistics 
Surveys Current Price Australian Bureau of Statistics 
Austria Austrian National Bank .. .. Austrian National Bank 
Belgium National Bank of Belgium a) Data on equity and 
other capital are based on 
ITRS 
b) Data on reinvested 
earnings are based on 
surveys 
Current Price National Bank of Belgium 
Canada Statistics Canada .. .. Statistics Canada 
Czech Republic Czech National Bank Surveys Market Price a) Inflows: Czech National 
Bank 
b) Outflows: Estimate for 1992 
and the national institution 
thereafter 
Denmark National Bank of Denmark .. .. IMF for 1980–1984 and the 
national institution thereafter 
Finland Bank of Finland and 
Statistics Finland 
Enterprise surveys Current Price. Bank of Finland and Statistics 
Finland and Data for 2015 are 
estimated 
France Banque de France .. Market Price Banque de France 
 
Germany Deutsche Bundesbank .. .. Deutsche Bundesbank 
Sources: World Investment Report 2016: Methodological Note 
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Table 4.1.2 Data Resources of Foreign Direct Investment Flows in 30 OECD Countries (Cont.) 
Country National Institution 
Reporting FDI 
Reporting System Used Valuation System 
Used 
Data Sources Used in the 
Report 
Greece Bank of Greece ITRS and Surveys Current Price a) Inflows: IMF for 1980–1989 and 
the national institution thereafter 
b) Outflows: Proxy for 1987–1997 
and the national institution thereafter 
Hungary Central Bank of Hungary Surveys .. a) Inflows: Central Bank of Hungary 
b) Outflows: IMF for 1992–1994 and 
the national institution thereafter 
Iceland Central Bank of Iceland .. .. a) Inflows: IMF for 1980–1987 and 
the national institution thereafter 
b) Outflows: IMF for 1986–1987 and 
the national institution thereafter 
Ireland Central Statistics Office of the 
Republic of Ireland 
Surveys Market value a) Inflows: IMF for 1980–1985 and 
the national institution thereafter 
b) Outflows: Proxy for 1987–1989 
and the national institution thereafter 
Italy Banca d’Italia .. .. IMF for 1980–1988 and the national 
institution thereafter 
Japan Bank of Japan For flows, data on equity and 
other capital are based on 
ITRS whereas data on 
reinvested earnings are based 
on surveys, which were 
started from 1996. 
Current Price Bank of Japan 






Table 4.1.2 Data Resources of Foreign Direct Investment Flows in 30 OECD Countries (Cont.) 
 
Country National Institution 
Reporting FDI 
Reporting System Used Valuation System 
Used 
Data Sources Used in the 
Report 
Kora, Republic of Ministry of Trade, Industry & 
Energy (MOTIE) and Bank of 
Korea 
.. .. Ministry of Trade, Industry & 
Energy (MOTIE) and Bank of Korea 
Luxembourg Service Central de la Statistique 
et des Etudes Economique du 
Luxembourg (STATEC) 
Banque Centrale du 
Luxembourg 
Surveys .. The national institutions 
Data for 2002–2012 are on an 
asset/liability basis 
Mexico Banco de México; Ministry of 
Economy 
Surveys Current price a) Inflows: The national institutions 
b) Outflows: Proxy for 1980–1991 
and the national institutions 
thereafter 
Netherlands De Nederlandsche Bank .. .. De Nederlandsche Bank 
New Zealand Statistics New Zealand Surveys Market prices Statistics New Zealand 
Norway Statistics Norway ITRS Current Price IMF for 1980 and the national 
institutions thereafter 
Poland National Bank of Poland .. .. a) Inflows: IMF for 1980–1989 and 
the national institution thereafter. 
b) Outflows: IMF for 1980–1985, 
proxy based on investments reported 
by Belgium and Luxembourg, France 
and the United States for 1990, and 
the national institution for 1986–
1989 and 1991–2015 




Table 4.1.2 Data Resources of Foreign Direct Investment Flows in 30 OECD Countries (Cont.) 
 
Country National Institution 
Reporting FDI 
Reporting System Used Valuation System 
Used 
Data Sources Used in the 
Report 
Portugal Banco de Portugal ITRS and Surveys Current Price Banco de Portugal 
Slovakia National Bank of Slovakia .. .. National Bank of Slovakia 
Spain Banco de España .. Current Price IMF for 1980–1989 and the national 
institution thereafter 
Sweden Statistics Sweden Surveys Current Price Statistics Sweden 
Switzerland Swiss National Bank Surveys Current Price Swiss National Bank 
2015 data are estimated. 
Turkey Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey 
ITRS and Surveys. .. Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey 
United Kingdom Office for National Statistics. .. .. a) Inflows: IMF for 1980–1984 and 
the national institution thereafter 
b) Outflows: The national institution 
United States Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
United States Department of 
Commerce 
Surveys Market Value Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
United States Department of 
Commerce. 









Inward Transactions Data Outward Transactions Data 
Direct Investment Income Direct 
Investment 
Financial Flows 
























Australia ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Austria ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Belgium ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Canada ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Czech Republic ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Denmark X X X ✓ ✓ X X X ✓ ✓ 
Finland ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
France ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ 
Germany ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Greece ✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Hungary ✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Iceland ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Ireland ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 













Inward Transactions Data Outward Transactions Data 
Direct Investment Income Direct 
Investment 
Financial Flows 
























Italy ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ 
Japan ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Belgium ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Canada ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Korea ✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Luxembourg NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Mexico ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X X X X X 
Netherlands ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
New Zealand ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Norway ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ 
Poland ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Portugal ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 














Inward Transactions Data Outward Transactions Data 
Direct Investment Income Direct 
Investment 
Financial Flows 
























Slovak Republic ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Spain ✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Sweden ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Switzerland ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Turkey ✓ ✓ X ✓ X ✓ X X ✓ X 
United Kingdom ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
United States ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 












Inward Position Data Outward Position Data 
Equity Capital and 
Reinvested Earnings 
Other Capital Equity Capital and 
Reinvested Earnings 
Other Capital 
Australia ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Austria ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Belgium ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Canada ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Czech Republic ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Denmark ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Finland ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
France ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Germany ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Greece ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Hungary ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Iceland ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Ireland X X X X 
Italy ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Japan ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Korea X X X X 
Luxembourg ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Mexico ✓ ✓ X X 












Inward Position Data Outward Position Data 
Equity Capital and 
Reinvested Earnings 
Other Capital Equity Capital and 
Reinvested Earnings 
Other Capital 
Netherlands ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
New Zealand ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Norway ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Poland ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Portugal ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Slovak Republic ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Spain ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Sweden ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Switzerland ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Turkey X X X X 
United Kingdom ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
United States ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 




























Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward 
Australia ✓ ✓ X X X X X X ✓ ✓ 
Austria ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X X X X X X 
Belgium X X ✓ ✓ X X X X X X 
Canada ✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X 
Czech 
Republic 
X X X X ✓ ✓ X X X X 
Denmark ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X X X X X X 
Finland ✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X 
France X X ✓ ✓ X X X X X X 
Germany X X ✓ ✓ X X X X X X 
Greece X X ✓ ✓ X X X X X X 
Hungary X X ✓ ✓ X X X X X X 
Iceland X X X X X X X X ✓ ✓ 
Ireland ✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X 
Italy ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X X X X X X 
Japan ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X X X X X X 
Korea X X X X ✓ ✓ X X X X 


























Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward 
Luxembourg NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Mexico X NA X NA ✓ NA X NA X NA 
Netherlands ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X X X X X X 
New Zealand ✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X 
Norway ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X X X X X X 
Poland X X ✓ ✓ X X X X X X 
Portugal ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X X X X X X 
Slovak 
Republic 
✓ ✓ X X X X X X ✓ ✓ 
Spain X X ✓ ✓ X X X X X X 
Sweden X X ✓ ✓ X X X X ✓ ✓ 
Switzerland ✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X 
Turkey X X ✓ ✓ X X X X X X 
United 
Kingdom 
✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X 
United States ✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X 
























Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward 
Australia ✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X 
Austria ✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X 
Belgium NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Canada NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Czech 
Republic 
✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X 
Denmark NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Finland ✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X 
France NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Germany NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Greece NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Hungary NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Iceland ✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X 
Ireland NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Italy ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X X X X 
Japan NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Korea NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 

























Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward 
Luxembourg NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Mexico ✓ NA X NA X NA X NA X NA 
Belgium NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Canada NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Czech 
Republic 
✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X 
Netherlands NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
New Zealand NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Norway NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Poland ✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X 
Portugal NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Slovak 
Republic 
✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X 
Spain X NA ✓ NA ✓ NA X NA ✓ NA 
Sweden ✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X 
Switzerland ✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X 


























Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward 
Turkey NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
United 
Kingdom 
✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X 
United States NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
























Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward 
Australia ✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X X X 
Austria ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X X X X X X ✓ ✓ 
Belgium X X ✓ ✓ X X X X X X ✓ ✓ 
Canada ✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X X X 
Czech Republic X X X X ✓ ✓ X X X X ✓ ✓ 
Denmark ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X X X X X X ✓ ✓ 
Finland ✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X ✓ ✓ 
France X X ✓ ✓ X X X X ✓ X ✓ ✓ 
Germany ✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X X X 
Greece ✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X ✓ ✓ 
Hungary X X ✓ ✓ X X X X ✓ X ✓ ✓ 
Iceland X X X X X X X X ✓ ✓ X X 
Ireland NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Italy X X ✓ ✓ X X X X X X ✓ ✓ 
Japan ✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X X X 
Korea NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Luxembourg ✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X X X 
Mexico ✓ NA X NA X NA X NA X NA X NA 

























Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward 
Netherlands ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X X X X X X ✓ ✓ 
New Zealand ✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X X X 
Norway ✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X X X 
Poland ✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X X X 
Portugal ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X X X X X X ✓ ✓ 
Slovak Republic ✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X X X 
Spain X X ✓ ✓ X X X X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Sweden ✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X ✓ ✓ 
Switzerland ✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X X X 
Turkey NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
United Kingdom ✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X ✓ ✓ 
United States ✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X ✓ ✓ 


























Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward 
Australia ✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X X X 
Austria NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Belgium NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Canada NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Czech Republic ✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X X X 
Denmark NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Finland ✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X X X 
France ✓ ✓ X X X X X X ✓ ✓ X X 
Germany NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Greece NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Hungary NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Iceland ✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X X X 
Ireland NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Italy NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Japan NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Korea NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Luxembourg NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Mexico NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 



























Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward 
Netherlands NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
New Zealand NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Norway NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Poland NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Portugal NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Slovak Republic NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Spain NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Sweden ✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X X X 
Switzerland NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Turkey NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
United Kingdom ✓ ✓ X X X X X X X X X X 
United States NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 






Table 4.1. 9 Global Innovation Index 2017 Rankings (30 OECD Countries) 
Country Region Score 
(0-100) 
Rank Income Rank Innovation 
Efficiency Ratio 
Rank 
Switzerland EUR 67.69 1 HI 1 0.95 2 
Sweden EUR 63.82 2 HI 2 0.83 12 
Netherlands EUR 63.36 3 HI 3 0.93 4 
United States NAC 61.40 4 HI 4 0.78 21 
United 
Kingdom 
EUR 60.89 5 HI 5 0.78 20 
Denmark EUR 58.70 6 HI 6 0.71 34 
Finland EUR 58.49 8 HI 8 0.70 37 
Germany EUR 58.39 9 HI 9 0.84 7 
Ireland EUR 58.13 10 HI 10 0.85 6 
Korea, Rep. SEAO 57.70 11 HI 11 0.82 14 
Luxembourg EUR 56.40 12 HI 12 0.97 1 
Iceland EUR 55.76 13 HI 13 0.86 5 
Japan SEAO 54.72 14 HI 14 0.67 49 
France EUR 54.18 15 HI 15 0.71 35 
Canada NAC 53.65 18 HI 18 0.64 59 
Norway EUR 53.14 19 HI 19 0.66 51 
Austria EUR 53.10 20 HI 20 0.69 41 
New Zealand SEAO 52.87 21 HI 21 0.65 56 
Australia SEAO 51.83 23 HI 22 0.60 76 
Czech 
Republic 
EUR 50.98 24 HI 23 0.83 13 
Belgium EUR 49.85 27 HI 26 0.67 47 
Spain EUR 48.81 28 HI 27 0.70 36 
Italy EUR 46.96 29 HI 28 0.73 31 
Portugal EUR 46.05 31 HI 30 0.71 33 
Slovakia EUR 43.43 34 HI 33 0.75 25 
Poland EUR 41.99 38 HI 35 0.67 48 
Hungary EUR 41.74 39 HI 36 0.73 30 
Turkey NAWA 38.90 43 UM 5 0.84 9 
Greece EUR 38.85 44 HI 39 0.56 87 
Mexico LCN 35.79 58 UM 11 0.61 74 








4.2 Country Profile Factors 
Table 4.2. 1 Institutions in Categories 
Political Environment Regulatory Environment Business Environment 
Country 2015 Country 2015 Country 2015 
Finland 1 98.9 Denmark 2 98.3 Canada 1 93.7 
Norway 3 94.4 New Zealand 3 98.3 Finland 2 91.8 
New Zealand 4 94.3 Norway 4 97.3 Korea, Rep. 4 90.2 
Switzerland 5 94.2 Netherlands 5 97 Norway 5 90.2 
Sweden 6 92.3 Finland 7 96.9 Denmark 7 90 
Denmark 7 91.1 Austria 8 95.9 Ireland 8 88.7 
Luxembourg 8 91.1 United Kingdom 9 95.4 Netherlands 9 88.2 
Austria 9 90.5 Canada 10 94.9 United Kingdom 10 87.9 
Netherlands 10 90.5 Switzerland 11 94.5 United States  11 87.4 
Canada 11 89.5 Australia 12 93.8 Australia 12 86.8 
Iceland 12 88.4 Sweden 13 93.1 New Zealand 13 86.5 
Australia 13 87.3 United States 14 92.5 Portugal 14 86.1 
Japan 16 86.5 Japan 16 90.6 Iceland 16 84.9 
Belgium 17 85.6 Iceland 17 90 Sweden 17 84.7 
Germany 18 84.8 Ireland 18 89.5 Belgium 18 84.2 
OECD Average Score .. 80.3 OECD Average Score .. 84.8 OECD Average Score .. 82.6 
World Average Score .. 53.6 World Average Score .. 64.6 World Average Score .. 68.2 
Source: The Global Innovation Index, 2015 
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Table 4.2.1 Institutions in Categories (Cont.) 
 
Political Environment Regulatory Environment Business Environment 
Country 2015 Country 2015 Country 2015 
Ireland 19 83.4 France 19 87 Germany 19 83.4 
United States 22 80.6 Luxembourg 22 83.9 Japan 21 82.4 
United Kingdom 24 78.6 Germany 26 81.5 France 26 80.3 
Portugal 25 78.5 Italy 27 81.4 Switzerland 28 80.2 
France 26 77.9 Belgium 30 80.2 Spain 30 79.7 
Czech Republic 27 77.6 Hungary 33 78.1 Austria 31 79.5 
Slovakia 30 76.9 Spain 35 77.4 Mexico 34 77.5 
Poland 35 74.1 Portugal 37 77 Poland 39 76.3 
Hungary 37 71.1 Czech Republic 40 75.6 Slovakia 41 76.2 
Korea, Rep. 38 70.9 Poland 42 75.4 Czech Republic 43 75.9 
Spain 41 68.5 Greece 45 73.1 Luxembourg 44 75.6 
Italy 48 65.2 Slovakia 46 72.2 Greece 47 75 
Greece 55 56.4 Korea, Rep. 66 67.4 Italy 49 74.9 
Mexico 76 47.8 Mexico 88 59.2 Hungary 60 71 
Turkey 88 43.0 Turkey 101 55.7 Turkey 67 68.9 
OECD Average Score .. 80.3 OECD Average Score .. 84.8 OECD Average Score .. 82.6 
World Average Score .. 53.6 World Average Score .. 64.6 World Average Score .. 68.2 




Table 4.2. 2 Market Sophistication in Categories 
Credit Investment Trade and Competition 
Country 2015 Country 2015 Country 2015 
United States 1 79.2 United States 2 76.7 Japan 3 92.7 
New Zealand 3 73.8 Switzerland 4 71.6 United Kingdom 5 90.4 
Denmark 5 67.9 Canada 5 71.5 Belgium 6 90.4 
Australia 6 65.5 United Kingdom 6 69.5 Germany 7 89.2 
United Kingdom 8 63 Korea, Rep. 9 59.9 Netherlands 9 88.9 
Canada 9 62.8 Finland 14 57.9 Australia 10 88.5 
Ireland 10 62.6 Sweden 15 56.5 United States 11 88.5 
Spain 14 58.3 Denmark 22 52.5 Austria 12 88.5 
Switzerland 15 57.8 Luxembourg 27 50.9 Czech Republic 13 87.8 
Japan 16 56 Spain 28 50.3 Switzerland 14 87.6 
Korea, Rep. 17 54.5 France 32 48.1 Turkey 18 86.3 
Netherlands 18 54.3 Ireland 35 46.2 Canada 20 86.2 
Portugal 21 50.4 Australia 36 46.1 France 21 85.9 
Germany 23 49.9 Japan 43 44.1 Slovakia 22 85.8 
Sweden 25 49.6 New Zealand 44 43.5 Norway 23 85.7 
OECD Average Score .. 49.5 OECD Average Score .. 44.8 OECD Average Score .. 85.4 
World Average Score .. 33.0 World Average Score .. 38.1 World Average Score .. 52.5 






Table 4.2.2 Market Sophistication in Categories (Cont.) 
Credit Investment Trade and Competition 
Country 2015 Country 2015 Country 2015 
Finland 27 48.3 Norway 47 42.5 Spain 24 85.6 
Austria 28 48.1 Netherlands 48 42.2 New Zealand 25 85.5 
Greece 33 44.9 Turkey 51 39.7 Sweden 28 85 
Iceland 35 44.7 Germany 59 38.5 Denmark 30 84.6 
Czech Republic 37 43.5 Belgium 61 37.5 Hungary 31 84.6 
France 38 43 Italy 63 36.2 Poland 33 83.9 
Italy 42 41.5 Portugal 78 32.9 Luxembourg 34 83.7 
Norway 43 41.3 Austria 79 32.8 Italy 36 83.2 
Slovakia 45 39.2 Iceland 80 32.6 Ireland 37 83.1 
Belgium 50 36.8 Poland 84 32 Portugal 38 82.9 
Luxembourg 55 34.1 Mexico 96 30.2 Greece 41 82.1 
Poland 69 31 Greece 110 26.7 Iceland 49 80.8 
Hungary 73 30.2 Slovakia 112 26.2 Mexico 50 80.7 
Mexico 75 30 Czech Republic 118 25.8 Finland 60 78.3 
Turkey 104 22.4 Hungary 132 23.3 Korea, Rep. 76 75.5 
OECD Average Score .. 49.5 OECD Average Score .. 44.8 OECD Average Score .. 85.4 
World Average Score .. 33.0 World Average Score .. 38.1 World Average Score .. 52.5 





Table 4.2. 3 Knowledge Input in Categories 
Knowledge Works Knowledge Absorption 
Country 2015 Country 2015 
Sweden 2 76.8 Luxembourg 4 61.7 
Finland 3 74.8 Netherlands 7 55.5 
Switzerland 4 73 Finland 9 52.7 
Ireland 5 70.6 Ireland 11 51.8 
Denmark 6 70.3 Mexico 13 50.4 
Belgium 8 68.9 Switzerland 14 50.1 
Iceland 9 67 United States 15 49.6 
Australia 10 66.7 Sweden 16 48.5 
United States 11 65.5 Czech Republic 24 46 
France 12 64.7 France 29 44.7 
United Kingdom 13 63.8 United Kingdom 30 43.6 
Japan 16 62.8 Germany 33 42.2 
Norway 17 62.1 Japan 34 41.8 
Luxembourg 18 61.5 Canada 35 41.6 
Netherlands 19 61.3 Austria 37 41.3 
Korea, Rep. 22 59.9 New Zealand 38 40.9 
Germany 24 59.4 Belgium 39 40.8 
Austria 27 56.1 Hungary 40 40.3 
Canada 28 56 Denmark 46 38.5 
New Zealand 29 55.1 Italy 50 37.5 
Spain 30 54.4 Iceland 54 36.9 
Czech Republic 32 53.7 Poland 60 35.6 
Italy 44 45.6 Korea, Rep. 61 35.6 
Poland 45 45.3 Australia 63 34.4 
Portugal 47 45.1 Slovakia 66 33.7 
Slovakia 48 45 Norway 71 32.4 
Hungary 60 40.9 Portugal 75 32.2 
Mexico 72 37 Spain 79 31.6 
Greece 78 35.5 Greece 95 29.3 
Turkey 85 32.6 Turkey 127 22.9 
OECD Average Score .. 57.7 OECD Average Score .. 41.5 
World Average Score .. 38.7 World Average Score .. 35.1 









Table 4.2. 4 Knowledge and Technology Outputs in Categories 
Knowledge Creation Knowledge Impact Knowledge Diffusion 
Country 2015 Country Country 2015 Country 
Korea, Rep. 1 78.6 United Kingdom 2 58.7 Switzerland 1 90.3 
Sweden 2 70.6 Switzerland 5 57.8 Ireland 2 84.8 
Switzerland 3 69.2 United States 8 56 Luxembourg 4 67.2 
United States 4 68.5 Italy 10 54.4 Netherlands 5 64.5 
Germany 5 64.7 Ireland 12 53.9 Sweden 6 63 
United Kingdom 7 58.6 Spain 17 51.8 Finland 10 54.2 
Finland 8 57.5 Slovakia 19 50.9 Japan 14 50 
Japan 10 56.3 Czech Republic 21 49.6 Austria 16 49.9 
Netherlands 11 55.2 Norway 22 49.1 United States 18 49.5 
New Zealand 12 54.8 Hungary 24 48.4 Korea, Republic of 19 49.1 
Czech Republic 16 48 Netherlands 26 48.1 Germany 20 49 
Denmark 17 45.3 Sweden 28 47.7 Mexico 22 47.5 
Canada 18 45 Portugal 29 47.3 United Kingdom 23 47.5 
Iceland 19 43.3 Germany 31 46.6 Denmark 24 46.7 
Belgium 22 39 Australia 32 46.2 France 25 44.9 
OECD Average Score .. 42.3 OECD Average Score .. 45.7 OECD Average Score .. 44.3 
World Average Score .. 18.7 World Average Score .. 35.5 World Average Score .. 30.5 




Table 4.2.4 Knowledge and Technology Outputs in Categories (Cont.) 
Credit Investment Trade and Competition 
Country 2015 Country 2015 Country 2015 
Austria 23 37.9 Denmark 33 46.1 Iceland 27 44.2 
Luxembourg 25 37 New Zealand 35 45.8 Czech Republic 29 42.4 
Australia 26 34.9 France 39 44.4 Canada 33 41 
Norway 27 34.5 Finland 42 44 Spain 38 36.6 
France 29 33.9 Luxembourg 44 43.1 Italy 39 36.6 
Italy 31 32.6 Korea, Rep. 47 42.4 Hungary 41 34.4 
Spain 33 31.3 Belgium 50 41.9 Norway 43 33.9 
Ireland 35 28.4 Austria 51 41.3 Portugal 55 30.3 
Turkey 36 26 Canada 56 39.7 Slovakia 69 27.5 
Poland 40 24.4 Japan 59 39.4 Belgium 70 27.3 
Slovakia 42 22.8 Greece 66 37.7 New Zealand 84 25.4 
Portugal 44 21.9 Poland 81 35.7 Poland 89 24.9 
Hungary 45 21.4 Turkey 83 35.3 Australia 99 23.2 
Greece 51 18.2 Iceland 85 34.7 Greece 103 22.1 
Mexico 83 8.4 Mexico 96 32.4 Turkey 108 20.4 
OECD Average Score .. 42.3 OECD Average Score .. 45.7 OECD Average Score .. 44.3 
World Average Score .. 18.7 World Average Score .. 35.5 World Average Score .. 30.5 







Appendices for Chapter 5 Econometric Method 
5.1 Unit-root in 30 OECD Countries 




I (2) vs I (1) I (1) vs I (0) 
FDI Inward (Flow) Reject Accept 
FDI Outward (Flow) Reject Reject 
GDP Reject Accept 
Export Reject Accept 
Import Reject Accept 
R&D .. .. 
 




I (2) vs I (1) I (1) vs I (0) 
FDI Inward (Flow) Reject Accept 
FDI Outward (Flow) Reject Accept 
GDP Reject Accept 
Export Reject Accept 
Import Reject Accept 
R&D Reject Accept 




I (2) vs I (1) I (1) vs I (0) 
FDI Inward (Flow) Reject Reject 
FDI Outward (Flow) Reject Accept 
GDP Reject Accept 
Export Reject Accept 
Import Reject Accept 











I (2) vs I (1) I (1) vs I (0) 
FDI Inward (Flow) Reject Accept 
FDI Outward (Flow) Reject Accept 
GDP Reject Accept 
Export Reject Accept 
Import Reject Accept 
R&D Reject Accept 




I (2) vs I (1) I (1) vs I (0) 
FDI Inward (Flow) Reject Reject 
FDI Outward (Flow) Reject Reject 
GDP Reject Accept 
Export Reject Accept 
Import Reject Accept 
R&D Reject Accept 




I (2) vs I (1) I (1) vs I (0) 
FDI Inward (Flow) Reject Reject 
FDI Outward (Flow) Reject Reject 
GDP Reject Accept 
Export Reject Accept 
Import Reject Accept 
R&D Reject Accept 




I (2) vs I (1) I (1) vs I (0) 
FDI Inward (Flow) Reject Reject 
FDI Outward (Flow) Reject Accept 
GDP Reject Accept 
Export Reject Accept 
Import Reject Accept 
R&D Reject Accept 
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I (2) vs I (1) I (1) vs I (0) 
FDI Inward (Flow) Reject Reject 
FDI Outward (Flow) Reject Reject 
GDP Reject Accept 
Export Reject Accept 
Import Reject Accept 
R&D Reject Accept 




I (2) vs I (1) I (1) vs I (0) 
FDI Inward (Flow) Reject Reject 
FDI Outward (Flow) Reject Accept 
GDP Reject Accept 
Export Reject Accept 
Import Reject Accept 
R&D Reject Accept 




I (2) vs I (1) I (1) vs I (0) 
FDI Inward (Flow) Reject Reject 
FDI Outward (Flow) Reject Accept 
GDP Reject Accept 
Export Reject Accept 
Import Reject Accept 
R&D Reject Accept 




I (2) vs I (1) I (1) vs I (0) 
FDI Inward (Flow) Reject Reject 
FDI Outward (Flow) Reject Reject 
GDP Accept Accept 
Export Accept Accept 
Import Reject Accept 
R&D Reject Accept 
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I (2) vs I (1) I (1) vs I (0) 
FDI Inward (Flow) Reject Reject 
FDI Outward (Flow) Reject Accept 
GDP Reject Accept 
Export Reject Accept 
Import Reject Accept 
R&D Reject Accept 




I (2) vs I (1) I (1) vs I (0) 
FDI Inward (Flow) Reject Accept 
FDI Outward (Flow) Reject Accept 
GDP Reject Accept 
Export Reject Accept 
Import Reject Accept 
R&D Reject Accept 




I (2) vs I (1) I (1) vs I (0) 
FDI Inward (Flow) Reject Reject 
FDI Outward (Flow) Reject Accept 
GDP Reject Accept 
Export Reject Accept 
Import Reject Accept 
R&D Reject Accept 




I (2) vs I (1) I (1) vs I (0) 
FDI Inward (Flow) Reject Reject 
FDI Outward (Flow) Reject Accept 
GDP Reject Accept 
Export Reject Accept 
Import Reject Accept 
R&D Reject Accept 
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I (2) vs I (1) I (1) vs I (0) 
FDI Inward (Flow) Reject Accept 
FDI Outward (Flow) Reject Accept 
GDP Reject Accept 
Export Reject Accept 
Import Reject Accept 
R&D Accept Accept 




I (2) vs I (1) I (1) vs I (0) 
FDI Inward (Flow) Reject Accept 
FDI Outward (Flow) Reject Accept 
GDP Accept Accept 
Export Reject Accept 
Import Reject Accept 
R&D Reject Accept 




I (2) vs I (1) I (1) vs I (0) 
FDI Inward (Flow) Reject Accept 
FDI Outward (Flow) Reject Accept 
GDP Reject Accept 
Export Reject Accept 
Import Reject Accept 
R&D Reject Accept 




I (2) vs I (1) I (1) vs I (0) 
FDI Inward (Flow) Reject Accept 
FDI Outward (Flow) Reject Accept 
GDP Reject Accept 
Export Reject Accept 
Import Reject Accept 
R&D Reject Accept 
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I (2) vs I (1) I (1) vs I (0) 
FDI Inward (Flow) Reject Reject 
FDI Outward (Flow) Accept Accept 
GDP Reject Accept 
Export Accept Accept 
Import Reject Accept 
R&D .. .. 




I (2) vs I (1) I (1) vs I (0) 
FDI Inward (Flow) Reject Reject 
FDI Outward (Flow) Reject Accept 
GDP Reject Accept 
Export Reject Accept 
Import Reject Accept 
R&D Reject Accept 




I (2) vs I (1) I (1) vs I (0) 
FDI Inward (Flow) Reject Accept 
FDI Outward (Flow) Reject Accept 
GDP Reject Accept 
Export Reject Accept 
Import Reject Accept 
R&D Accept Accept 




I (2) vs I (1) I (1) vs I (0) 
FDI Inward (Flow) Reject Reject 
FDI Outward (Flow) Reject Reject 
GDP Reject Accept 
Export Reject Accept 
Import Reject Accept 
R&D Reject Accept 
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I (2) vs I (1) I (1) vs I (0) 
FDI Inward (Flow) Reject Reject 
FDI Outward (Flow) Reject Reject 
GDP Reject Accept 
Export Reject Accept 
Import Reject Accept 
R&D Accept Accept 




I (2) vs I (1) I (1) vs I (0) 
FDI Inward (Flow) Reject Reject 
FDI Outward (Flow) Reject Accept 
GDP Reject Accept 
Export Reject Accept 
Import Reject Accept 
R&D Accept Accept 




I (2) vs I (1) I (1) vs I (0) 
FDI Inward (Flow) Reject Reject 
FDI Outward (Flow) Reject Reject 
GDP Reject Accept 
Export Reject Accept 
Import Reject Accept 
R&D Reject Accept 




I (2) vs I (1) I (1) vs I (0) 
FDI Inward (Flow) Reject Accept 
FDI Outward (Flow) Reject Accept 
GDP Reject Accept 
Export Reject Accept 
Import Reject Accept 
R&D .. .. 
205 
 




I (2) vs I (1) I (1) vs I (0) 
FDI Inward (Flow) Reject Accept 
FDI Outward (Flow) Reject Accept 
GDP Reject Accept 
Export Reject Accept 
Import Reject Accept 
R&D Accept Accept 




I (2) vs I (1) I (1) vs I (0) 
FDI Inward (Flow) Reject Accept 
FDI Outward (Flow) Reject Reject 
GDP Reject Accept 
Export Reject Accept 
Import Reject Accept 
R&D Reject Accept 




I (2) vs I (1) I (1) vs I (0) 
FDI Inward (Flow) Reject Accept 
FDI Outward (Flow) Reject Accept 
GDP Reject Accept 
Export Reject Accept 
Import Reject Accept 













Table 5. 31 Summary of Unit-root Test for 30 OECD Countries 
Variables 
 
Australia Austria Belgium Canada Czech 
Republic 
Denmark Finland France Germany Greece 
FDI Inward (Flow) I (1) I (1) I (0) I (1) I (0) I (0) I (0) I (0) I (0) I (0) 
FDI Outward (Flow) I (0) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (0) I (0) I (1) I (0) I (1) I (1) 
GDP I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) 
Export I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) 
Import I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) 
R&D .. I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) 
 
Table 5. 32 Summary of Unit-root Test for 30 OECD Countries (Cont.) 
Variables 
 
Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg Mexico Netherland New 
Zealand 
FDI Inward (Flow) I (0) I (0) I (1) I (0) I (0) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (0) 
FDI Outward (Flow) I (0) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (2) 
at least 
GDP I (2) 
at least 
I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (2) 
at least 
I (1) I (1) I (1) 
Export I (2) 
at least 
I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (2) 
at least 
Import I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) 
R&D I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (2) 
at least 
I (1) I (1) I (1) .. 
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FDI Inward (Flow) I (0) I (1) I (0) I (0) I (0) I (0) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) 
FDI Outward (Flow) I (1) I (1) I (0) I (0) I (1) I (0) I (1) I (1) I (0) I (1) 
GDP I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) 
Export I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) 
Import I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) I (1) 















Table 5.34 Engle-Granger Two Step Method (Four Types of Countries) 
































Table 5.35 Type A: United Kingdom (Engle-Granger Test) 
Dependent tau-statistic z-statistic 
FDIOF -4.989* -54.631*** 
FDIOF -4.920* -52.122*** 
GDP -2.577 -10.049 
X -1.758 -6.763 
M -1.775 -6.657 
RD -3.688 -18.749 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 5.36 Type B: United States (Engle-Granger Test) 
Dependent tau-statistic z-statistic 
FDIOF -2.774 -12.663 
FDIOF -4.413 -25.322 
GDP -2.408 -12.672 
X -3.079 -285.260*** 
M -2.479 -9.988 
RD -2.557 -10.895 




Table 5.37 Type C: Japan (Engle-Granger Test) 
Dependent tau-statistic z-statistic 
FDIOF -4.186 -23.073 
FDIOF -2.483 -9.941 
GDP -2.140 -7.818 
X -3.047 -16.671 
M -2.496 -10.350 
RD -3.919 -21.811 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 5.38 Type D: France (Engle-Granger Test) 
Dependent tau-statistic z-statistic 
FDIOF -6.628*** -39.279*** 
FDIOF -3.494 -21.284 
GDP -2.335 -10.596 
X -3.483 -17.968 
M -2.663 -20.679 
RD -4.635  16.415 




































Adj. R-squared 0.406 
No. obs. 27 
Histogram-Normality 0.005 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 





















Adj. R-squared 0.579 
No. obs. 30 
Histogram-Normality 0.120 


























Adj. R-squared 0.115 
No. obs. 31 
Histogram-Normality 0.248 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 





















Adj. R-squared 0.629 
No. obs. 31 
Histogram-Normality 0.566 






Table 5.43 Type A: United Kingdom (Error Correction Model) 
 DFDINF DFDIOF DLGDP DLGX DLGM 
CointEq1 
 
 0.383***  0.764***  0.000**  0.000  0.000*** 
 (0.161)  (0.173)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
DFDINF(-1) 
 
-0.458 -0.830*** -0.000  0.000  0.000 
 (0.291)  (0.313)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
DFDINF(-2) 
 
-0.084  0.989***  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 (0.271)  (0.291)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
DFDIOF(-1) 
 
 0.221  0.521**  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 (0.188)  (0.202)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
DFDIOF(-2) 
 
 0.238 -0.192 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.190)  (0.204)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
DLGDP(-1) 
 
 152,313.445  293,412.006  0.765**  0.276  0.811** 
 (229,720.811)  (246,916.346)  (0.368)  (0.410)  (0.368) 
DLGDP(-2) 
 
 162,090.306 -92,076.739 -0.388 -0.085 -0.202 
 (164,459.805)  (176,770.289)  (0.264)  (0.293)  (0.264) 
DLGX(-1) 
 
-293,719.795 -740,279.120 -0.546 -0.609 -1.103** 
 (289,124.181)  (310,766.300)  (0.463)  (0.516)  (0.464) 
DLGX(-2) 
 
-490,753.042 -815,755.724** -1.659*** -0.906 -1.634*** 
 (348,065.671)  (374,119.800)  (0.558)  (0.621)  (0.558) 
DLGM(-1) 
 
 284,748.873  425,424.292  0.147  0.451  0.454 
 (305,811.154)  (328,702.360)  (0.490)  (0.545)  (0.490) 
DLGM(-2) 
 
 322,642.985  987,826.518***  1.866***  0.891  1.608*** 
 (320,974.853)  (345,001.123)  (0.514)  (0.572)  (0.515) 
Constant 
 
-2,469,332.914** -4,696,530.030*** -2.766 -1.660 -4.258** 
 (1,093,219.311)  (1,175,051.214)  (1.752)  (1.949)  (1.753) 
LGRD  241,923.897**  460,702.823***  0.276  0.169  0.425** 
 (107,576.471)  (115,629.007)  (0.172)  (0.192)  (0.173) 
R-squared  0.424  0.826  0.752  0.630  0.727 
Adj. 
R-squared 
-0.007  0.696  0.565  0.353  0.522 
F-statistic  0.983  6.341  4.032  2.275  3.544 
No. obs. 29 29 29 29 29 












Table 5.44 Type B: United States (Error Correction Model) 
 D(FDINF) D(FDIOF) D(GDP) D(X) D(M) 
CointEq1 
 
 0.257**  0.360***  0.305  0.410***  0.469** 
 (0.102)  (0.132)  (0.312)  (0.141)  (0.236) 
DFDINF(-1) 
 
 0.314  0.351  0.946  0.197 -0.180 
 (0.325)  (0.421)  (0.990)  (0.448)  (0.750) 
DFDINF(-2) 
 
 0.223  0.203 -0.744  0.798  1.027 
 (0.361)  (0.467)  (1.099)  (0.497)  (0.833) 
DFDIOF(-1) 
 
 1.083**  1.052  0.606  1.629**  2.046 
 (0.500)  (0.647)  (1.522)  (0.689)  (1.154) 
DFDIOF(-2) 
 
 0.748***  0.419  0.364  0.594*  0.657 
 (0.257)  (0.332)  (0.782)  (0.354)  (0.592) 
DGDP(-1) 
 
 0.170 -0.361  1.522**  0.195  0.627 
 (0.195)  (0.252)  (0.594)  (0.269)  (0.450) 
DGDP(-2) 
 
-0.257  0.133 -1.058** -0.440* -0.812** 
 (0.167)  (0.216)  (0.509)  (0.230)  (0.386) 
DX(-1) 
 
-0.131 -0.807  0.684  1.026  0.345 
 (0.575)  (0.743)  (1.748)  (0.791)  (1.324) 
DX(-2) 
 
 0.302  0.075 -1.067 -0.441 -0.284 
 (0.569)  (0.736)  (1.731)  (0.784)  (1.312) 
DM(-1) 
 
-0.807* -0.355 -2.304 -1.451** -1.523 
 (0.471)  (0.608)  (1.432)  (0.648)  (1.085) 
DM(-2) 
 
-0.373 -0.503  1.253 -0.171 -0.114 
 (0.366)  (0.473)  (1.112)  (0.503)  (0.843) 
DRD(-1) 
 
 3.258  9.625** -3.924 -1.282 -1.125 
 (2.922)  (3.776)  (8.886)  (4.022)  (6.734) 
DRD(-2) 
 
-3.821 -6.988**  2.279  0.609 -0.119 





 167,892.074  351,338.050  247,588.529*  277,506.102 
 
(94,076.444) 
 (121,580.524)  (286,118.601)  (129,511.611)  
(216,836.393) 
R-squared  0.717  0.778  0.762  0.780  0.763 
Adj. 
R-squared 
 0.473  0.586  0.556  0.589  0.558 
F-statistic  2.930  4.053  3.693  4.082  3.720 
No. obs. 29 29 29 29 29 









Table 5.45 Type C: Japan (Error Correction Model) 
 D(FDINF) D(FDIOF) D(LGDP) D(LGX) D(LGM) 
CointEq1 
 
 0.682 -1.580 -0.000 -0.000  0.000 
 (0.682)  (1.094)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
DFDINF(-1) 
 
-0.997  1.799*  0.000  0.000 -0.000 
 (0.624)  (1.002)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
DFDINF(-2) 
 
-1.077** -0.960  0.000 -0.000 -0.000** 
 (0.534)  (0.857)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
DFDIOF(-1) 
 
 0.102  0.094 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000** 
 (0.129)  (0.207)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
DFDIOF(-2) 
 
 0.268 -0.031 -0.000 -0.000  0.000 
 (0.197)  (0.316)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
DLGDP(-1) 
 
-65,161.379*  25,469.658  0.656  0.589*  0.261 
 (34,864.228)  (55,940.229)  (0.497)  (0.327)  (0.453) 
DLGDP(-2) 
 
-15,700.790  66,674.798*  0.197 -0.269 -0.234 
 (24,090.056)  (38,652.891)  (0.343)  (0.226)  (0.313) 
DLX(-1) 
 
 82,805.075  43,054.492 -0.647 -1.075* -0.053 
 (58,897.050)  (94,501.286)  (0.839)  (0.552)  (0.766) 
DLX(-2) 
 
 51,206.835 -80,533.402  0.167  0.416  0.857 
 (45,163.150)  (72,465.018)  (0.644)  (0.424)  (0.587) 
DLM(-1) 
 
-32,939.502  4,241.515  0.017  0.875**  0.327 
 (43,798.441)  (70,275.319)  (0.624)  (0.411)  (0.570) 
DLM(-2) 
 
-59,763.481  61,251.185 -0.217 -0.292 -0.915 
 (45,446.561)  (72,919.756)  (0.648)  (0.426)  (0.591) 
DLRD(-1)  17,586.830 -103,055.322 -0.085 -0.361  0.363 
 (61,779.856)  (99,126.796)  (0.881)  (0.579)  (0.804) 
DLRD(-2)  126,153.914* -205,573.886* -0.304 -0.106  0.183 
 (65,731.016)  (105,466.499)  (0.937)  (0.616)  (0.855) 
Constant 
 
-7,135.885  14,713.393*  0.076  0.083*  0.020 
 (4,967.524)  (7,970.474)  (0.071)  (0.047)  (0.065) 
R-squared  0.508  0.826  0.611  0.814  0.714 
Adj. 
R-squared 
 0.108  0.684  0.295  0.663  0.482 
F-statistic  1.271  5.830  1.931  5.390  3.076 
No. obs. 30 30 30 30 30 










Table 5.46 Type D: France (Error Correction Model) 
 D(FDINF) D(FDIOF) D(LGDP) D(LGX) D(LGM) 
CointEq1 
 
 0.746**  1.050  0.000*  0.000**  0.000** 
 (0.318)  (0.814)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
DFDINF(-1) 
 
-0.886**  0.285 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.380)  (0.973)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
DFDINF(-2) 
 
-0.267  0.482 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000* 
 (0.339)  (0.868)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
DFDIOF(-1) 
 
 0.413*  0.505  0.000  0.000*  0.000** 
 (0.251)  (0.645)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
DFDIOF(-2) 
 
 0.490**  0.486  0.000*  0.000**  0.000** 
 (0.203)  (0.520)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
DLGDP(-1) 
 
 31,766.344  161,572.236  0.454  0.508  0.885* 
 (58,703.590)  (150,486.956)  (0.476)  (0.443)  (0.470) 
DLGDP(-2) 
 
 148,861.660**  251,502.664  0.752  1.155**  1.432** 
 (71,667.861)  (183,720.931)  (0.581)  (0.541)  (0.574) 
DLX(-1) 
 
 339,591.959***  443,913.350 -0.919 -0.740 -1.206 
 (130,655.983)  (334,937.287)  (1.060)  (0.987)  (1.047) 
DLX(-2) 
 
-171,414.752 -139,691.801  0.646 -0.458 -0.963 
 (140,063.236)  (359,052.828)  (1.136)  (1.058)  (1.122) 
DLM(-1) 
 
-288,848.856** -484,538.288*  0.947  0.564  0.708 
 (112,928.749)  (289,493.430)  (0.916)  (0.853)  (0.905) 
DLM(-2) 
 
 21,663.870 -124,277.232 -1.387* -0.712 -0.638 
 (96,049.532)  (246,223.472)  (0.779)  (0.725)  (0.770) 
DLRD(-1)  425,276.736**  502,046.549  2.158  2.070  2.724* 
 (181,890.322)  (466,276.780)  (1.475)  (1.373)  (1.458) 
DLRD(-2) -62,463.389 -247,417.709  2.636***  2.163**  1.999** 
 (120,994.031)  (310,168.823)  (0.981)  (0.914)  (0.970) 
Constant 
 
-20,449.564 -15,956.800 -0.211 -0.159 -0.172* 
 (13,045.915)  (33,443.271)  (0.106)  (0.099)  (0.105) 
R-squared  0.646  0.483  0.510  0.473  0.507 
Adj. 
R-squared 
 0.359  0.062  0.111  0.044  0.106 
F-statistic  2.249  1.148  1.280  1.104  1.265 
No. obs. 30 30 30 30 30 
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Table 6. 5 Dummy Variable 
Dummy Variable for Countries Representation 
DUMAUL Dummy Variable of Australia 
DUMAUS Dummy Variable of Austria 
DUMBEL Dummy Variable of Belgium 
DUMCAN Dummy Variable of Canada 
DUMCZE Dummy Variable of Czech Republic 
DUMDEN Dummy Variable of Denmark 
DUMFIN Dummy Variable of Finland 
DUMFRA Dummy Variable of France 
DUMGER Dummy Variable of Germany 
DUMGRE Dummy Variable of Greece 
DUMHUN Dummy Variable of Hungary 
DUMICE Dummy Variable of Iceland 
DUMIRE Dummy Variable of Ireland 
DUMITA Dummy Variable of Italy 
DUMJAP Dummy Variable of Japan 
DUMKOR Dummy Variable of Korea 
DUMLUX Dummy Variable of Luxembourg 
DUMMEX Dummy Variable of Mexico 
DUMNET Dummy Variable of Netherland 
DUMNEW Dummy Variable of New Zealand 
DUMNOR Dummy Variable of Norway 
DUMPOL Dummy Variable of Poland 
DUMPOR Dummy Variable of Portugal 
DUMSLO Dummy Variable of Slovakia 
DUMSPA Dummy Variable of Spain 
DUMSWE Dummy Variable of Sweden 
DUMSWI Dummy Variable of Switzerland 
DUMTUR Dummy Variable of Turkey 
DUMUK Dummy Variable of United Kingdom 













Regression Result in 30 OECD Countries 
Table 6. 6 Australia 
 FDINF FDIOF GDP 
FDINF 
.. 0.362*** 65.877*** 
.. (0.309) (8.741) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.183 -0.293* 1.337 
(0.178) (0.406) (14.641) 
FDIOF 
0.705*** .. -10.516 
(0.228) .. (21.142) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.076 -0.583 -17.398 
(0.241) (0.420) (19.156) 
GDP 
0.010*** -0.001 .. 
(0.001) (0.002) .. 
GDP(-1) 
-0.005*** 0.005*** 0.181 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.207) 
Constant 
6.899** 1.372 -478.334* 
(3.474) (2.645) (284.675) 
R-squared 0.864 0.610 0.809 
Adj. R-squared 0.839 0.541 0.775 
F-statistic 
35.511 8.769 23.794 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.774 0.813 0.504 
Serial Correlation 0.008 0.762 0.048 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.043 0.352 0.001 













Table 6. 7 Austria 
 FDINF FDIOF GDP 
FDINF 
.. 0.965*** -2.571 
.. (0.153) (1.875) 
FDINF(-1) 
-0.411** 0.462** -3.410* 
(0.175) (0.225) (1.856) 
FDIOF 
0.607*** .. 3.063** 
(0.096) .. (1.424) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.058 0.181 1.204 
(0.125) (0.154) (1.265) 
GDP 
-0.024 0.046** .. 
(0.018) (0.021) .. 
GDP(-1) 
0.008 -0.027 0.558*** 
(0.014) (0.017) (0.099) 
Constant 
22.262* -21.424 427.021*** 
(12.291) (15.864) (105.931) 
R-squared 0.682 0.807 0.629 
Adj. R-squared 0.625 0.773 0.563 
F-statistic 
12.001 23.472 9.500 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.375 0.953 0.890 
Serial Correlation 0.079 0.850 0.284 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.109 0.446 0.823 















Table 6. 8 Belgium 
 FDINF FDIOF GDP 
FDINF 
.. 0.724*** 0.025 
.. (0.081) (0.467) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.098 -0.076 0.455 
(0.196) (0.163) (0.460) 
FDIOF 
1.042*** .. -0.232 
(0.116) .. (0.558) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.183 0.283 -0.453 
(0.228) (0.184) (0.542) 
GDP 
0.004 -0.028 .. 
(0.082) (0.068) .. 
GDP(-1) 
0.036 -0.041 0.384*** 
(0.053) (0.044) (0.104) 
Constant 
 
-30.668 71.839 620.122*** 
(69.966) (56.804) (144.687) 
R-squared 0.822 0.859 0.460 
Adj. R-squared 0.788 0.832 0.356 
F-statistic 
 
24.045 31.758 4.436 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) 
No. obs. 32 32 32 
Histogram-Normality 0.000 0.015 0.682 
Serial Correlation 0.373 0.087 0.052 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.302 0.013 0.551 















Table 6. 9 Canada 
 FDINF FDIOF GDP 
FDINF 
.. 0.338*** 1.385 
.. (0.088) (1.202) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.142 0.138 0.127 
(0.186) (0.105) (1.224) 
FDIOF 
1.022*** .. 1.070 
(0.266) .. (2.129) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.214 0.300** -2.199 
(0.251) (0.135) (1.601) 
GDP 
0.033 0.008 .. 
(0.028) (0.017) .. 
GDP(-1) 
-0.021 -0.010 0.674*** 
(0.020) (0.011) (0.038) 
Constant 
-12.074 8.960 296.790*** 
(11.847) (6.729) (54.941) 
R-squared 0.603 0.731 0.932 
Adj. R-squared 0.533 0.683 0.919 
F-statistic 
8.524 15.207 76.458 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.001 0.010 0.658 
Serial Correlation 0.363 0.576 0.002 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.014 0.809 0.357 















Table 6. 10 Czech Republic 
 FDINF FDIOF GDP 
FDINF 
.. 0.023 -0.829 
.. (0.028) (1.120) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.280 -0.012 0.284 
(0.355) (0.027) (1.063) 
FDIOF 
4.263 .. 27.434* 
(5.274) .. (11.315) 
FDIOF(-1) 
13.672 -1.180** 43.493* 
(7.541) (0.493) (20.199) 
GDP 
-0.101 0.018* .. 
(0.136) (0.007) .. 
GDP(-1) 
-0.041 -0.001 0.406 
(0.130) (0.010) (0.338) 
Constant 
58.622 -5.380 201.355 
(47.033) (3.197) (126.983) 
R-squared 0.479 0.619 0.856 
Adj. R-squared 0.046 0.301 0.735 
F-statistic 
1.105 1.949 7.112 
(0.445) (0.220) (0.017) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.662 0.813 0.633 
Serial Correlation 0.007 0.241 0.020 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.841 0.091 0.237 

















Table 6. 11 Denmark 
 FDINF FDIOF GDP 
FDINF 
.. 0.003*** -2.557* 
.. (0.000) (1.312) 
FDINF(-1) 
-0.330* 0.001 -2.221 
(0.181) (0.001) (1.357) 
FDIOF 
235.931*** .. 476.582 
(19.883) .. (349.862) 
FDIOF(-1) 
83.204* -0.221 437.871 
(47.274) (0.188) (359.274) 
GDP 
-0.047* 0.000 .. 
(0.024) (0.000) .. 
GDP(-1) 
-0.009 0.000 0.374*** 
(0.019) (0.000) (0.120) 
Constant 
41.351* -0.106 593.126*** 
(20.779) (0.083) (120.100) 
R-squared 0.894 0.882 0.593 
Adj. R-squared 0.875 0.861 0.520 
F-statistic 
47.399 41.782 8.150 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.872 0.862 0.635 
Serial Correlation 0.541 0.578 0.045 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.524 0.560 0.509 
















Table 6. 12 Finland 
 FDINF FDIOF GDP 
FDINF 
.. 0.866*** -0.471 
.. (0.248) (1.344) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.324* -0.570* 0.431 
(0.188) (0.292) (1.412) 
FDIOF 
0.351*** .. 0.035 
(0.100) .. (0.858) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.225* 0.543*** -0.139 
(0.129) (0.187) (0.970) 
GDP 
-0.009 0.002 .. 
(0.026) (0.042) .. 
GDP(-1) 
-0.020 -0.006 0.703*** 
(0.026) (0.042) (0.135) 
Constant 
39.747* 8.466 290.309* 
(21.692) (36.022) (154.264) 
R-squared 0.428 0.458 0.570 
Adj. R-squared 0.326 0.361 0.494 
F-statistic 
4.197 4.735 7.437 
(0.006) (0.003) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.000 0.000 0.707 
Serial Correlation 0.435 0.327 0.011 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.882 0.128 0.653 

















Table 6. 13 France 
 FDINF FDIOF GDP 
FDINF 
.. 1.285*** 3.389 
.. (0.345) (3.541) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.043 0.867* 2.639 
(0.215) (0.451) (4.062) 
FDIOF 
0.257*** .. -0.541 
(0.069) .. (1.607) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.056 0.289* -1428 
(0.071) (0.151) (1.343) 
GDP 
0.009 -0.007 .. 
(0.010) (0.022) .. 
GDP(-1) 
-0.001 -0.006 0.579*** 
(0.009) (0.019) (0.122) 
Constant 
-1.742 6.378 387.632*** 
(7.609) (16.975) (125.181) 
R-squared 0.491 0.698 0.528 
Adj. R-squared 0.400 0.644 0.444 
F-statistic 
5.399 12.943 6.276 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.814 0.154 0.503 
Serial Correlation 0.692 0.060 0.016 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.354 0.003 0.622 

















Table 6. 14 Germany 
 FDINF FDIOF GDP 
FDINF 
.. 0.138 -2.724* 
.. (0.228) (1.523) 
FDINF(-1) 
-0.288 -0.125 -0.817 
(0.201) (0.210) (1.504) 
FDIOF 
0.136 .. 0.672 
(0.226) .. (1.629) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.701*** 0.486* 0.818 
(0.252) (0.279) (2.137) 
GDP 
-0.053* 0.013 .. 
(0.029) (0.032) .. 
GDP(-1) 
-0.036 0.000 0.541** 
(0.033) (0.034) (0.213) 
Constant 
87.046** -2.107 466.342** 
(26.730) (33.550) (214.169) 
R-squared 0.565 0.320 0.615 
Adj. R-squared 0.451 0.141 0.515 
F-statistic 
4.937 1.789 6.089 
(0.005) (0.163) (0.001) 
No. obs. 25 25 25 
Histogram-Normality 0.000 0.358 0.971 
Serial Correlation 0.347 0.540 0.270 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.036 0.072 0.843 

















Table 6. 15 Greece 
 FDINF FDIOF GDP 
FDINF 
.. 0.506 9.218** 
.. (0.103) (3.823) 
FDINF(-1) 
-0.149 0.030 3.292 
(0.207) (0.205) (4.166) 
FDIOF 
0.108 .. 2.829 
(0.217) .. (4.353) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.004 0.506** 2.774 
(0.229) (0.196) (4.579) 
GDP 
0.023** 0.007 .. 
(0.009) (0.010) .. 
GDP(-1) 
-0.011 -0.001 0.674*** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.132) 
Constant 
-2.764 -5.098 197.393 
(6.120) (5.915) (116.612) 
R-squared 0.341 0.507 0.810 
Adj. R-squared 0.191 0.395 0.767 
F-statistic 
2.278 4.534 18.738 
(0.082) (0.005) (0.000) 
No. obs. 28 28 28 
Histogram-Normality 0.872 0.035 0.886 
Serial Correlation 0.948 0.439 0.099 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.010 0.026 0.428 

















Table 6. 16 Hungary 
 FDINF FDIOF GDP 
FDINF 
.. 0.443*** 0.010 
.. (0.133) (1.216) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.002 -0.046 -2.207* 
(0.273) (0.192) (1.262) 
FDIOF 
0.893*** .. 0.216 
(0.268) .. (1.727) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.290 0.256 3.023* 
(0.362) (0.252) (1.700) 
GDP 
0.000 0.004 .. 
(0.048) (0.034) .. 
GDP(-1) 
-0.026 0.032 0.729*** 
(0.045) (0.031) (0.142) 
Constant 
60.121* -39.459* 303.444* 
(30.912) (22.075) (154.808) 
R-squared 0.406 0.594 0.822 
Adj. R-squared 0.231 0.475 0.770 
F-statistic 
2.323 4.978 15.742 
(0.088) (0.005) (0.000) 
No. obs. 23 23 23 
Histogram-Normality 0.656 0.722 0.783 
Serial Correlation 0.846 0.656 0.096 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.847 0.005 0.064 

















Table 6. 17 Iceland 
 FDINF FDIOF GDP 
FDINF 
.. 2.067*** 0.851 
.. (0.254) (0.554) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.431*** -0.880** -0.609 
(0.137) (0.347) (0.439) 
FDIOF 
0.359*** .. 0.044 
(0.044) .. (0.242) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.054 -0.143 0.213 
(0.065) (0.154) (0.177) 
GDP 
0.109 0.032 .. 
(0.071) (0.179) .. 
GDP(-1) 
-0.136** 0.181 0.608*** 
(0.067) (0.170) (0.158) 
Constant 
33.129 -210.283 363.629** 
(59.631) (137.097) (149.281) 
R-squared 0.911 0.855 0.765 
Adj. R-squared 0.892 0.823 0.714 
F-statistic 
47.390 27.155 14.982 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 29 29 29 
Histogram-Normality 0.001 0.000 0.567 
Serial Correlation 0.127 0.008 0.167 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.761 0.984 0.804 

















Table 6. 18 Ireland* 
 FDINF FDIOF GDP 
FDINF 
.. 0.337*** -0.330 
.. (0.107) (0.219) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.330* -0.116 0.099 
(0.194) (0.122) (0.222) 
FDIOF 
0.917*** .. 0.277 
(0.292) .. (0.375) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.213 0.772** 1.111* 
(0.600) (0.326) (0.606) 
GDP 
-0.283 0.087 .. 
(0.188) (0.118) .. 
GDP(-1) 
0.048 -0.013 0.668*** 
(0.168) (0.102) (0.114) 
Constant 
197.762** -60.671 246.457** 
(94.431) (61.339) (98.644) 
R-squared 0.556 0.681 0.846 
Adj. R-squared 0.456 0.609 0.811 
F-statistic 
5.521 9.405 24.145 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 28 28 28 
Histogram-Normality 0.610 0.131 0.188 
Serial Correlation 0.047 0.632 0.048 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.009 0.013 0.535 

















Table 6. 19 Italy 
 FDINF FDIOF GDP 
FDINF 
.. 0.664*** -0.025 
.. (0.175) (3.764) 
FDINF(-1) 
-0.088 0.543*** 1.383 
(0.203) (0.208) (4.042) 
FDIOF 
0.509*** .. 3.376 
(0.135) .. (3.235) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.220* 0.372*** -1.750 
(0.122) (0.129) (2.540) 
GDP 
0.000 0.011 .. 
(0.009) (0.011) .. 
GDP(-1) 
-0.005 -0.000 0.751*** 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.137) 
Constant 
9.535** -12.027 216.072 
(6.914) (7.834) (136.344) 
R-squared 0.404 0.723 0.613 
Adj. R-squared 0.298 0.674 0.544 
F-statistic 
3.798 14.643 8.872 
(0.009) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.197 0.631 0.881 
Serial Correlation 0.304 0.932 0.071 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.002 0.008 0.765 

















Table 6. 20 Japan 
 FDINF FDIOF GDP 
FDINF 
.. 0.730 -0.097 
.. (0.582) (16.072) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.480*** -0.779 14.267 
(0.175) (0.605) (16.575) 
FDIOF 
0.073 .. 0.917 
(0.058) .. (5.090) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.066 0.872*** -4.817 
(0.062) (0.114) (5.323) 
GDP 
-0.000 0.001 .. 
(0.002) (0.007) .. 
GDP(-1) 
-0.000 -0.001 0.894*** 
(0.002) (0.007) (0.080) 
Constant 
0.350 1.853 133.826* 
(1.025) (3.222) (83.612) 
R-squared 0.238 0.700 0.817 
Adj. R-squared 0.102 0.647 0.785 
F-statistic 
1.753 13.078 25.064 
(0.155) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.000 0.118 0.465 
Serial Correlation 0.596 0.695 0.040 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.899 0.008 0.170 

















Table 6. 21 Korea 
 FDINF FDIOF GDP 
FDINF 
.. 0.064 204.270*** 
.. (0.226) (52.163) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.747*** -0.009 -171.065*** 
(0.125) (0.226) (56.260) 
FDIOF 
0.044 .. 160.493*** 
(0.158) .. (44.964) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.044 0.934*** -155.388*** 
(0.161) (0.080) (47.164) 
GDP 
0.002*** 0.002*** .. 
(0.000) (0.000) .. 
GDP(-1) 
-0.001*** -0.002*** 0.648*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.149) 
Constant 
1.808 0.720 3.688*** 
(1.075) (1.343) (387.517) 
R-squared 0.723 0.864 0.719 
Adj. R-squared 0.674 0.840 0.669 
F-statistic 
14.649 35.617 14.364 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.024 0.002 0.299 
Serial Correlation 0.002 0.190 0.053 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.456 0.989 0.001 

















Table 6. 22 Luxembourg 
 FDINF FDIOF GDP 
FDINF 
.. 0.721*** 4.282*** 
.. (0.106) (0.306) 
FDINF(-1) 
-0.107 0.152 0.351 
(0.197) (0.176) (0.899) 
FDIOF 
0.886*** .. -3.030*** 
(0.131) .. (0.794) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.166 0.015 -1.012 
(0.218) (0.198) (0.984) 
GDP 
0.206*** -0.118*** .. 
(0.015) (0.031) .. 
GDP(-1) 
0.022 -0.045 -0.049 
(0.044) (0.039) (0.201) 
Constant 
-172.741 114.607** 435.647 
(122.066) (103.647) (571.095) 
R-squared 0.971 0.864 0.946 
Adj. R-squared 0.965 0.837 0.936 
F-statistic 
173.916 32.933 91.488 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 32 32 32 
Histogram-Normality 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Serial Correlation 0.873 0.568 0.921 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.958 0.881 0.126 

















Table 6. 23 Mexico 
 FDINF FDIOF GDP 
FDINF 
.. -0.217 4.109 
.. (0.429) (4.773) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.533*** 0.280 -3.542 
(0.131) (0.372) (4.173) 
FDIOF 
-0.042 .. 1.181 
(0.082) .. (2.110) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.242*** 0.402* 0.971 
(0.087) (0.211) (2.510) 
GDP 
0.006 0.009 .. 
(0.007) (0.017) .. 
GDP(-1) 
-0.005** -0.005 0.265*** 
(0.002) (0.005) (0.038) 
Constant 
7.995 -0.641 679.045*** 
(5.725) (13.492) (80.571) 
R-squared 0.536 0.163 0.904 
Adj. R-squared 0.453 0.014 0.887 
F-statistic 
6.469 1.091 52.699 
(0.000) (0.387) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.029 0.000 0.034 
Serial Correlation 0.916 0.025 0.009 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.761 0.996 0.646 

















Table 6. 24 Netherland* 
 FDINF FDIOF GDP 
FDINF 
.. 0.151 -0.370 
.. (0.169) (0.531) 
FDINF(-1) 
-0.077 0.234* -0.189 
(0.193) (0.170) (0.548) 
FDIOF 
0.183 .. 0.160 
(0.205) .. (0.589) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.316 0.413** 0.471 
(0.206) (0.179) (0.603) 
GDP 
-0.046 0.016 .. 
(0.066) (0.060) .. 
GDP(-1) 
-0.013 -0.027 0.513*** 
(0.043) (0.039) (0.076) 
Constant 
74.124* 28.285 456.605*** 
(42.676) (40.432) (93.563) 
R-squared 0.270 0.431 0.668 
Adj. R-squared 0.139 0.220 0.609 
F-statistic 
2.067 4.252 11.267 
(0.100) (0.005) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.000 0.000 0.717 
Serial Correlation 0.032 0.553 0.062 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.213 0.989 0.002 

















Table 6. 25 New Zealand* 
 FDINF FDIOF GDP 
FDINF 
.. -0.951 6.611 
.. (1.461) (7.134) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.436 -0.248 -3.436 
(0.170) (1.474) (7.229) 
FDIOF 
-0.016 .. 0.429 
(0.024) .. (0.926) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.006 0.992*** 0.036 
(0.035) (0.202) (1.357) 
GDP 
0.004 0.018 .. 
(0.005) (0.038) .. 
GDP(-1) 
-0.004*** -0.001 -0.111* 
(0.001) (0.013) (0.062) 
Constant 
10.886 25.603 1,132.194*** 
(6.973) (56.418) (178.444) 
R-squared 0.402 0.494 0.703 
Adj. R-squared 0.296 0.404 0.650 
F-statistic 
3.771 5.477 13.245 
(0.010) (0.001) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.016 0.000 0.000 
Serial Correlation 0.271 0.000 0.001 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.894 0.551 0.077 

















Table 6. 26 Norway 
 FDINF FDIOF GDP 
FDINF 
.. 0.379 118.943*** 
.. (0.272) (13.202) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.504*** -0.414 -64.616*** 
(0.148) (0.251) (21.053) 
FDIOF 
0.171 .. 13.725 
(0.123) .. (17.301) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.188 0.500*** -41.777** 
(0.133) (0.181) (17.216) 
GDP 
0.006*** 0.002 .. 
(0.001) (0.002) .. 
GDP(-1) 
-0.005*** 0.000 0.666*** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.133) 
Constant 
-1.940 9.613** 223.373 
(3.212) (4.461) (443.949) 
R-squared 0.903 0.701 0.906 
Adj. R-squared 0.886 0.648 0.889 
F-statistic 
52.380 13.160 53.836 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.864 0.000 0.383 
Serial Correlation 0.100 0.450 0.118 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.480 0.956 0.124 

















Table 6. 27 Poland 
 FDINF FDIOF GDP 
FDINF 
.. 0.408*** 52.752 
.. (0.150) (76.384) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.830*** -0.320** -12.674 
(0.109) (0.160) (77.809) 
FDIOF 
0.510*** .. -7.700 
(0.188) .. (86.108) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.606 0.918*** -25.891 
(0.212) (0.128) (98.207) 
GDP 
0.000 -0.000 .. 
(0.000) (0.000) .. 
GDP(-1) 
-0.000 0.000 -0.075 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.188) 
Constant 
3.404 -0.083 -323.605 
(2.310) (2.145) (975.457) 
R-squared 0.740 0.706 0.049 
Adj. R-squared 0.693 0.654 -0.121 
F-statistic 
15.929 13.486 0.289 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.915) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.009 0.000 0.000 
Serial Correlation 0.436 0.019 0.643 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.136 0.116 0.920 

















Table 6. 28 Portugal 
 FDINF FDIOF GDP 
FDINF 
.. 0.752*** 1.379 
.. (0.179) (1.902) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.111 0.752 2.878 
(0.181) (0.179) (1.767) 
FDIOF 
0.514*** .. -0.969 
(0.122) .. (1.576) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.294** 0.437*** -0.398 
(0.139) (0.161) (1.522) 
GDP 
0.013 -0.014 .. 
(0.018) (0.022) .. 
GDP(-1) 
-0.011 0.006 0.424*** 
(0.009) (0.012) (0.059) 
Constant 
13.369 -2.100 481.148*** 
(11.910) (14.723) (83.814) 
R-squared 0.448 0.521 0.656 
Adj. R-squared 0.349 0.436 0.595 
F-statistic 
4.547 6.098 10.709 
(0.004) (0.001) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.698 0.001 0.788 
Serial Correlation 0.559 0.938 0.016 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.067 0.941 0.866 
















Table 6. 29 Slovakia 
 FDINF FDIOF GDP 
FDINF 
.. -0.099 1.176 
.. (0.189) (1.047) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.000 -0.167 0.380 
(0.252) (0.188) (1.093) 
FDIOF 
-0.170 .. 0.497 
(0.324) .. (1.418) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.031 -0.290 -0.015 
(0.339) (0.249) (1.478) 
GDP 
0.062 0.015 .. 
(0.055) (0.044) .. 
GDP(-1) 
-0.010 -0.002 0.167*** 
(0.011) (0.009) (0.026) 
Constant 
3.946 15.184 715.342*** 
(47.618) (36.198) (104.693) 
R-squared 0.090 0.133 0.774 
Adj. R-squared -0.194 -0.138 0.703 
F-statistic 
0.317 0.491 10.962 
(0.895) (0.777) (0.000) 
No. obs. 22 22 22 
Histogram-Normality 0.025 0.000 0.685 
Serial Correlation 0.000 0.029 0.000 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.052 0.690 0.053 

















Table 6. 30 Spain 
 FDINF FDIOF GDP 
FDINF 
.. 0.514 3.900*** 
.. (0.392) (2.920) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.183 -1.149*** 2.104 
(0.178) (0.367) (3.155) 
FDIOF 
0.705*** .. 0.077 
(0.228) .. (1.408) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.076 0.939*** -0.47 
(0.241) (0.226) (2.140) 
GDP 
0.010*** 0.001 .. 
(0.001) (0.025) .. 
GDP(-1) 
-0.005*** 0.000 0.422*** 
(0.002) (0.012) (0.047) 
Constant 
6.899** 14.172 427.518*** 
(3.474) (15.409) (83.980) 
R-squared 0.864 0.733 0.773 
Adj. R-squared 0.839 0.685 0.733 
F-statistic 
35.511 15.350 19.150 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.774 0.000 0.487 
Serial Correlation 0.008 0.778 0.000 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.043 0.338 0.149 

















Table 6. 31 Sweden 
 FDINF FDIOF GDP 
FDINF 
.. 0.230** -0.866 
.. (0.109) (0.585) 
FDINF(-1) 
-0.041 0.416*** -2.009*** 
(0.233) (0.122) (0.646) 
FDIOF 
0.593** .. 2.482*** 
(0.281) .. (0.854) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.382 -0.032 1.467* 
(0.243) (0.158) (0.765) 
GDP 
-0.084 0.093*** .. 
(0.056) (0.032) .. 
GDP(-1) 
0.017 -0.053** 0.529*** 
(0.043) (0.025) (0.097) 
Constant 
54.420 -12.369 372.945*** 
(39.302) (25.232) (110.062) 
R-squared 0.418 0.590 0.671 
Adj. R-squared 0.314 0.517 0.613 
F-statistic 
4.025 8.064 11.446 
(0.007) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.000 0.462 0.740 
Serial Correlation 0.480 0.542 0.381 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.396 0.945 0.350 

















Table 6. 32 Switzerland 
 FDINF FDIOF GDP 
FDINF 
.. 0.876*** 0.350 
.. (0.221) (0.982) 
FDINF(-1) 
-0.018 0.229 0.644 
(0.242) (0.343) (1.210) 
FDIOF 
0.430*** .. -0.609 
(0.108) .. (0.679) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.045 0.154 0.364 
(0.137) (0.194) (0.687) 
GDP 
0.014 -0.049 .. 
(0.039) (0.055) .. 
GDP(-1) 
-0.012 0.022 0.764*** 
(0.039) (0.055) (0.124) 
Constant 
-3.854 49.580 223.212 
(29.055) (40.326) (139.221) 
R-squared 0.467 0.531 0.615 
Adj. R-squared 0.364 0.441 0.541 
F-statistic 
4.554 5.899 8.307 
(0.004) (0.001) (0.000) 
No. obs. 32 32 32 
Histogram-Normality 0.000 0.066 0.676 
Serial Correlation 0.025 0.765 0.419 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.423 0.858 0.675 

















Table 6. 33 Turkey 
 FDINF FDIOF GDP 
FDINF 
.. 0.831* 88.902 
.. (0.448) (75.987) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.822*** -0.451 -79.123 
(0.101) (0.459) (74.901) 
FDIOF 
0.131* .. -12.679 
(0.071) .. (30.851) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.021 0.248 0.957 
(0.082) (0.202) (33.911) 
GDP 
0.000 -0.000 .. 
(0.000) (0.001) .. 
GDP(-1) 
-0.000 0.000 -0.105 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.181) 
Constant 
1.497 1.054 1,227.873** 
(1.528) (3.902) (596.251) 
R-squared 0.761 0.214 0.072 
Adj. R-squared 0.718 0.073 -0.094 
F-statistic 
17.841 1.522 0.432 
(0.000) (0.215) (0.822) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Serial Correlation 0.020 0.082 0.009 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.571 0.156 0.862 

















Table 6. 34 The United Kingdom 
 FDINF FDIOF GDP 
FDINF 
.. 0.926*** 1.766* 
.. (0.296) (0.999) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.383** -0.241 1.024 
(0.172) (0.336) (1.021) 
FDIOF 
0.279*** .. 0.451 
(0.089) .. (0.572) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.033 0.405** -1.245** 
(0.109) (0.183) (0.561) 
GDP 
0.057* 0.048 .. 
(0.032) (0.061) .. 
GDP(-1) 
-0.020 -0.044 0.181*** 
(0.019) (0.035) (0.207) 
Constant 
-28.931 0.209 474.793*** 
(19.419) (36.752) (67.743) 
R-squared 0.667 0.584 0.735 
Adj. R-squared 0.608 0.510 0.687 
F-statistic 
11.227 7.863 15.504 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.000 0.205 0.816 
Serial Correlation 0.107 0.016 0.121 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.565 0.000 0.685 
















Table 6. 35 The United States 
 FDINF FDIOF GDP 
FDINF 
.. 0.408* 1.826** 
.. (0.219) (0.730) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.512*** -0.194 -0.845 
(0.159) (0.226) (0.779) 
FDIOF 
0.270* .. -0.180 
(0.145) .. (0.656) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.082 0.473*** 0.028 
(0.159) (0.420) (0.683) 
GDP 
0.100** -0.015 .. 
(0.040) (0.054) .. 
GDP(-1) 
-0.074*** 0.002 0.695*** 
(0.028) (0.039) (0.033) 
Constant 
-21.247 15.708 288.196*** 
(14.829) (18.650) (36.603) 
R-squared 0.529 0.422 0.946 
Adj. R-squared 0.444 0.319 0.936 
F-statistic 
6.280 4.088 98.235 
(0.000) (0.006) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.384 0.055 0.517 
Serial Correlation 0.426 0.568 0.007 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.158 0.031 0.224 
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Table 7. 4 Austria 
 FDINF FDIOF RD 
FDINF 
.. 0.901*** 0.014 
.. (0.171) (0.016) 
FDINF(-1) 
-0.394* 0.289 0.032 
(0.197) (0.261) (0.017) 
FDIOF 
0.564*** .. 0.005 
(0.107) .. (0.014) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.038 0.143 0.002 
(0.153) (0.192) (0.013) 
RD 
1.967 2.607 .. 
(2.262) (2.857) .. 
RD(-1) 
-2.150 -1.558 0.949*** 
(2.152) (2.754) (0.046) 
GDP 
.. .. 0.001 
.. .. (0.002) 
GDP(-1) 
.. .. -0.002* 
.. .. (0.001) 
Constant 
10.151 -18.554* 1.767 
(8.844) (10.881) (1.364) 
R-squared 0.676 0.803 0.983 
Adj. R-squared 0.616 0.766 0.978 
F-statistic 
11.286 21.972 204.680 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 33 33 33 
Histogram-Normality 0.256 0.622 0.609 
Serial Correlation 0.187 0.693 0.299 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.692 0.015 0.956 









Table 7. 5 Belgium 
 FDINF FDIOF RD 
FDINF 
.. 0.772*** 0.002 
.. (0.108) (0.002) 
FDINF(-1) 
-0.159 0.037 0.007*** 
(0.269) (0.243) (0.002) 
FDIOF 
0.959*** .. 0.001 
(0.134) .. (0.003) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.041 0.241 -0.004 
(0.269) (0.235) (0.002) 
RD 
25.845 -13.707 .. 
(17.085) (15.954) .. 
RD(-1) 
-25.421 11.480 0.944*** 
(16.288) (15.338) (0.052) 
GDP 
.. .. 0.001** 
.. .. (0.001) 
GDP(-1) 
.. .. 0.003*** 
.. .. (0.001) 
Constant 
23.045 28.379 -3.358 
(93.477) (83.761) (1.503) 
R-squared 0.832 0.847 0.960 
Adj. R-squared 0.785 0.805 0.943 
F-statistic 
17.839 19.970 55.301 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 24 24 24 
Histogram-Normality 0.352 0.296 0.798 
Serial Correlation 0.296 0.054 0.322 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.229 0.080 0.136 














Table 7. 6 Canada 
 FDINF FDIOF RD 
FDINF 
.. 0.343*** 0.003 
.. (0.085) (0.009) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.140 0.140 0.004 
(0.204) (0.111) (0.010) 
FDIOF 
1.122*** .. 0.008 
(0.278) .. (0.017) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.281 0.227 0.004 
(0.269) (0.145) (0.013) 
RD 
0.066 2.581 .. 
(3.835) (2.058) .. 
RD(-1) 
-0.010 -1.877 0.807*** 
(2.523) (1.345) (0.068) 
GDP 
.. .. 0.000 
.. .. (0.001) 
GDP(-1) 
.. .. -0.002 
.. .. (0.001) 
Constant 
-2.218 -2.997 4.492*** 
(23.165) (12.794) (0.772) 
R-squared 0.584 0.728 0.968 
Adj. R-squared 0.503 0.676 0.958 
F-statistic 
7.299 13.945 102.737 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 33 33 33 
Histogram-Normality 0.003 0.040 0.645 
Serial Correlation 0.300 0.769 0.097 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.010 0.647 0.255 














Table 7. 7 The Czech Republic 
 FDINF FDIOF RD 
FDINF 
.. 0.002 -0.001 
.. (0.027) (0.014) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.425 -0.048 0.029* 
(0.535) (0.031) (0.012) 
FDIOF 
0.420 .. 0.166 
(6.186) .. (0.353) 
FDIOF(-1) 
6.507 -0.925* 0.124 
(7.661) (0.379) (0.667) 
RD 
-3.817 1.637* .. 
(15.131) (0.749) .. 
RD(-1) 
4.930 0.275 0.583 
(10.781) (0.715) (0.655) 
GDP 
.. .. -0.002 
.. .. (0.005) 
GDP(-1) 
.. .. 0.006 
.. .. (0.008) 
Constant 
-2.809 -16.274 1.857 
(136.490) (6.078) (9.085) 
R-squared 0.399 0.646 0.857 
Adj. R-squared 0.101 0.350 0.608 
F-statistic 
0.797 2.186 3.434 
(0.589) (0.184) (0.125) 
No. obs. 33 33 33 
Histogram-Normality 0.663 0.771 0.890 
Serial Correlation 0.648 0.016 0.050 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.208 0.159 0.536 














Table 7. 8 Denmark 
 FDINF FDIOF RD 
FDINF 
.. 0.003*** -0.011 
.. (0.000) (0.009) 
FDINF(-1) 
-0.110 0.001 -0.011 
(0.209) (0.001) (0.009) 
FDIOF 
226.858*** .. 5.542** 
(31.948) .. (2.125) 
FDIOF(-1) 
59.181 -0.345 6.727*** 
(60.026) (0.213) (2.117) 
RD 
-6.167 0.045** .. 
(5.098) (0.017) .. 
RD(-1) 
6.380 -0.048** 1.041*** 
(5.369) (0.018) (0.024) 
GDP 
.. .. 0.001 
.. .. (0.001) 
GDP(-1) 
.. .. -0.002** 
.. .. (0.001) 
Constant 
-17.477 0.116** -1.081 
(12.844) (0.042) (1.010) 
R-squared 0.744 0.797 0.990 
Adj. R-squared 0.686 0.751 0.987 
F-statistic 
12.816 17.288 286.562 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 28 28 28 
Histogram-Normality 0.764 0.513 0.111 
Serial Correlation 0.270 0.510 0.782 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.286 0.414 0.327 













Table 7. 9 Finland 
 FDINF FDIOF RD 
FDINF 
.. 0.892*** 0.002 
.. (0.318) (0.012) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.183 -0.940** 0.056*** 
(0.291) (0.376) (0.012) 
FDIOF 
0.431*** .. 0.019*** 
(0.111) .. (0.007) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.099 0.506** -0.021*** 
(0.146) (0.184) (0.007) 
RD 
-0.011 13.405*** .. 
(4.685) (4.539) .. 
RD(-1) 
0.470 -12.688*** 0.918*** 
(3.422) (4.189) (0.026) 
GDP 
.. .. 0.001 
.. .. (0.001) 
GDP(-1) 
.. .. -0.000 
.. .. (0.001) 
Constant 
-5.356 -7.760 0.614 
(10.262) (14.760) (1.120) 
R-squared 0.580 0.688 0.989 
Adj. R-squared 0.493 0.622 0.986 
F-statistic 
6.643 10.567 289.119 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 30 30 30 
Histogram-Normality 0.047 0.001 0.103 
Serial Correlation 0.171 0.751 0.292 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.003 0.147 0.341 













Table 7. 10 France 
 FDINF FDIOF RD 
FDINF 
.. 1.050** 0.001 
.. (0.408) (0.018) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.245 0.779 -0.041* 
(0.219) (0.499) (0.020) 
FDIOF 
0.193** .. 0.008 
(0.075) .. (0.007) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.136* 0.215 0.020*** 
(0.075) (0.182) (0.006) 
RD 
1.435 4.117 .. 
(2.090) (4.852) .. 
RD(-1) 
-2.200 -5.355 0.881*** 
(2.007) (4.672) (0.070) 
GDP 
.. .. 0.001 
.. .. (0.001) 
GDP(-1) 
.. .. 0.000 
.. .. (0.001) 
Constant 
22.693 23.221 0.593 
(13.811) (33.541) (1.452) 
R-squared 0.548 0.713 0.937 
Adj. R-squared 0.461 0.658 0.919 
F-statistic 
6.301 12.922 51.075 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 33 33 33 
Histogram-Normality 0.529 0.004 0.486 
Serial Correlation 0.552 0.043 0.612 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.271 0.015 0.627 














Table 7. 11 Germany 
 FDINF FDIOF RD 
FDINF 
.. 0.069 -0.009 
.. (0.186) (0.015) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.040 -0.175 -0.005 
(0.222) (0.165) (0.013) 
FDIOF 
0.117 .. 0.013** 
(0.314) .. (0.014) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.647* 0.473 0.042 
(0.370) (0.287) (0.020) 
RD 
-0.840 3.372 .. 
(5.206) (3.920) .. 
RD(-1) 
-0.177 -3.837 1.016*** 
(5.405) (4.050) (0.055) 
GDP 
.. .. 0.001 
.. .. (0.002) 
GDP(-1) 
.. .. -0.003 
.. .. (0.002) 
Constant 
18.452 21.522 1.150 
(26.237) (19.782) (2.323) 
R-squared 0.311 0.376 0.966 
Adj. R-squared 0.109 0.193 0.950 
F-statistic 
1.538 2.054 60.326 
(0.230) (0.122) (0.000) 
No. obs. 23 23 23 
Histogram-Normality 0.000 0.538 0.952 
Serial Correlation 0.853 0.040 0.617 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.028 0.242 0.733 














Table 7. 9 Greece 
 FDINF FDIOF RD 
FDINF 
.. 0.547 0.032 
.. (0.388) (0.036) 
FDINF(-1) 
-0.235 0.210 -0.011 
(0.375) (0.388) (0.035) 
FDIOF 
0.519 .. -0.050 
(0.369) .. (0.040) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.215 0.657 0.087 
(0.600) (0.550) (0.048) 
RD 
5.922 -4.763 .. 
(4.301) (4.728) .. 
RD(-1) 
-4.335 3.421 0.747** 
(2.850) (3.190) (0.206) 
GDP 
.. .. 0.002 
.. .. (0.002) 
GDP(-1) 
.. .. -0.003 
.. .. (0.002) 
Constant 
-3.188 5.789 3.008 
(18.213) (18.575) (1.815) 
R-squared 0.539 0.606 0.933 
Adj. R-squared 0.078 0.213 0.776 
F-statistic 
1.168 1.541 5.957 
(0.434) (0.323) (0.085) 
No. obs. 11 11 11 
Histogram-Normality 0.729 0.509 0.906 
Serial Correlation 0.069 0.007 0.005 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.848 0.253 0.406 














Table 7. 10 Hungary 
 FDINF FDIOF RD 
FDINF 
.. 0.540*** -0.032 
.. (0.134) (0.021) 
FDINF(-1) 
-0.190 0.110 -0.022 
(0.254) (0.192) (0.024) 
FDIOF 
0.960*** .. 0.042 
(0.239) .. (0.029) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.219 -0.103 0.062* 
(0.375) (0.283) (0.033) 
RD 
-4.181 3.303 .. 
(2.875) (2.139) .. 
RD(-1) 
0.325 0.146 0.683*** 
(2.884) (2.163) (0.170) 
GDP 
.. .. -0.004 
.. .. (0.004) 
GDP(-1) 
.. .. 0.004 
.. .. (0.004) 
Constant 
99.319*** -67.939** 6.504 
(31.063) (24.588) (3.730) 
R-squared 0.533 0.677 0.907 
Adj. R-squared 0.378 0.570 0.858 
F-statistic 
3.431 6.297 18.233 
(0.029) (0.002) (0.000) 
No. obs. 21 21 21 
Histogram-Normality 0.932 0.870 0.445 
Serial Correlation 0.125 0.117 0.007 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.315 0.066 0.683 












Table 7. 12 Iceland 
 FDINF FDIOF RD 
FDINF 
.. 2.064*** -0.035 
.. (0.086) (0.034) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.147* -0.317* 0.006 
(0.073) (0.150) (0.018) 
FDIOF 
0.475*** .. 0.018 
(0.020) .. (0.016) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.189*** -0.381*** 0.010* 
(0.038) (0.084) (0.005) 
RD 
-5.000 9.453 .. 
(2.952) (6.291) .. 
RD(-1) 
4.220 -7.574 0.894*** 
(3.097) (6.591) (0.117) 
GDP 
.. .. -0.005 
.. .. (0.004) 
GDP(-1) 
.. .. -0.000 
.. .. (0.005) 
Constant 
11.083 -25.124 6.861 
(11.756) (24.313) (6.065) 
R-squared 0.991 0.986 0.972 
Adj. R-squared 0.987 0.979 0.951 
F-statistic 
247.874 151.963 45.258 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 17 17 17 
Histogram-Normality 0.522 0.171 0.186 
Serial Correlation 0.118 0.134 0.085 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.007 0.007 0.022 














Table 7. 13 Ireland 
 FDINF FDIOF RD 
FDINF 
.. 0.022 -0.001 
.. (0.073) (0.001) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.394* -0.076 -0.002 
(0.221) (0.074) (0.001) 
FDIOF 
0.214 .. 0.011** 
(0.717) .. (0.004) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.840 0.059 0.005 
(0.675) (0.224) (0.004) 
RD 
7.882 22.503** .. 
(36.504) (10.466) .. 
RD(-1) 
8.043 -11.423 0.968*** 
(34.082) (10.579) (0.087) 
GDP 
.. .. 0.001 
.. .. (0.001) 
GDP(-1) 
.. .. -0.003** 
.. .. (0.001) 
Constant 
-96.138 -66.432** 1.566* 
(107.846) (31.673) (0.802) 
R-squared 0.254 0.617 0.970 
Adj. R-squared 0.057 0.517 0.958 
F-statistic 
1.291 6.135 79.013 
(0.309) (0.001) (0.000) 
No. obs. 25 25 25 
Histogram-Normality 0.417 0.115 0.700 
Serial Correlation 0.132 0.145 0.180 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.031 0.134 0.034 














Table 7. 14 Italy 
 FDINF FDIOF RD 
FDINF 
.. 0.690*** 0.008 
.. (0.192) (0.017) 
FDINF(-1) 
-0.136 0.569** 0.009 
(0.208) (0.225) (0.018) 
FDIOF 
0.479*** .. 0.013 
(0.134) .. (0.015) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.228* 0.404*** 0.011 
(0.117) (0.127) (0.011) 
RD 
1.186 1.054 .. 
(2.125) (2.556) .. 
RD(-1) 
-2.028 -0.660 1.016*** 
(2.136) (2.603) (0.091) 
GDP 
.. .. -0.000 
.. .. (0.001) 
GDP(-1) 
.. .. -0.001 
.. .. (0.001) 
Constant 
14.565 -6.510 1.062 
(10.294) (12.753) (0.952) 
R-squared 0.429 0.711 0.873 
Adj. R-squared 0.319 0.655 0.836 
F-statistic 
3.906 12.775 23.627 
(0.009) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 33 33 33 
Histogram-Normality 0.643 0.408 0.377 
Serial Correlation 0.066 0.855 0.323 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.002 0.012 0.338 














Table 7. 15 Japan 
 FDINF FDIOF RD 
FDINF 
.. 0.616 -0.129 
.. (0.543) (0.123) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.292 -0.233 -0.201 
(0.196) (0.579) (0.122) 
FDIOF 
0.076 .. 0.103** 
(0.067) .. (0.037) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.108 0.790*** -0.105** 
(0.071) (0.143) (0.042) 
RD 
-0.247 2.229*** .. 
(0.313) (0.787) .. 
RD(-1) 
0.355 -1.884** 0.977*** 
(0.302) (0.800) (0.061) 
GDP 
.. .. -0.002 
.. .. (0.001) 
GDP(-1) 
.. .. 0.001 
.. .. (0.001) 
Constant 
-1.472 -6.548 2.042** 
(1.523) (4.209) (0.898) 
R-squared 0.328 0.754 0.973 
Adj. R-squared 0.199 0.707 0.965 
F-statistic 
2.540 15.980 123.984 
(0.053) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 33 33 33 
Histogram-Normality 0.003 0.026 0.650 
Serial Correlation 0.483 0.701 0.595 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.052 0.122 0.299 













Table 7. 16 Korea 
 FDINF FDIOF RD 
FDINF 
.. 0.133 -0.129 
.. (0.197) (0.090) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.757*** -0.263 -0.204** 
(0.185) (0.201) (0.080) 
FDIOF 
0.208 .. 0.136 
(0.308) .. (0.101) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.029 0.325 0.097 
(0.319) (0.242) (0.120) 
RD 
-0.547 1.019*** .. 
(0.518) (0.344) .. 
RD(-1) 
0.456 -0.561 0.872*** 
(0.540) (0.418) (0.095) 
GDP 
.. .. 0.011*** 
.. .. (0.003) 
GDP(-1) 
.. .. -0.008*** 
.. .. (0.003) 
Constant 
4.137 -7.390* -0.006 
(5.426) (4.008) (3.549) 
R-squared 0.530 0.918 0.993 
Adj. R-squared 0.383 0.893 0.989 
F-statistic 
3.607 36.102 278.176 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 22 22 22 
Histogram-Normality 0.065 0.227 0.128 
Serial Correlation 0.014 0.450 0.016 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.484 0.100 0.320 












Table 7. 17 Luxembourg 
 FDINF FDIOF RD 
FDINF 
.. 0.207 -0.001 
.. (0.399) (0.002) 
FDINF(-1) 
-0.614 0.274 -0.001 
(0.463) (0.438) (0.001) 
FDIOF 
0.564 .. -0.000 
(0.107) .. (0.001) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.038 -0.139 -0.001 
(0.153) (0.423) (0.002) 
RD 
1.967 -103.110 .. 
(2.262) (292.742) .. 
RD(-1) 
-2.150 266.425 0.232 
(2.152) (258.852) (1.288) 
GDP 
.. .. 0.007 
.. .. (0.012) 
GDP(-1) 
.. .. -0.001 
.. .. (0.014) 
Constant 
10.151 -1,799.233 4.935 
(8.844) (3,985.357) (10.393) 
R-squared 0.767 0.349 0.796 
Adj. R-squared 0.661 -0.465 0.085 
F-statistic 
7.237 0.428 1.120 
(0.000) (0.811) (0.548) 
No. obs. 10 10 10 
Histogram-Normality 0.034 0.695 0.303 
Serial Correlation 0.109 0.591 .. 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.076 0.001 0.739 












Table 7. 18 Mexico 
 FDINF FDIOF RD 
FDINF 
.. 0.119 -0.029 
.. (0.089) (0.021) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.571* -0.285*** 0.028 
(0.317) (0.085) (0.020) 
FDIOF 
1.087 .. 0.084* 
(0.814) .. (0.043) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.205 -0.179 0.007 
(0.637) (0.205) (0.037) 
RD 
-1.033 2.576 .. 
(5.106) (1.520) .. 
RD(-1) 
-2.984 1.286 0.491** 
(4.539) (1.483) (0.195) 
GDP 
.. .. 0.002 
.. .. (0.001) 
GDP(-1) 
.. .. -0.000 
.. .. (0.001) 
Constant 
27.294* -11.942*** 0.869 
(13.307) (4.781) (0.865) 
R-squared 0.246 0.809 0.948 
Adj. R-squared 0.068 0.630 0.912 
F-statistic 
0.784 10.200 26.221 
(0.580) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 33 33 33 
Histogram-Normality 0.585 0.127 0.975 
Serial Correlation 0.262 0.052 0.151 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.383 0.757 0.459 














Table 7. 19 Netherland 
 FDINF FDIOF RD 
FDINF 
.. 0.289* -0.002 
.. (0.167) (0.004) 
FDINF(-1) 
-0.272 0.360** -0.002 
(0.196) (0.168) (0.004) 
FDIOF 
0.357* .. 0.002 
(0.206) .. (0.004) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.433 0.149 0.005 
(0.202) (0.195) (0.004) 
RD 
-1.855 -1.667 .. 
(9.535) (8.588) .. 
RD(-1) 
0.380 -0.554 0.779*** 
(6.975) (6.282) (0.048) 
GDP 
.. .. 0.002 
.. .. (0.001) 
GDP(-1) 
.. .. -0.002* 
.. .. (0.001) 
Constant 
27.887 64.838 3.983*** 
(56.620) (49.633) (1.005) 
R-squared 0.380 0.502 0.967 
Adj. R-squared 0.261 0.406 0.958 
F-statistic 
3.187 5.245 101.249 
(0.022) (0.002) (0.000) 
No. obs. 33 33 33 
Histogram-Normality 0.000 0.000 0.645 
Serial Correlation 0.153 0.915 0.398 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.056 0.962 0.824 














Table 7. 20 Norway 
 FDINF FDIOF RD 
FDINF 
.. 0.437 0.012 
.. (0.576) (0.027) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.707*** -0.708 -0.023 
(0.199) (0.514) (0.025) 
FDIOF 
0.124 .. -0.006 
(0.164) .. (0.014) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.292 0.377 -0.002 
(0.163) (0.331) (0.015) 
RD 
0.762*** 0.044 .. 
(0.089) (0.482) .. 
RD(-1) 
-0.702*** 0.266 0.009** 
(0.138) (0.483) (0.000) 
GDP 
.. .. 0.008*** 
.. .. (0.000) 
GDP(-1) 
.. .. -0.007*** 
.. .. (0.003) 
Constant 
-8.581 22.341* 0.667 
(6.292) (10.731) (1.237) 
R-squared 0.954 0.732 0.999 
Adj. R-squared 0.931 0.598 0.999 
F-statistic 
41.590 5.472 8,865.166 
(0.000) (0.011) (0.000) 
No. obs. 33 33 33 
Histogram-Normality 0.606 0.348 0.071 
Serial Correlation 0.050 0.163 0.891 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.468 0.890 0.753 












Table 7. 20 Poland 
 FDINF FDIOF RD 
FDINF 
.. 0.408** -0.013 
.. (0.180) (0.021) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.391** -0.094 -0.008 
(0.193) (0.181) (0.023) 
FDIOF 
0.569** .. 0.039 
(0.251) .. (0.024) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.019 0.225 0.038 
(0.298) (0.246) (0.024) 
RD 
-2.023 4.218** .. 
(2.350) (1.757) .. 
RD(-1) 
-1.216 -1.406 0.542*** 
(1.721) (1.439) (0.103) 
GDP 
.. .. -0.002 
.. .. (0.002) 
GDP(-1) 
.. .. 0.005** 
.. .. (0.002) 
Constant 
47.787*** -33.326** 2.759 
(16.262) (14.858) (1.633) 
R-squared 0.686 0.732 0.938 
Adj. R-squared 0.594 0.653 0.909 
F-statistic 
7.432 9.277 32.303 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 23 23 23 
Histogram-Normality 0.844 0.173 0.664 
Serial Correlation 0.620 0.176 0.991 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.018 0.204 0.264 














Table 7. 21 Portugal 
 FDINF FDIOF RD 
FDINF 
.. 0.781*** 0.014 
.. (0.178) (0.017) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.041 0.161 -0.030 
(0.188) (0.221) (0.016) 
FDIOF 
0.557*** .. 0.005 
(0.127) .. (0.015) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.280* 0.310* 0.039*** 
(0.151) (0.181) (0.013) 
RD 
1.689 0.136 .. 
(1.769) (2.132) .. 
RD(-1) 
-0.930 -1.424 0.991*** 
(1.896) (2.238) (0.050) 
GDP 
.. .. 0.007*** 
.. .. (0.002) 
GDP(-1) 
.. .. -0.002 
.. .. (0.001) 
Constant 
7.606 1.769 -4.437 
(5.360) (6.588) (1.309) 
R-squared 0.494 0.603 0.969 
Adj. R-squared 0.393 0.524 0.960 
F-statistic 
4.886 7.607 104.578 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 31 31 31 
Histogram-Normality 0.529 0.790 0.582 
Serial Correlation 0.661 0.845 0.134 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.053 0.479 0.188 












Table 7. 21 Slovakia 
 FDINF FDIOF RD 
FDINF 
.. 0.019 0.013 
.. (0.202) (0.034) 
FDINF(-1) 
-0.106 -0.060 0.002 
(0.264) (0.200) (0.030) 
FDIOF 
0.033 .. -0.028 
(0.353) .. (0.040) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.094 -0.353 -0.007 
(0.355) (0.253) (0.042) 
RD 
2.855 -0.698 .. 
(1.981) (1.597) .. 
RD(-1) 
-0.313 0.086 0.427 
(0.275) (0.217) (0.370) 
GDP 
.. .. 0.027 
.. .. (0.016) 
GDP(-1) 
.. .. -0.016 
.. .. (0.017) 
Constant 
30.233 20.091 -2.812 
(30.608) (23.369) (5.549) 
R-squared 0.173 0.135 0.855 
Adj. R-squared 0.135 0.021 0.771 
F-statistic 
0.439 0.427 10.123 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 33 33 33 
Histogram-Normality 0.444 0.000 0.748 
Serial Correlation 0.003 0.030 0.000 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.007 0.975 0.426 













Table 7. 22 Spain 
 FDINF FDIOF RD 
FDINF 
.. 0.392 0.006 
.. (0.406) (0.011) 
FDINF(-1) 
-0.216 -1.151 0.012 
(0.209) (0.388) (0.012) 
FDIOF 
0.089 .. 0.014 
(0.091) .. (0.005) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.289 0.858*** -0.000 
(0.127) (0.241) (0.008) 
RD 
1.518 3.955 .. 
(1.594) (3.328) .. 
RD(-1) 
-0.843 -2.790 0.906*** 
(1.278) (2.660) (0.002) 
GDP 
.. .. 0.004*** 
.. .. (0.001) 
GDP(-1) 
.. .. -0.003*** 
.. .. (0.000) 
Constant 
11.871** 8.671 -0.052 
(5.962) (13.377) (0.443) 
R-squared 0.689 0.737 0.983 
Adj. R-squared 0.630 0.687 0.979 
F-statistic 
7.897 14.588 204.456 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 33 33 33 
Histogram-Normality 0.700 0.033 0.633 
Serial Correlation 0.402 0.988 0.005 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.007 0.096 0.041 














Table 7. 23 Sweden 
 FDINF FDIOF RD 
FDINF 
.. 0.465** 0.049 
.. (0.142) (0.021) 
FDINF(-1) 
-0.653 0.551* 0.043 
(0.592) (0.245) (0.035) 
FDIOF 
1.563** .. -0.090 
(0.479) .. (0.047) 
FDIOF(-1) 
1.689 -1.116** -0.035 
(0.933) (0.400) (0.059) 
RD 
4.750 -0.802 .. 
(5.867) (3.429) .. 
RD(-1) 
2.661 -4.318 -0.285 
(8.389) (4.098) (0.391) 
GDP 
.. .. 0.008 
.. .. (0.003) 
GDP(-1) 
.. .. -0.000 
.. .. (0.002) 
Constant 
-345.799 235.283 31.627 
(262.703) (124.825) (13.264) 
R-squared 0.924 0.889 0.965 
Adj. R-squared 0.829 0.750 0.843 
F-statistic 
9.728 6.409 7.932 
(0.023) (0.048) (0.116) 
No. obs. 33 33 33 
Histogram-Normality 0.597 0.718 0.186 
Serial Correlation 0.205 0.066 0.085 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.901 0.529 0.022 













Table 7. 24 Turkey 
 FDINF FDIOF RD 
FDINF 
.. 0.407 0.014 
.. (0.346) (0.035) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.794*** -0.813** 0.026 
(0.204) (0.366) (0.040) 
FDIOF 
0.185 .. 0.019 
(0.157) .. (0.022) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.010 -0.436** 0.014 
(0.147) (0.191) (0.020) 
RD 
1.695 2.304 .. 
(1.752) (2.610) .. 
RD(-1) 
-1.976 0.411 0.896*** 
(1.729) (2.658) (0.093) 
GDP 
.. .. 0.002 
.. .. (0.002) 
GDP(-1) 
.. .. -0.001 
.. .. (0.002) 
Constant 
3.399 -14.637 -0.359 
(4.307) (5.449) (1.094) 
R-squared 0.738 0.528 0.972 
Adj. R-squared 0.660 0.389 0.959 
F-statistic 
9.561 3.803 75.377 
(0.000) (0.017) (0.000) 
No. obs. 23 23 23 
Histogram-Normality 0.000 0.000 0.692 
Serial Correlation 0.107 0.002 0.936 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.854 0.020 0.027 














Table 7. 25 The United Kingdom 
 FDINF FDIOF RD 
FDINF 
.. 0.972** 0.014** 
.. (0.354) (0.006) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.412** -0.257 0.004 
(0.179) (0.380) (0.006) 
FDIOF 
0.262*** .. 0.000 
(0.095) .. (0.003) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.132 0.338 -0.000 
(0.108) (0.202) (0.001) 
RD 
13.322* 5.743 .. 
(7.205) (14.864) .. 
RD(-1) 
-12.171* -4.837 0.879*** 
(6.336) (13.145) (0.026) 
GDP 
.. .. -0.001 
.. .. (0.001) 
GDP(-1) 
.. .. 0.001 
.. .. (0.001) 
Constant 
-2.142 -7.417 2.352** 
(20.083) (38.653) (0.981) 
R-squared 0.653 0.523 0.984 
Adj. R-squared 0.575 0.414 0.978 
F-statistic 
8.299 4.828 172.394 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 33 33 33 
Histogram-Normality 0.000 0.363 0.983 
Serial Correlation 0.671 0.012 0.072 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.463 0.001 0.260 














Table 7. 26 The United States 
 FDINF FDIOF RD 
FDINF 
.. 0.504* 0.022 
.. (0.261) (0.023) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.461*** -0.182 0.023 
(0.150) (0.243) (0.022) 
FDIOF 
0.258* .. -0.006 
(0.133) .. (0.017) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.078 0.371* 0.020 
(0.150) (0.198) (0.017) 
RD 
2.712** -0.215 .. 
(1.115) (1.733) .. 
RD(-1) 
-2.539** -0.149 0.781*** 
(0.993) (1.559) (0.081) 
GDP 
.. .. 0.026*** 
.. .. (0.005) 
GDP(-1) 
.. .. -0.016*** 
.. .. (0.004) 
Constant 
0.144 12.125 -4.336** 
(8.522) (11.664) (1.656) 
R-squared 0.628 0.405 0.968 
Adj. R-squared 0.554 0.287 0.959 
F-statistic 
8.459 3.411 101.847 
(0.000) (0.017) (0.000) 
No. obs. 33 33 33 
Histogram-Normality 0.599 0.154 0.493 
Serial Correlation 0.176 0.158 0.027 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.021 0.114 0.619 
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Table 8. 4 Australia 
 FDINF FDIOF EXP IMP 
FDINF 
.. 0.367** 0.226* -0.229 
.. (0.144) (0.130) (0.160) 
FDINF(-1) 
-0.112 -0.250 0.193 -0.225 
(0.201) (0.158) (0.137) (0.165) 
FDIOF 
0.543** .. -0.013 0.009 
(0.213) .. (0.168) (0.202) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.262 0.210 -0.184 0.208 
(0.245) (0.202) (0.173) (0.209) 
EXP 
0.457* -0.018 .. 1.204*** 
(0.264) (0.229) .. (0.015) 
EXP(-1) 
0.011 0.009 0.330** -0.400** 
(0.244) (0.201) (0.159) (0.192) 
IMP 
-0.318 0.009 0.827*** .. 
(0.222) (0.190) (0.010) .. 
IMP(-1) 
-0.018 0.019 -0.306** 0.371** 
(0.206) (0.169) (0.132) (0.159) 
Constant 
-1.360 0.807 12.418*** -15.232*** 
(5.810) (4.780) (3.287) (3.931) 
R-squared 0.889 0.582 0.999 0.999 
Adj. R-squared 0.859 0.469 0.999 0.999 
F-statistic 
29.758 5.164 5,577.011 5,292.966 
(0.000) (0.650) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.635 0.837 0.164 0.099 
Serial Correlation 0.054 0.226 0.400 0.475 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.201 0.163 0.094 0.151 









Table 8. 5 Austria 
 FDINF FDIOF EXP IMP 
FDINF 
.. 0.735*** -0.225 0.137 
.. (0.124) (0.231) (0.236) 
FDINF(-1) 
-0.434 0.373** 0.052 -0.107 
(0.180) (0.179) (0.239) (0.241) 
FDIOF 
0.781*** .. 0.508 -0.314 
(0.132) .. (0.221) (0.237) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.193 -0.094 -0.055** 0.077 
(0.171) (0.412) (0.210) (0.212) 
EXP 
-0.156 0.331** .. 0.969*** 
(0.160) (0.144) .. (0.055) 
EXP(-1) 
-0.084 0.044 0.346** -0.319** 
(0.125) (0.122) (0.136) (0.140) 
IMP 
0.093 -0.201 0.951*** .. 
(0.160) (0.152) (0.054) .. 
IMP(-1) 
0.097 -0.097 -0.265** 0.278** 
(0.114) (0.110) (0.128) (0.129) 
Constant 
24.391* -30.831** -8.033 22.366 
(12.554) (11.555) (16.073) (15.703) 
R-squared 0.714 0.897 0.991 0.987 
Adj. R-squared 0.637 0.870 0.988 0.984 
F-statistic 
9.289 32.484 408.335 292.588 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.114 0.000 0.884 0.660 
Serial Correlation 0.534 0.088 0.004 0.001 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.728 0.566 0.013 0.035 












Table 8. 6 Belgium 
 FDINF FDIOF EXP IMP 
FDINF 
.. 0.750*** 0.073 -0.082* 
.. (0.087) (0.047) (0.049) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.276 -0.227 -0.072 0.093 
(0.217) (0.188) (0.052) (0.053) 
FDIOF 
1.005*** .. -0.055 0.063 
(0.117) .. (0.056) (0.058) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.272 0.365* 0.028 -0.041 
(0.230) (0.190) (0.056) (0.058) 
EXP 
1.267 -0.713 .. 1.043*** 
(0.809) (0.719) .. (0.030) 
EXP(-1) 
-1.067 0.895 0.815*** -0.842*** 
(0.791) (0.685) (0.106) (0.117) 
IMP 
-1.280 0.739 0.940*** .. 
(0.763) (0.680) (0.027) .. 
IMP(-1) 
1.099 -0.911 -0.782*** 0.819*** 
(0.738) (0.640) (0.094) (0.101) 
Constant 
-14.281 -5.268 27.438 -23.324 
(71.623) (61.927) (16.286) (17.511) 
R-squared 0.841 0.865 0.992 0.991 
Adj. R-squared 0.794 0.825 0.989 0.990 
F-statistic 
18.150 21.942 411.710 445.621 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 32 32 32 32 
Histogram-Normality 0.001 0.094 0.378 0.643 
Serial Correlation 0.359 0.147 0.829 0.843 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.124 0.009 0.963 0.899 












Table 8. 7 Canada 
 FDINF FDIOF EXP IMP 
FDINF 
.. 0.260** 0.174 -0.011 
.. (0.097) (0.203) (0.212) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.210 0.172 -0.270 0.178 
(0.199) (0.109) (0.207) (0.217) 
FDIOF 
0.829** .. 0.297 0.106 
(0.310) .. (0.363) (0.378) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.206 0.315** -0.097 -0.112 
(0.289) (0.151) (0.305) (0.315) 
EXP 
0.158 0.084 .. 0.854*** 
(0.184) (0.103) .. (0.113) 
EXP(-1) 
-0.112 -0.049 0.760*** -0.702*** 
(0.173) (0.097) (0.105) (0.128) 
IMP 
-0.009 0.028 0.803*** .. 
(0.181) (0.101) (0.106) .. 
IMP(-1) 
0.039 -0.021 -0.598*** 0.711*** 
(0.167) (0.093) (0.130) (0.115) 
Constant 
-20.889 -5.420 8.078 37.857 
(17.110) (9.787) (18.395) (17.532) 
R-squared 0.618 0.756 0.952 0.931 
Adj. R-squared 0.515 0.689 0.940 0.913 
F-statistic 
6.015 11.428 74.628 50.465 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.000 0.008 0.330 0.869 
Serial Correlation 0.366 0.125 0.904 0.006 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.016 0.686 0.007 0.009 












Table 8. 8 The Czech Republic 
 FDINF FDIOF EXP IMP 
FDINF 
.. -0.007 0.327 -0.334 
.. (0.020) (0.234) (0.222) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.062 -0.041* -0.034 0.157 
(0.656) (0.017) (0.374) (0.356) 
FDIOF 
-4.555 .. 3.246 0.300 
(12.206) .. (6.897) (6.906) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-8.637 -1.544** 5.051 -0.727 
(20.771) (0.365) (11.839) (11.796) 
EXP 
1.005 0.016 .. 0.918*** 
(0.718) (0.034) .. (0.164) 
EXP(-1) 
0.409 0.069 0.248 -0.338 
(1.292) (0.040) (0.736) (0.708) 
IMP 
-1.080 0.001 0.966*** .. 
(0.718) (0.036) (0.172) .. 
IMP(-1) 
-0.133 -0.053 -0.241 0.359 
(0.995) (0.030) (0.556) (0.525) 
Constant 
3.494 -3.460* -14.194 23.765 
(56.367) (1.471) (31.386) (29.035) 
R-squared 0.664 0.926 0.995 0.994 
Adj. R-squared 0.076 0.797 0.985 0.983 
F-statistic 
1.129 7.167 107.286 90.354 
(0.481) (0.038) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 12 12 12 12 
Histogram-Normality 0.916 0.674 0.959 0.776 
Serial Correlation 0.012 0.004 0.052 0.017 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.763 0.281 0.573 0.463 













Table 8. 9 Denmark 
 FDINF FDIOF EXP IMP 
FDINF 
.. -0.591*** -0.251 0.203 
.. (0.313) (0.196) (0.193) 
FDINF(-1) 
-0.231 -0.024 -0.065 0.079 
(0.181) (0.388) (0.191) (0.187) 
FDIOF 
246.307*** .. 74.919 -59.297 
(20.722) .. (52.097) (51.660) 
FDIOF(-1) 
67.844 -0.159 13.573 -19.959 
(49.392) (0.188) (52.611) (51.384) 
EXP 
-0.237 0.001 .. 0.950*** 
(0.185) (0.001) .. (0.046) 
EXP(-1) 
0.321* -0.001* 0.845*** -0.772*** 
(0.180) (0.001) (0.105) (0.118) 
IMP 
0.200 -0.001 0.993*** .. 
(0.191) (0.001) (0.048) .. 
IMP(-1) 
-0.338* 0.001* -0.845*** 0.817*** 
(0.687) (0.001) (0.110) (0.110) 
Constant 
1.687 0.010 5.218 -2.267 
(10.351) (0.038) (10.615) (10.423) 
R-squared 0.895 0.891 0.987 0.986 
Adj. R-squared 0.867 0.861 0.983 0.982 
F-statistic 
1.661 30.328 227.660 254.326 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.948 0.943 0.826 0.688 
Serial Correlation 0.245 0.511 0.933 0.784 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.597 0.732 0.232 0.124 












Table 8. 10 Finland 
 FDINF FDIOF EXP IMP 
FDINF 
.. 0.762*** 0.203 -0.199 
.. (0.241) (0.165) (0.164) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.318 -0.691** 0.153 -0.046 
(0.220) (0.302) (0.196) (0.196) 
FDIOF 
0.364*** .. -0.005 0.037 
(0.115) .. (0.117) (0.116) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.193 0.491** 0.052 -0.009 
(0.143) (0.191) (0.128) (0.127) 
EXP 
0.270 -0.014 .. 0.934*** 
(0.220) (0.330) .. (0.064) 
EXP(-1) 
-0.184 0.276 0.775*** -0.713*** 
(0.212) (0.307) (0.108) (0.121) 
IMP 
-0.270 0.104 0.953*** .. 
(0.222) (0.330) (0.065) .. 
IMP(-1) 
0.216 -0.368 -0.817** 0.841*** 
(0.223) (0.321) (0.114) (0.104) 
Constant 
-3.882 2.564 28.919 -21.870 
(16.216) (23.489) (12.891) (13.267) 
R-squared 0.418 0.531 0.997 0.970 
Adj. R-squared 0.261 0.405 0.958 0.961 
F-statistic 
2.664 4.212 108.653 118.766 
(0.032) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.000 0.000 0.540 0.328 
Serial Correlation 0.311 0.663 0.540 0.338 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.368 0.348 0.535 0.814 












Table 8. 11 France 
 FDINF FDIOF EXP IMP 
FDINF 
.. 0.619*** 0.594*** -0.630*** 
.. (0.388) (0.163) (0.192) 
FDINF(-1) 
-0.385 1.124** 0.468** -0.495** 
(0.192) (0.478) (0.190) (0.219) 
FDIOF 
0.248*** .. -0.211*** 0.243*** 
(0.059) .. (0.067) (0.075) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.034 0.164 -0.067 0.065 
(0.058) (0.147) (0.058) (0.067) 
EXP 
0.568 -1.318*** .. 1.122*** 
(0.156) (0.416) .. (0.035) 
EXP(-1) 
-0.025 0.706* 0.467*** -0.568*** 
(0.160) (0.384) (0.135) (0.149) 
IMP 
-0.466*** 1.175*** 0.869*** .. 
(0.142) (0.364) (0.027) .. 
IMP(-1) 
0.065 -0.740** -0.476*** 0.589*** 
(0.145) (0.343) (0.116) (0.149) 
Constant 
-27.773*** 33.965 30.922*** -31.595*** 
(7.861) (23.530) (7.678) (9.233) 
R-squared 0.719 0.782 0.992 0.994 
Adj. R-squared 0.644 0.723 0.990 0.992 
F-statistic 
9.523 13.322 481.565 587.884 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.004 0.333 0.798 0.756 
Serial Correlation 0.880 0.794 0.514 0.323 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.763 0.161 0.462 0.716 












Table 8. 12 Germany 
 FDINF FDIOF EXP IMP 
FDINF 
.. 0.085 0.087 -0.091 
.. (0.199) (0.167) (0.144) 
FDINF(-1) 
-0.029 -0.217 0.245 -0.182 
(0.225) (0.) (0.145) (0.128) 
FDIOF 
0.125 .. 0.184 -0.132 
(0.292) .. (0.199) (0.173) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.796** 0.540* -0.428 0.381* 
(0.333) (0.290) (0.246) (0.212) 
EXP 
0.180 0.261 .. 0.836*** 
(0.346) (0.282) .. (0.053) 
EXP(-1) 
-0.016 -0.112 0.705*** -0.494** 
(0.385) (0.318) (0.206) (0.198) 
IMP 
-0.252 -0.251 1.119*** .. 
(0.399) (0.329) (0.071) .. 
IMP(-1) 
-0.057 0.071 -0.700** 0.511** 
(0.433) (0.358) (0.248) (0.228) 
Constant 
32.232 16.053 -26.917 31.72* 
(27.380) (23.228) (18.665) (15.261) 
R-squared 0.412 0.379 0.992 0.989 
Adj. R-squared 0.170 0.123 0.989 0.985 
F-statistic 
1.704 1.480 314.361 232.265 
(0.174) (0.239) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 25 25 25 25 
Histogram-Normality 0.000 0.532 0.036 0.185 
Serial Correlation 0.696 0.190 0.613 0.454 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.061 0.067 0.832 0.843 












Table 8. 13 Greece 
 FDINF FDIOF EXP IMP 
FDINF 
.. -0.052 -0.427 0.754 
.. (0.160) (0.449) (0.541) 
FDINF(-1) 
-0.125 -0.029 -0.998** 0.998 
(0.247) (0.178) (0.459) (0.589) 
FDIOF 
-0.100 .. -0.966 1.846** 
(0.310) .. (0.601) (0.672) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.157 -0.072 -0.888 1.547* 
(0.353) (0.254) (0.700) (0.830) 
EXP 
-0.101 -0.118 .. 1.137*** 
(0.106) (0.074) .. (0.107) 
EXP(-1) 
0.029 0.067 0.767*** -0.837*** 
(0.098) (0.069) (0.108) (0.166) 
IMP 
0.117 0.148** 0.746*** .. 
(0.084) (0.054) (0.070) .. 
IMP(-1) 
-0.033 -0.061 -0.454*** 0.573*** 
(0.068) (0.047) (0.098) (0.118) 
Constant 
2.011 -7.502** -10.158 23.450* 
(4.937) (3.142) (9.920) (11.417) 
R-squared 0.276 0.708 0.982 0.986 
Adj. R-squared 0.022 0.606 0.976 0.981 
F-statistic 
1.088 6.924 161.287 204.428 
(0.407) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 28 28 28 28 
Histogram-Normality 0.990 0.508 0.153 0.134 
Serial Correlation 0.080 0.043 0.683 0.720 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.015 0.062 0.975 0.934 












Table 8. 14 Hungary 
 FDINF FDIOF EXP IMP 
FDINF 
.. 0.489 0.310 -0.323 
.. (0.115) (0.320) (0.318) 
FDINF(-1) 
-0.193 0.129*** 0.102 -0.234 
(0.265) (0.175) (0.344) (0.338) 
FDIOF 
1.115*** .. -0.457 0.523 
(0.263) .. (0.485) (0.478) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.121 -0.110 0.012 0.199 
(0.389) (0.257) (0.500) (0.495) 
EXP 
0.189 -0.122 .. -0.235*** 
(0.196) (0.130) .. (0.146) 
EXP(-1) 
-0.197 0.146 0.666*** 0.965*** 
(0.177) (0.116) (0.233) (0.062) 
IMP 
-0.199 0.141 0.975*** .. 
(0.196) (0.129) (0.063) .. 
IMP(-1) 
0.137 -0.106 -0.561*** -0.673*** 
(0.181) (0.119) (0.186) (0.158) 
Constant 
77.398*** -46.587** -56.924 69.838* 
(23.008) (16.208) (36.127) (34.356) 
R-squared 0.560 0.734 0.995 0.993 
Adj. R-squared 0.355 0.610 0.992 0.990 
F-statistic 
2.730 5.916 395.013 316.910 
(0.048) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 23 23 23 23 
Histogram-Normality 0.897 0.443 0.000 0.001 
Serial Correlation 0.065 0.069 0.276 0.555 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.588 0.098 0.777 0.686 












Table 8. 15 Iceland 
 FDINF FDIOF EXP IMP 
FDINF 
.. 1.374*** 0.251* 0.001 
.. (0.147) (0.139) (0.213) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.099 -0.811* 0.288* -0.114 
(0.222) (0.391) (0.139) (0.217) 
FDIOF 
0.360*** .. -0.038 0.203* 
(0.082) .. (0.077) (0.102) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.134 -0.374* -0.088 0.228*** 
(0.082) (0.146) (0.057) (0.069) 
EXP 
0.538 -0.304 .. 0.698** 
(0.297) (0.610) .. (0.272) 
EXP(-1) 
-0.307 -1.533* 1.062*** 0.026 
(0.438) (0.787) (0.197) (0.435) 
IMP 
0.001 0.786* 0.342** .. 
(0.223) (0.394) (0.133) .. 
IMP(-1) 
0.058 1.330** -0.580*** 0.104 
(0.327) (0.558) (0.185) (0.319) 
Constant 
-69.500 -68.879 50.089 51.955 
(44.968) (89.943) (30.542) (44.926) 
R-squared 0.934 0.931 0.959 0.936 
Adj. R-squared 0.912 0.908 0.945 0.915 
F-statistic 
42.574 40.345 70.502 44.273 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 29 29 29 29 
Histogram-Normality 0.000 0.373 0.728 0.405 
Serial Correlation 0.116 0.006 0.050 0.023 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.117 0.151 0.115 0.499 












Table 8. 16 Ireland 
 FDINF FDIOF EXP IMP 
FDINF 
.. 0.315*** 0.065* -0.073** 
.. (0.107) (0.037) (0.035) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.278 -0.148 0.087** -0.080* 
(0.249) (0.143) (0.042) (0.041) 
FDIOF 
0.963*** .. -0.076 0.068 
(0.326) .. (0.068) (0.066) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.494 0.780** 0.100 -0.062 
(0.664) (0.343) (0.119) (0.116) 
EXP 
2.030* -0.768 .. 0.936*** 
(1.160) (0.692) .. (0.057) 
EXP(-1) 
-1.656 1.153* 0.691*** -0.598*** 
(1.054) (0.585) (0.128) (0.141) 
IMP 
-2.397** 0.738 0.994*** .. 
(1.167) (0.716) (0.060) .. 
IMP(-1) 
1.934* -1.125* -0.638*** 0.604*** 
(1.024) (0.584) (0.140) (0.149) 
Constant 
32.530 -23.429 -4.148 7.466 
(67.343) (38.383) (12.120) (11.674) 
R-squared 0.584 0.734 0.997 0.996 
Adj. R-squared 0.438 0.641 0.997 0.995 
F-statistic 
4.012 7.879 1,159.956 853.190 
(0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 33 33 33 33 
Histogram-Normality 0.141 0.166 0.520 0.528 
Serial Correlation 0.065 0.419 0.125 0.123 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.508 0.078 0.271 0.114 












Table 8. 17 Italy 
 FDINF FDIOF EXP IMP 
FDINF 
.. 0.473** -0.291 0.397 
.. (0.198) (0.331) (0.347) 
FDINF(-1) 
-0.044 0.315 0.307 -0.023 
(0.214) (0.231) (0.362) (0.388) 
FDIOF 
0.380** .. 0.049 0.244 
(0.159) .. (0.301) (0.315) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.391** 0.291 -0.498* 0.457 
(0.160) (0.190) (0.289) (0.309) 
EXP 
-0.099 0.021 .. 0.949*** 
(0.113) (0.127) .. (0.091) 
EXP(-1) 
0.083 -0.008 0.807*** -0.769*** 
(0.109) (0.123) (0.103) (0.131) 
IMP 
0.121 0.092 -0.600*** .. 
(0.106) (0.119) (0.112) .. 
IMP(-1) 
-0.048 -0.033 -5.616*** 0.677*** 
(0.094) (0.105) (13.148) (0.149) 
Constant 
-5.319 -14.245* -5.616 20.053 
(7.630) (8.117) (13.148) (13.385) 
R-squared 0.447 0.755 0.967 0.969 
Adj. R-squared 0.298 0.689 0.959 0.961 
F-statistic 
2.999 11.450 110.309 117.078 
(0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.288 0.163 0.648 0.353 
Serial Correlation 0.722 0.816 0.370 0.658 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.007 0.002 0.341 0.485 












Table 8. 18 Japan 
 FDINF FDIOF EXP IMP 
FDINF 
.. 0.508 0.776 0.649 
.. (0.477) (0.978) (0.117) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.438** -0.598 0.022 -0.778 
(0.184) (0.492) (1.028) (0.975) 
FDIOF 
0.082 .. -0.645 -0.049*** 
(0.077) .. (0.378) (1.025) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.080 0.705*** 0.434* 0.969* 
(0.080) (0.149) (0.404) (0.349) 
EXP 
0.030 -0.156* .. 0.888*** 
(0.038) (0.091) .. (0.089) 
EXP(-1) 
-0.005 0.118 0.607*** -0.423** 
(0.036) (0.087) (0.233) (0.163) 
IMP 
-0.031 0.236** 0.894*** .. 
(0.038) (0.085) (0.089) .. 
IMP(-1) 
0.016 -0.162* -0.638*** 0.649*** 
(0.034) (0.079) (0.121) (0.117) 
Constant 
-1.054 -0.139 21.197*** -20.190*** 
(1.519) (3.809) (6.529) (6.622) 
R-squared 0.266 0.821 0.952 0.972 
Adj. R-squared 0.069 0.773 0.940 0.964 
F-statistic 
1.349 17.031 74.757 128.464 
(0.368) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.000 0.063 0.808 0.027 
Serial Correlation 0.187 0.640 0.814 0.730 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.146 0.274 0.419 0.061 












Table 8. 19 Korea 
 FDINF FDIOF EXP IMP 
FDINF 
.. 0.073 2.273 -2.048 
.. (0.246) (1.485) (1.575) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.748*** -0.020 -2.170 2.003 
(0.130) (0.246) (1.493) (1.579) 
FDIOF 
0.047 .. -0.745 1.035 
(0.156) .. (1.227) (1.279) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.109 0.962*** 2.023 -2.344* 
(0.168) (0.098) (1.278) (1.325) 
EXP 
0.036 -0.019 .. 1.046*** 
(0.024) (0.030) .. (0.014) 
EXP(-1) 
-0.013 0.006 0.591*** -0.619*** 
(0.024) (0.031) (0.155) (0.162) 
IMP 
-0.030 0.024 0.952*** .. 
(0.023) (0.029) (0.013) .. 
IMP(-1) 
0.008 -0.010 -0.559*** 0.589*** 
(0.023) (0.029) (0.146) (0.153) 
Constant 
1.499 0.873 2.376 -2.661 
(1.068) (1.379) (8.746) (9.167) 
R-squared 0.758 0.869 0.999 0.998 
Adj. R-squared 0.692 0.834 0.998 0.998 
F-statistic 
11.661 24.632 3,129.232 3,090.536 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.044 0.002 0.356 0.217 
Serial Correlation 0.004 0.097 0.187 0.228 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.496 0.994 0.665 0.686 













Table 8. 20 Luxembourg 
 FDINF FDIOF EXP IMP 
FDINF 
.. 0.728*** -0.035 0.037 
.. (0.111) (0.075) (0.075) 
FDINF(-1) 
-0.122 0.149 0.002 -0.001 
(0.201) (0.181) (0.075) (0.074) 
FDIOF 
0.881*** .. 0.068 -0.069 
(0.134) .. (0.082) (0.081) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.179 0.012 -0.012 0.011 
(0.223) (0.205) (0.084) (0.083) 
EXP 
-0.256 0.405 .. 0.986*** 
(0.545) (0.491) .. (0.001) 
EXP(-1) 
0.021 -0.040 0.003 -0.003 
(0.120) (0.109) (0.045) (0.044) 
IMP 
0.276 -0.420 1.013*** .. 
(0.552) (0.497) (0.001) .. 
IMP(-1) 
-0.019 0.037 -0.003 0.003 
(0.121) (0.110) (0.045) (0.045) 
Constant 
26.073 36.612 342.718*** -338.273*** 
(234.652) (213.220) (52.509) (51.821) 
R-squared 0.972 0.869 0.999 0.999 
Adj. R-squared 0.964 0.831 0.999 0.999 
F-statistic 
121.443 22.724 44.659 18.959 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 32 32 32 32 
Histogram-Normality 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Serial Correlation 0.822 0.656 0.054 0.052 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.975 0.941 0.019 0.019 













Table 8. 21 Mexico 
 FDINF FDIOF EXP IMP 
FDINF 
.. -0.582 0.205 0.477 
.. (0.343) (0.451) (0.589) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.156 -0.751 0.464 -0.301 
(0.214) (0.372) (0.492) (0.657) 
FDIOF 
-0.171 .. 0.104 0.307 
(0.101) .. (0.245) (0.317) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.129 -0.035 0.115 0.044 
(0.100) (0.195) (0.238) (0.314) 
EXP 
0.038 0.066 .. 1.192*** 
(0.084) (0.156) .. (0.110) 
EXP(-1) 
-0.026 0.002 0.686*** -0.853*** 
(0.064) (0.119) (0.064) (0.103) 
IMP 
0.051 0.113 0.686*** .. 
(0.063) (0.117) (0.063) .. 
IMP(-1) 
0.002 0.037 -0.444*** 0.558*** 
(0.046) (0.085) (0.061) (0.088) 
Constant 
2.727 -15.742* -2.004 21.960 
(4.545) (7.856) (10.565) (13.248) 
R-squared 0.603 0.531 0.977 0.961 
Adj. R-squared 0.496 0.405 0.971 0.950 
F-statistic 
5.648 4.208 160.553 90.619 
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.000 0.000 0.105 0.000 
Serial Correlation 0.049 0.607 0.310 0.363 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.870 0.220 0.483 0.747 












Table 8. 22 Netherland 
 FDINF FDIOF EXP IMP 
FDINF 
.. 0.698*** -0.001 -0.010 
.. (0.183) (0.124) (0.104) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.310* -0.021 -0.028 -0.002 
(0.171) (0.198) (0.102) (0.086) 
FDIOF 
0.604 .. -0.010 0.021 
(0.158) .. (0.115) (0.097) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.022 0.236 0.021 0.008 
(0.160) (0.164) (0.089) (0.075) 
EXP 
-0.029 -0.040 .. 0.083*** 
(0.404) (0.435) .. (0.035) 
EXP(-1) 
0.535 -0.418 0.804*** -0.611*** 
(0.364) (0.401) (0.112) (0.116) 
IMP 
-0.046 0.110 1.163*** .. 
(0.479) (0.514) (0.049) .. 
IMP(-1) 
-0.532 0.379 -0.898*** 0.701*** 
(0.394) (0.435) (0.107) (0.111) 
Constant 
6.522 21.495 -22.107 25.413** 
(26.231) (27.832) (13.660) (10.876) 
R-squared 0.784 0.790 0.997 0.997 
Adj. R-squared 0.708 0.716 0.996 0.996 
F-statistic 
10.359 10.738 1,076.411 865.001 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 28 28 28 28 
Histogram-Normality 0.620 0.458 0.153 0.146 
Serial Correlation 0.153 0.965 0.930 0.778 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.235 0.463 0.859 0.890 













Table 8. 23 New Zealand 
 FDINF FDIOF EXP IMP 
FDINF 
.. -0.939 0.023 -0.005 
.. (1.495) (0.193) (0.221) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.446** -0.175 -0.026 -0.003 
(0.179) (1.529) (0.196) (0.224) 
FDIOF 
-0.016 .. 0.024 -0.026 
(0.025) .. (0.025) (0.028) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.007 0.939*** 0.007 -0.000 
(0.388) (0.225) (0.037) (0.043) 
EXP 
0.024 1.491 .. 1.128*** 
(0.199) (1.500) .. (0.035) 
EXP(-1) 
0.006 0.312 -0.130 0.045 
(0.145) (1.116) (0.141) (0.164) 
IMP 
-0.004 -1.221 0.864*** .. 
(0.174) (1.316) (0.027) .. 
IMP(-1) 
-0.020 -0.301 0.127 -0.052 
(0.133) (1.022) (0.129) (0.150) 
Constant 
9.337 -47.193 44.878*** -40.063 
(15.462) (119.246) (12.570) (15.676) 
R-squared 0.407 0.512 0.997 0.997 
Adj. R-squared 0.247 0.381 0.996 0.996 
F-statistic 
2.549 3.897 1,268.768 1,357.195 
(0.039) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.017 0.000 0.027 0.015 
Serial Correlation 0.270 0.000 0.005 0.036 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.958 0.018 0.364 0.040 













Table 8. 24 Norway 
 FDINF FDIOF EXP IMP 
FDINF 
.. 0.359 -0.155 0.271 
.. (0.255) (0.631) (0.548) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.549*** -0.641** 1.482** -1.361** 
(0.181) (0.254) (0.612) (0.527) 
FDIOF 
0.197 .. 0.910** -0.774** 
(0.140) .. (0.433) (0.379) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.188 0.438 -0.374 0.81 
(0.141) (0.178) (0.465) (0.407) 
EXP 
-0.015 0.159** .. -0.871*** 
(0.061) (0.076) .. (0.010) 
EXP(-1) 
-0.003 -0.047 0.602*** -0.529*** 
(0.053) (0.071) (0.123) (0.107) 
IMP 
0.034 -0.179* 1.145*** .. 
(0.069) (0.087) (0.013) .. 
IMP(-1) 
-0.010 0.058 -0.703*** 0.619*** 
(0.060) (0.080) (0.137) (0.118) 
Constant 
-1.864 9.071* -11.805 10.596 
(3.511) (4.420) (11.133) (9.697) 
R-squared 0.903 0.754 0.999 0.999 
Adj. R-squared 0.877 0.689 0.999 0.996 
F-statistic 
34.685 11.429 44.659 18.959 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.925 0.031 0.000 0.000 
Serial Correlation 0.029 0.048 0.813 0.866 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.191 0.505 0.956 0.954 













Table 8. 25 Poland 
 FDINF FDIOF EXP IMP 
FDINF 
.. 0.401** -0.541* 0.523* 
.. (0.168) (0.307) (0.294) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.515** -0.336 -1.085** 1.037*** 
(0.236) (0.234) (0.369) (0.354) 
FDIOF 
0.448** .. 0.003 -0.001 
(0.188) .. (0.344) (0.330) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.393 0.909*** 0.751* -0.716* 
(0.242) (0.162) (0.396) (0.380) 
EXP 
-0.196 0.001 .. 0.958*** 
(0.112) (0.112) .. (0.004) 
EXP(-1) 
0.003* -0.006 0.037 -0.038 
(0.077) (0.073) (0.128) (0.123) 
IMP 
0.207* -0.000 1.043*** .. 
(0.116) (0.117) (0.004) .. 
IMP(-1) 
-0.005 0.008 -0.044 0.044 
(0.081) (0.076) (0.134) (0.128) 
Constant 
4.364* 0.038 6.666 -6.389 
(2.434) (2.441) (4.076) (3.908) 
R-squared 0.767 0.708 0.999 0.999 
Adj. R-squared 0.707 0.630 0.999 0.999 
F-statistic 
12.363 9.027 8,834.751 9,012.477 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.007 0.000 0.534 0.543 
Serial Correlation 0.829 0.013 0.550 0.546 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.073 0.016 0.268 0.259 












Table 8. 26 Portugal 
 FDINF FDIOF EXP IMP 
FDINF 
.. 0.789*** 0.037 0.136 
.. (0.182) (0.247) (0.375) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.003 0.119 0.470* -0.528 
(0.202) (0.245) (0.236) (0.372) 
FDIOF 
0.530 .. 0.000 -0.040 
(0.122) .. (0.202) (0.308) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.241 0.376* -0.568*** 0.845 
(0.168) (0.199) (0.189) (0.290) 
EXP 
0.023 0.000 .. 1.364*** 
(0.156) (0.190) .. (0.133) 
EXP(-1) 
0.039 -0.094 0.745*** -0.933*** 
(0.130) (0.157) (0.073) (0.169) 
IMP 
0.037 -0.016 0.588*** .. 
(0.102) (0.125) (0.057) .. 
IMP(-1) 
-0.042 0.046 -0.378*** 0.555*** 
(0.064) (0.079) (0.035) (0.061) 
Constant 
0.699 4.624 -1.459 26.363 
(10.519) (12.808) (13.243) (19.493) 
R-squared 0.499 0.558 0.954 0.932 
Adj. R-squared 0.364 0.439 0.942 0.913 
F-statistic 
3.704 4.688 77.965 50.707 
(0.006) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.739 0.001 0.524 0.760 
Serial Correlation 0.377 0.713 0.008 0.000 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.019 0.907 0.314 0.298 












Table 8. 27 Slovakia 
 FDINF FDIOF EXP IMP 
FDINF 
.. -0.094 -0.065 0.038 
.. (0.209) (0.172) (0.175) 
FDINF(-1) 
-0.038 -0.222 -0.474** 0.470** 
(0.322) (0.246) (0.165) (0.171) 
FDIOF 
-0.152 .. -0.094 0.112 
(0.337) .. (0.218) (0.222) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.075 -0.282 0.076 -0.058 
(0.351) (0.266) (0.226) (0.231) 
EXP 
-0.155 -0.1140 .. 0.996 
(0.411) (0.323) .. (0.058) 
EXP(-1) 
0.410 0.063 0.375** -0.295 
(0.279) (0.235) (0.165) (0.181) 
IMP 
0.088 0.160 0.958*** .. 
(0.405) (0.316) (0.056) .. 
IMP(-1) 
-0.365 -0.055 -0.310* 0.241 
(0.244) (0.206) (0.148) (0.161) 
Constant 
77.218 7.024 -6.446 34.451 
(55.432) (46.475) (38.183) (37.865) 
R-squared 0.162 0.230 0.987 0.983 
Adj. R-squared 0.010 0.155 0.981 0.975 
F-statistic 
0.387 0.366 153.870 117.418 
(0.590) (0.652) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 22 22 22 22 
Histogram-Normality 0.512 0.000 0.851 0.823 
Serial Correlation 0.028 0.030 0.037 0.041 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.012 0.833 0.295 0.790 













Table 8. 28 Spain 
 FDINF FDIOF EXP IMP 
FDINF 
.. 0.161 -0.130 0.298 
.. (0.379) (0.254) (0.286) 
FDINF(-1) 
-0.146 -0.983** 0.190 -0.171 
(0.214) (0.372) (0.279) (0.320) 
FDIOF 
0.043 .. -0.216* 0.305** 
(0.101) .. (0.125) (0.138) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.273** 0.800 0.149 -0.151 
(0.125) (0.212) (0.175) (0.200) 
EXP 
-0.076 -0.479* .. 1.072*** 
(0.150) (0.276) .. (0.077) 
EXP(-1) 
0.013 0.248 0.893*** -0.905*** 
(0.157) (0.301) (0.106) (0.152) 
IMP 
0.134 0.519** 0.822*** .. 
(0.129) (0.234) (0.059) .. 
IMP(-1) 
-0.043 -0.239 -0.727*** 0.793*** 
(0.129) (0.247) (0.091) (0.115) 
Constant 
11.316 8.289 2.174 4.778 
(6.613) (13.443) (9.890) (10.349) 
R-squared 0.715 0.791 0.974 0.977 
Adj. R-squared 0.638 0.735 0.967 0.971 
F-statistic 
9.327 14.054 141.292 160.568 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.915 0.503 0.768 0.896 
Serial Correlation 0.514 0.373 0.014 0.047 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.487 0.005 0.721 0.841 












Table 8. 29 Sweden 
 FDINF FDIOF EXP IMP 
FDINF 
.. 0.201* 0.043 -0.052 
.. (0.106) (0.066) (0.058) 
FDINF(-1) 
-0.028 0.394*** -0.016 -0.037 
(0.242) (0.116) (0.082) (0.072) 
FDIOF 
0.602* .. -0.089 0.150 
(0.318) .. (0.114) (0.098) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.375 -0.084 0.029 0.004 
(0.264) (0.157) (0.093) (0.082) 
EXP 
0.372 -0.257 .. 0.852*** 
(0.571) (0.329) .. (0.046) 
EXP(-1) 
0.060 0.176 0.857*** -0.679*** 
(0.585) (0.336) (0.107) (0.115) 
IMP 
-0.575 0.551 1.091*** .. 
(0.642) (0.360) (0.059) .. 
IMP(-1) 
-0.046 -0.332 -0.951*** 0.800*** 
(0.640) (0.364) (0.113) (0.112) 
Constant 
33.067 -11.954 10.403 -3.458 
(28.996) (16.991) (9.905) (8.914) 
R-squared 0.438 0.661 0.989 0.987 
Adj. R-squared 0.286 0.569 0.985 0.984 
F-statistic 
2.890 7.232 323.383 286.804 
(0.022) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.000 0.828 0.797 0.759 
Serial Correlation 0.476 0.851 0.881 0.532 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.580 0.583 0.275 0.162 












Table 8. 30 Switzerland 
 FDINF FDIOF EXP IMP 
FDINF 
.. 0.924*** -0.125 0.051 
.. (0.211) (0.132) (0.126) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.115 -0.126 0.298 -0.240 
(0.241) (0.335) (0.148) (0.142) 
FDIOF 
0.480*** .. 0.153 -0.088 
(0.110) .. (0.092) (0.089) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.025 0.081 -0.105 0.118 
(0.136) (0.188) (0.087) (0.081) 
EXP 
-0.286 0.676 .. 0.900*** 
(0.303) (0.406) .. (0.054) 
EXP(-1) 
0.355 -0.440 0.705*** -0.605*** 
(0.254) (0.355) (0.098) (0.107) 
IMP 
0.132 -0.440 1.022*** .. 
(0.328) (0.448) (0.061) .. 
IMP(-1) 
-0.191 0.163 -0.674*** 0.644*** 
(0.268) (0.374) (0.114) (0.104) 
Constant 
-12.420 32.715** -6.902 5.883 
(12.065) (15.754) (8.028) (7.556) 
R-squared 0.587 0.657 0.995 0.994 
Adj. R-squared 0.467 0.557 0.994 0.992 
F-statistic 
4.877 6.564 735.833 568.351 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 32 32 32 32 
Histogram-Normality 0.592 0.731 0.719 0.668 
Serial Correlation 0.004 0.024 0.625 0.388 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.455 0.836 0.508 0.137 












Table 8. 31 Turkey 
 FDINF FDIOF EXP IMP 
FDINF 
.. 0.616 -0.638 0.853 
.. (0.483) (0.482) (0.604) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.812*** -0.338 0.500 -0.653 
(0.105) (0.480) (0.474) (0.596) 
FDIOF 
0.095 .. -0.228 0.292 
(0.075) .. (0.191) (0.240) 
FDIOF(-1) 
0.011 0.317 0.294 -0.383 
(0.089) (0.217) (0.218) (0.274) 
EXP 
-0.099 -0.228 .. 1.257*** 
(0.075) (0.191) .. (0.018) 
EXP(-1) 
0.031 0.151 0.298 -0.430 
(0.089) (0.225) (0.219) (0.273) 
IMP 
0.083 0.184 0.791*** .. 
(0.059) (0.151) (0.011) .. 
IMP(-1) 
-0.027 -0.109 -0.221 0.320 
(0.069) (0.174) (0.170) (0.212) 
Constant 
2.099 -0.434 9.781 -10.066 
(2.922) (7.496) (7.238) (9.288) 
R-squared 0.781 0.266 0.996 0.996 
Adj. R-squared 0.722 0.068 0.995 0.996 
F-statistic 
13.277 1.344 1,036.208 1,075.370 
(0.000) (0.370) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.000 0.000 0.936 0.937 
Serial Correlation 0.013 0.020 0.412 0.415 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.853 0.029 0.380 0.554 












Table 8. 32 The United Kingdom 
 FDINF FDIOF EXP IMP 
FDINF 
.. 1.049*** 0.022 0.015 
.. (0.267) (0.101) (0.113) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.194 0.144 0.038 0.005 
(0.206) (0.358) (0.108) (0.121) 
FDIOF 
0.355*** .. -0.033 0.050 
(0.090) .. (0.059) (0.065) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.032 0.267 -0.063 0.021 
(0.112) (0.186) (0.057) (0.065) 
EXP 
0.084 -0.367 .. 1.045*** 
(0.379) (0.647) .. (0.077) 
EXP(-1) 
-0.255 0.734* 0.531*** -0.624*** 
(0.259) (0.430) (0.088) (0.091) 
IMP 
0.044 0.443 0.838*** .. 
(0.339) (0.577) (0.062) .. 
IMP(-1) 
0.264 -0.998** -0.445*** 0.613*** 
(0.286) (0.460) (0.122) (0.111) 
Constant 
-28.880 49.107 13.302 -4.201 
(17.504) (30.095) (9.148) (10.592) 
R-squared 0.694 0.660 0.977 0.976 
Adj. R-squared 0.612 0.569 0.971 0.969 
F-statistic 
8.443 7.228 158.408 148.570 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.000 0.008 0.027 0.002 
Serial Correlation 0.020 0.000 0.893 0.642 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.451 0.000 0.838 0.948 












Table 8. 33 The United States 
 FDINF FDIOF EXP IMP 
FDINF 
.. 0.516** -0.130 0.544** 
.. (0.225) (0.210) (0.238) 
FDINF(-1) 
0.637*** -0.305 0.115 -0.548** 
(0.171) (0.260) (0.228) (0.260) 
FDIOF 
0.325** .. 0.073 -0.176 
(0.142) .. (0.168) (0.204) 
FDIOF(-1) 
-0.215 0.482** 0.014 0.222 
(0.159) (0.185) (0.178) (0.214) 
EXP 
-0.111 0.099 .. 0.988*** 
(0.180) (0.228) .. (0.143) 
EXP(-1) 
0.181 -0.268 0.829*** -0.915*** 
(0.171) (0.213) (0.095) (0.146) 
IMP 
0.308** -0.158 0.655*** .. 
(0.135) (0.183) (0.095) .. 
IMP(-1) 
-0.308** 0.250 -0.516*** 0.889*** 
(0.135) (0.180) (0.124) (0.090) 
Constant 
-3.795 7.739 -1.669 6.887 
(4.461) (5.494) (4.878) (5.853) 
R-squared 0.593 0.476 0.949 0.961 
Adj. R-squared 0.484 0.335 0.935 0.950 
F-statistic 
5.418 3.371 68.998 91.654 
(0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. obs. 34 34 34 34 
Histogram-Normality 0.200 0.361 0.591 0.476 
Serial Correlation 0.393 0.353 0.000 0.000 
White 
Hetero-scedasticity 0.407 0.037 0.515 0.104 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
